Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State by Avi-Yonah, Reuven S.
University of Michigan Law School
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Articles Faculty Scholarship
2000
Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal
Crisis of the Welfare State
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah
University of Michigan Law School, aviyonah@umich.edu
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/50
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles
Part of the Taxation-Transnational Commons, Tax Law Commons, and the Transnational Law
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.
Recommended Citation
Avi-Yonah, Reuven S. "Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State." Harv. L. Rev. 113, no. 7 (2000):
1573-676.
VOLUME 113 MAY 2000 NUMBER 7
I HARVARD LAW REVIEW
ARTICLE
GLOBALIZATION, TAX COMPETITION, AND
THE FISCAL CRISIS OF THE WELFARE STATE
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. -IN T R O D U C T IO N .................................................................................................................. 1575
II. INTERNATIONAL TAX COMPETITION AND THE TAXATION OF CAPITAL ........... 1579
A. Taxation of Savings: Portfolio Exemptions, Traditional Tax Havens,
and the G lobal Tax ......................................................................................................... 1579
B. Taxation of Multinationals: Permanent Establishments and
Headquarters and Production Tax Havens ............................................................ I586
i. Demand Jurisdictions and the Permanent Establishment Threshold .................... 1587
2. Supply Jurisdictions and Production Tax Havens ................................................... 1588
3. Corporate Residence Jurisdictions and Headquarters Tax Havens ....................... 1593
C . R evenue L osses ............................................................................................................... 1597
x. Personal Incom e Tax .................................................................................................. 1597
2. C orporate Incom e T ax ............................................................................................... 1599
III. THE PROBLEM OF TAX COMPETITION FROM A GLOBAL
N ORM ATIVE PERSPECTIVE ............................................................................................. 1603
A. Global Efficiency and Global Welfare ........................................................................... 1604
i. Capital Export Neutrality and Capital Import Neutrality ..................................... 1604
2. W elfare Econom ics and Public Choice ..................................................................... 1611
B . E quity: The Tax M ix .................................................................................................. i616
C. Democracy: Th1o Types of Tax Competition .................................................................. 1625
IV THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF TAX COMPETITION FROM EACH
C O UN TRY 'S PERSPECTIVE .............................................................................................. 1631
A. Developed Countries and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State ............................... 1632
B. Developing Countries and Tax Incentives .................................................................... 1639
I. Do Developing Countries Need Tax Revenues? ...................................................... 1640
2. Should Developing Countries Tax Foreign Investors? ............................................ 1641
3. Do Developing Countries Need to Offer Tax Incentives
to A ttract Foreign Investm ent? ................................................................................ 1643
C. Inter-Nation Equity and the Division of Global Tax Revenues ................................. 1648
1573
HeinOnline  -- 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1573 1999-2000
1574 HARVARD LAWREVIEW [Vol. 113:1573
V. SOLUTIONS .......................................................................................................................... 1652
A. E U Proposals and Critique ........................................................................................... 1652
i. The Code of Conduct ................................................................................................ 1652
2. Taxation of Savings .................................................................................................... 1654
3. Taxation of Interest and Royalties ............................................................................ 1655
4. C ritique ........................................................................................................................ 1655
B. OE CD Proposals and Critique ...................................................................................... 1657
i. The O ECD Report ..................................................................................................... 1657
2. Critique ........................................................................................................................ 1662
C. Recom m ended Proposals .............................................................................................. 1666
i. A Uniform Withholding Tax on Portfolio Investment ....................................... 1667
2. Consum ption-Based Taxation of M ultinationals ..................................................... 1670
(a) A G ross W ithholding Tax .................................................................................... 1672
(b) Filing ..................................................................................................................... 1672
(c) T hird-Party Lim itations ...................................................................................... 1672
(d) Refunds ................................................................................................................ 1673
VI. CON CLUSION .................................................................................................................... 1675
HeinOnline  -- 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1574 1999-2000
GLOBALIZATION, TAX COMPETITION, AND
THE FISCAL CRISIS OF THE WELFARE STATE
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah"
This Article examines the increased use of tax incentives as weapons in the international
competition to attract investment. Professor Avi-Yonah argues that the establishment of
tax havens allows large amounts of capital to go untaxed, depriving both developed and
developing countries of revenue and forcing them to rely on forms of taxation less
progressive than the income tax. He points to social insurance programs, many of which
are already on uncertain courses as aging populations imperil their fiscal health, as
likely to bear the brunt of the revenue loss that tax havens cause. Professor Avi-Yonah
contends that both economic efficiency and equity among individuals and among
nations support limits on international tax competition, and he presents a proposal that
accommodates the competing concern for democratic states' ability to set their tax rates
independently. He proposes the coordinated imposition of withholding taxes on
international portfolio investment, with the goal of ensuring that all income may be
taxed in the investor's home jurisdiction. Professor Avi-Yonah also proposes that
multinational corporations be taxed initially in the jurisdictions where their goods and
services are consumed. Under the framework this Article outlines, both developed and
developing nations would be able to preserve the progressivity of the income tax and to
broaden and stabilize their tax bases in time to stave off the fiscal threat to the welfare
state.
I. INTRODUCTION
-n the current age of globalization, capital is much more mobile than
labor. In the previous age, which lasted roughly from 1870 to 1914
(before immigration restrictions), labor was at least as mobile as capi-
tal. This increased mobility of capital is the result of such technologi-
cal advances as the electronic transfer of funds and the relaxation of
exchange controls. The mobility of capital has resulted in interna-
tional tax competition, in which sovereign countries aim to attract
both portfolio and direct investment by lowering their tax rates on in-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. I would like to thank the participants in
workshops at Georgetown, Harvard, Michigan, Minnesota, NYU, Penn, UCLA, and Virginia law
schools, as well as participants in the 1999 Harvard Seminar on Current Research in Taxation, the
G-24 Technical Advisory Group, and the 1999-2000 MacArthur Workshop on Transnational Eco-
nomic Security, for their helpful comments on previous versions of this Article. Special thanks are
due to Bill Andrews, Hugh Ault, Lucian Bebchuk, David Bradford, David Charny, Wouter van
Ginneken, Michael Graetz, Joe Guttentag, Daniel Halperin, Jim Hines, Robert Howse, Howell
Jackson, Louis Kaplow, David Kennedy, Duncan Kennedy, Robert Kuttner, Lance Lindblom, Jack
Mintz, Dani Rodrik, Dan Shaviro, Reed Shuldiner, Joel Slemrod, Deborah Spar, Emil Sunley, Vito
Tanzi, Louis Wells, Philip West, and Bernard Wolfman for their comments, to Stephanie Hunter
for her meticulous and insightfulresearch assistance, and to the Ford Foundation for its generous
support. This Article is dedicated to Orli Avi-Yonah for her unfailing inspiration and love, without
which it would never have been written.
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come earned by foreigners. Tax competition, in turn, threatens to un-
dermine the individual and corporate income taxes, which traditionally
have generated the largest share of revenue for modern welfare states.
The developed countries have responded in two ways: first, by shifting
the tax burden from (mobile) capital to (less mobile) labor, and second,
when increased taxation of labor has become politically and economi-
cally problematic, by reducing the social safety net. Thus, globaliza-
tion and tax competition lead to fiscal crises for countries that wish to
continue to provide social insurance; at the same time, demographic
factors and the increased income inequality, job insecurity, and income
volatility that result from globalization render such social insurance all
the more necessary. These crises pressure nations to limit globalization
(for example, by re-introducing exchange controls), an act that risks
reducing world welfare. This Article argues that maintaining both
globalization and social insurance will require measures that limit tax
competition but preserve each democratic state's ability to determine
the size of its public sector.
From its inception in the late nineteenth century through the recent
rise of payroll taxation, the welfare state has been financed primarily
through progressive income taxation. Unlike other forms of taxation
(such as consumption or social security taxes), the income tax includes
income from capital in the tax base, even if that income is saved and
not consumed. Because the rich save more than do the poor, a tax that
includes income from capital in its base is more progressive than a tax
that excludes income from capital (such as a consumption tax or a
payroll tax). However, greater capital mobility and international tax
competition allow investors to escape taxation easily by shifting capital
to low- or no-tax jurisdictions. Consequently, the income tax's pro-
gressive effect is significantly weakened.
Two recent developments have dramatically augmented individu-
als' and corporations' ability to earn tax-free overseas income: the ef-
fective end of withholding taxation by developed countries and the rise
of production tax havens in developing countries. Since the United
States abolished its withholding tax on interest paid to foreigners in
1984, no major capital-importing country has been able to impose such
a tax for fear of driving mobile capital elsewhere (or increasing the cost
of capital for domestic borrowers, including the government itself). As
a result, individuals can generally earn investment income free of host-
country taxation in any of the world's major economies. Second, tax
havens with strong bank secrecy laws have made it exceedingly diffi-
cult for developed countries - let alone developing countries with
their weaker tax administrations - to collect tax on the foreign in-
come of their individual residents in the absence of withholding taxes
in the host countries. Thus, cross-border investment income can
largely be earned free of either host- or home-country taxation.
1576 [Voi. 113:1573
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A similar threat to the taxing capacity of both home and host juris-
dictions has emerged in the context of productive investment. In the
last decade, competition for inbound investment has led an increasing
number of countries (103 as of 1998) to offer reductions in the effective
tax rate ("tax holidays") to foreign corporate investors.1 Given the
relative ease with which an integrated multinational corporation can
relocate production facilities in response to tax rates, such "production
tax havens" enable multinationals to derive most of their income from
abroad, free of host-country taxation. Moreover, these multinationals
generally manage to escape home-country taxation as well. Most dev-
eloped countries (including the United States) do not dare impose cur-
rent taxation (or, in some cases, any taxation) on the foreign source
business income of their resident multinationals for fear of reducing
their multinationals' ability to compete against multinationals of other
countries. If they did, new multinationals would choose to become
residents of jurisdictions that do not tax such foreign source income.
Thus, businesses can earn income abroad largely free of either host- or
home-country taxation.
If much of both passive and productive income from capital can
escape the tax net, the income tax becomes in effect a tax on labor.
Several empirical studies have suggested that in some developed coun-
tries, the effective tax rate on income from capital approaches zero.
Since the early i98os, when exchange controls were relaxed, nominal
tax rates have gone down sharply. As a result, countries that formerly
relied on income tax revenues now must increase relatively regressive
taxes, such as consumption and payroll taxes, which in recent years
have been the two fastest growing taxes in the member countries of the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).2
Moreover, there is evidence that as an OECD member country's econ-
omy becomes more open, its taxes on capital tend to go down while its
taxes on labor go upA
1 See RAYMOND VERNON, IN THE HURRICANE'S EYE: THE TROUBLED PROSPECTS OF
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 32 tbl.2-1 (1998) (citing UNITED NATIONS, INCENTIVES AND
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT tbl.III.2 (I996)).
2 Consumption taxes represented 12% of OECD members' total revenues in 1965 and 18%
in 1995; payroll taxes rose from 18% to 25% over that time. Moreover, during the same period,
neither the personal nor the corporate income tax has grown as a percentage of total revenues
(the personal income tax accounted for 26% of total revenues in 1965 and 27% in i995; the cor-
porate income tax, nine percent and eight percent, respectively). See infra p. 16i9 tbl.2. The total
tax revenue as a percentage of GDP in developed countries went up sharply during the same
period (from an average of 28% in x965 to almost 40% in 1994), an increase largely attributable
to the rise in consumption and payroll taxes.
3 Because the income tax is imposed on both capital and labor, the stability of its overall re-
ceipts, see, e.g., Vito Tanzi, Globalization, Tax Competition and the Future of Tax Systems, in
STEUERSYSTEME DER ZUKUNFT i i, 19 (Gerold Krause-Junk ed., 1998), may mask this trend.
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At some point, developed countries find themselves politically un-
able to raise income taxes on labor, consumption taxes, or payroll taxes
any further. High income taxes on labor discourage work, high payroll
taxes discourage job creation and contribute to unemployment, and
high consumption taxes (for example, on luxury goods) drive consump-
tion overseas. If developed countries are unable to tax income from
capital and if alternative taxes are not feasible, their only recourse is to
cut the social safety net - a net that is needed more than ever both
because of demographic factors and because of the increased income
inequality, income volatility, and job insecurity that tend to result from
globalization. Thus, globalization leads to a more pressing need for
revenues at the same time that it limits governments' ability to collect
those revenues.
This dilemma threatens to undercut the social consensus about the
value of the welfare state that underlies modern industrialized societies
and to create a backlash against the globalization that produces so
many overall benefits. The previous age of globalization collapsed in
the 1920S in the face of just such a backlash. Maintaining the social
compact underlying the modern welfare state requires a means of tax-
ing cross-border income from capital at rates that approximate the
rates imposed domestically on labor income - that is, it requires a
limit on tax competition. However, any such limit must (as both a
normative and a practical matter) be balanced against the desire of
democratic countries to determine the size of their own public sectors.
This Article attempts first to describe the problems of tax competi-
tion and then to develop possible solutions that both are congruent
with democratic principles and balance the developed countries' need
to maintain their social safety nets with the developing countries' need
to attract foreign capital. Part II describes in detail the ways in which
international tax competition can lead to under-taxation of cross-
border income from capital, as compared with the taxation of domesti-
cally invested capital in developed countries. It seeks to establish that
both portfolio investment income and income from direct investment
can be earned abroad largely free of tax. It then presents the available
data on the magnitude of the resulting revenue losses.
Part III analyzes the problem of tax competition from a global
normative perspective. Tax competition implicates three normative
considerations: efficiency, equity, and democracy. From an efficiency
perspective, tax competition impairs the optimal global allocation of
investment; when the effective tax rate abroad is lower than the effec-
tive rate at home, taxpayers will prefer international investments over
domestic investments that, but for the tax regime, would provide more
efficient returns. From an equity perspective, if capital cannot be ef-
fectively taxed, the tax base will generally shift - regressively - to-
ward labor. Thus, tax competition impairs the income tax's ability to
redistribute wealth from the rich to the poor.
1578 [Vol. 1i3:1573
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These considerations weigh in favor of limiting tax competition.
However, from the standpoint of democracy, each country should have
the autonomy to determine the size of its public sector and the tax mix
that finances it. Thus, Part III concludes by trying to define which
forms of tax competition are acceptable when we balance the effi-
ciency and equity arguments against democracy.
Part IV attempts to describe the costs and benefits of tax competi-
tion from the perspectives of developed and developing countries. For
developed countries, tax competition makes it more difficult to finance
the social safety net, which already faces increasing pressure from both
demographic factors and the side effects of globalization. For devel-
oping countries, tax competition makes it difficult to maintain stable
government revenues; foreign investments do not adequately offset
that loss of revenue. Finally, Part IV attempts to analyze the effects of
tax competition on inter-nation equity: it argues that we should give
preference to the interests of developing countries as we choose among
competing solutions to the tax competition problem.
Part V suggests possible solutions to the globalization dilemma. It
first describes recent proposals by the European Union and the OECD
to curb tax competition and argues that although they represent useful
beginnings, because they are limited to member countries of the EU
and OECD, they are insufficiently broad and therefore likely to be in-
effective in the long run. Part V then seeks to develop alternative so-
lutions, based on the coordinated imposition of withholding taxes by
OECD countries where portfolio investment and the consumption of
goods and services take place, in a way that adequately distinguishes
between acceptable and unacceptable forms of tax competition.
II. INTERNATIONAL TAX COMPETITION AND THE TAXATION
OF CAPITAL
A. Taxation of Savings: Portfolio Exemptions, Traditional Tax Havens,
and the Global Tax
In 1984, the United States unilaterally abolished its withholding tax
of 30% on foreign residents who earned portfolio interest income from
sources within the United States.4 "Portfolio interest" was defined to
include interest on U.S. government bonds, on bonds issued by U.S.
corporations (unless the bondholder held ten percent or more of the
shares of the corporation), and on U.S. bank accounts and certificates
4 See Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 127(a), 98 Stat. 494, 648-50 (codi-
fied as amended at I.R.C. § 871(h) (1994)).
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of deposit.5 This "portfolio interest exemption" is available to any
nonresident alien (that is, any person who is not a U.S. resident for tax
purposes) and does not require any certification of identity or proof
that the interest income was subject to tax in the investor's country of
residence.
The portfolio interest exemption resulted from a fortuitous combi-
nation of three factors. First, the Reagan tax cuts of 1981, which dra-
matically lowered the U.S. effective tax rate,6 and the accompanying
defense buildup created a significant budgetary deficit that the U.S.
government could finance only by borrowing abroad. Second, unlike
other U.S. tax treaties with developed countries, which provide for
zero withholding rates on interest paid from one treaty partner to the
other, the Japan-U.S. tax treaty imposed a io% withholding tax.7
Third, in 1987, the United States decided to terminate its tax treaty
with the Netherlands Antilles, which had a zero withholding rate on
interest and no limitation on benefits to Antilles residents.8 By chan-
neling the loans through a Netherlands Antilles finance subsidiary,
U.S. corporations had been able to borrow abroad without having a
withholding tax imposed on the interest9 Thus, the portfolio interest
exemption was motivated by the desire of both the U.S. government
and U.S. multinationals to borrow abroad without having to bear the
cost of any withholding tax, which, under the circumstances of 1987,
was likely to be shifted to the borrower.
Arguably, none of these reasons for the portfolio interest exemption
is valid today. The U.S. government is in budgetary surplus, and Ja-
5 Id. Interest on loans made by foreign banks was excluded from the exemption to protect the
competitive position of U.S. banks. See I.R.C. § 88I(CX3)(A) (1994). Interest on U.S. bank ac-
counts received by foreigners is exempt. See id. § 8710).
6 See Hans-Werner Sinn, Why Taxes Matter: Reagan's Accelerated Cost Recovery System and
the U.S. Trade Deficit, I ECON. POL'Y 240, 246 (1985) (estimating that the adoption of ACRS re-
sulted in a shift of between $o.8 and $I.1 trillion of foreign investment into the United States).
See Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion
with Respect to Taxes on Income, Mar. 8, i971, U.S.-Japan, art. XIII, 4, 23 US.T. 967, 990.
8 On June 29, 1987, the United States officially notified the Netherlands Antilles of the termi-
nation of their bilateral income tax treaties, effective January I, 1988. See Andre Fogarasi, Rich-
ard Gordon, John Venuti & Diane Renfroe, Current Status of U.S. Tax Treaties, 25 TAX MGMT.
INT'L J. 523, 523 (1996). However, on July io, 1987, the United States modified its notice of termi-
nation to provide that Article VIII (exempting interest paid by U.S. persons to corporations and
residents of the Netherlands Antilles from U.S. tax) would continue in force. See id. The Tr'easury
reached an agreement with the Antilles on a protocol to the limited income tax treaty, to take effect
June 30, 1996, that terminated the U.S. tax exemption on interest paid to Antilles companies that
were not U.S.-owned (that is, not subsidiaries of U.S. companies), and to U.S.-owned Antilles com-
panies both on non-Eurobond debt and on Eurobond debt issued after October i5, 1984. See id. at
523-24.
9 See CHARLES I. KINGSON WITH CYNTHIA A. BLUM, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 229
(x998).
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pan is an unlikely source of funds. 10 Moreover, given the size of the
U.S. bond market and the widely held perception of U.S. bonds as
relatively safe investments in turbulent economic times, both the U.S.
government and U.S. corporations can probably afford to borrow
abroad despite any withholding costs." However, the portfolio inter-
est exemption remains with us.'
The United States's enactment of the portfolio interest exemption
has resulted in a classic "race to the bottom." One after another, all
the major economies have abolished their withholding taxes on interest
for fear of losing mobile capital flows to the United States. 13 Table i
shows the 1993 withholding rates imposed by EU member countries
and the United States on various forms of capital income (interest on
bank accounts; interest on securities, specifically government and cor-
porate bonds; and dividends) paid to foreign residents in the absence
of a treaty.' 4
TABLE I. WITHHOLDING TAXES ON INTEREST, 1993
(percentage rates)
Country Bank Securities Dividends
accounts
Belgium o 10 15
Denmark o o IS
France o o 15
Germany o 0 15
Greece io 10 0
Ireland o o o
Italy io io 15
10 If Japan were a possible source of funds, the tax treaty could be renegotiated to reduce the
withholding rate on interest - especially given Japan's current desire to attract foreign investors.
Interestingly, the reason this was not done in 1984 was probably the desire of Japanese investors to
avoid being covered by the treaty's exchange-of-information article, which could have required
them to reveal their unreported foreign source income.
11 See generally Clive Crook, The State of the World - Fragile but Euphoric, 31 NAT'L J. 86
(ggg); J. Bradford DeLong, Should We Fear Deflation?, i BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON.
ACTIVITY 225, 239-41 (William C. Brainard & George L. Perry eds., 1999).
12 Part V argues that the United States should abolish the exemption unilaterally, given recent
EU developments. See infra pp. 1667-68.
13 The race may have begun earlier than 1984, when the interest on U.S. bank deposits was tax-
free and the Antilles treaty enabled U.S. borrowers to avoid withholding on their interest pay-
ments. See KINGSON WITH BLUM, supra note 9, at 229. But the symbolic significance of enacting
the exemption gave the race a strong push forward, as the resulting capital flight from Latin
America indicates. See infra pp. 1584-85.
14 See VITO TANZI, TAXATION IN AN INTEGRATING WORLD 131 tbl.8-4 (1995); see also Ed-
ward H. Gardner, Taxes on Capital Income: A Survey, in TAX HARMONIZATION IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 52, 60 (George Kopits ed., 1992) (providing similar but not identical fig-
ures).
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Luxembourg 0 0 15
Netherlands 0 0 15
Portugal 15 15 15
Spain 0 0 15
United Kingdom 0 0 15
United States 0 0 30
As the table indicates, most developed countries levy no withhold-
ing tax on interest paid to nonresidents on bank deposits and on gov-
ernment and corporate bonds. These nations do levy taxes on divi-
dends, but dividends (unlike interest) are not deductible, and the
underlying income has therefore already been taxed once.' 5 In reality,
the discrepancy between interest and dividends may be smaller than
the table indicates, for two reasons. First, a significant portion of the
return on equity comes in the form of capital gains, which are not sub-
ject to source-based taxation in any of the countries included in the ta-
ble. Second, the withholding tax on dividends is generally easy to
avoid for sophisticated investors. For example, a foreign investor can
construct a "total return equity swap" in which she receives payments
equivalent to dividends from an investment banker in the source coun-
try, who in turn hedges by holding the underlying stock and receiving
the actual dividends. Most countries do not subject the dividend-
equivalent payments to withholding, and the underlying dividends are
free from withholding because they are paid to a domestic recipient' 6
This situation has led to calls for a "portfolio dividends exemption."' 7
The standard economic advice to small, open economies is to avoid
taxing capital income at its source, because the tax will be shifted for-
ward to the borrowers and result in higher domestic interest rates. 18
IS Moreover, even countries that integrate the corporate and shareholder taxes by giving share-
holders a credit for corporate tax attributable to dividends (and most countries in Table I use this
"imputation" method of integration) generally do not extend those credits to nonresidents. See, e.g.,
Hugh J. Ault, Corporate Integration, Tax Treaties and the Division of the International Tax Base:
Principles and Practices, 47 TAX L. REV. 565, 585-86 (992).
16 See Reuven Avi-Yonah & Linda Swartz, Virtual Taxation: Source-Based Taxation in the Age
of Derivatives, 2 DERIVATIVES 247, 248 (i997); Edmund S. Cohen, Individual International Tax
Planning Employing Equity Derivatives, 4 DERIVATIVES 52, 54 (1998). For other techniques rely-
ing on the portfolio interest exemption, see Gregory May, Flying on Instruments: Synthetic In-
vestments and Withholding Tax Avoidance, 73 TAX NOTES 1225 (1996).
17 E.g., Yaron Z. Reich, 7hxing Foreign Investors' Portfolio Investments: Developments and
Discontinuities, 98 TAX NOTES TODAY 114-71, 198-211 (1998), available in WL 98 TNT 114-
7'.
18 See, e.g., JACOB A. FRENKEL, ASSAF RAZIN & EFRAIM SADKA, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION
IN AN INTEGRATED WORLD 203-07, 214-6 (I99I); see also id. at 2o6 ("We can conclude therefore
that no capital-income tax whatsoever is imposed.., if capital flight to the rest of the world cannot
be effectively stopped."). For further discussion of this advice and its implications, see Part IV be-
low.
1582 [Vol. II3:I573
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However, the countries in Table i include several large economies (the
United States, Germany, and the United Kingdom) in which the tax
would not necessarily be shifted forward, but which refrain from im-
posing withholding taxes primarily out of fear that capital would oth-
erwise move swiftly to other locations that do not impose a withhold-
ing tax. Thus, the Ruding Committee, writing about the European
Community, concluded in 1992 that "recent experience suggests that
any attempt by the EC to impose withholding taxes on cross-border
interest flows could result in a flight of financial capital to non-EC
countries."1 9
Germany is a case in point: In 1988, its government introduced a
relatively low io% withholding tax on interest on bank deposits but
had to abolish it within a few months because of the magnitude of
capital flight to Luxembourg.20 In i99i, the German Federal Consti-
tutional Court held that withholding taxes on wages but not on inter-
est violated the constitutional right to equality; the government was
therefore obliged to reintroduce the withholding tax on interest, but it
exempted nonresidents.2 1  "Nonresidents" may, however, be German
residents investing through Luxembourg bank accounts and benefiting
from the Luxembourg tradition of bank secrecy 2 2
The current situation resembles a multiple-player assurance ("stag
hunt") game: all developed countries would benefit if all re-introduced
the withholding tax on interest because they would gain revenue with-
out the risk that the capital would be shifted to another developed
country. However, no country is willing to attempt to spark coopera-
tion by imposing a withholding tax unilaterally; thus, they all "defect"
(that is, refrain from imposing the tax) to the detriment of all.23
In global terms, this outcome would make no difference if countries
were able to tax their residents on foreign source interest and dividend
income as a portion of all income "from whatever source derived.
24
However, as Joel Slemrod writes, "although it is not desirable to tax
capital on a source basis, it is not administratively feasible to tax capi-
1g COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF
INDEPENDENT EXPERTS ON COMPANY TAXATION 201 (1992) [hereinafter RUDING REPORT].
20 See Leif Mutdn, International Experience of How Taxes Influence the Movement of Private
Capital, 8 TAX NOTES INT'L 743, 745-46 (994).
21 See id.
22 See Suzanne McGee, Tax Inquiry Turns Banking Grayer in Luxembourg, WALL ST. J., July
20, 1999, at Ci (discussing German government investigations of German residents' accounts in
Luxembourg banks); Sleepless in Frankfurt, Again, ECONOMIST, June 20, 1998, at 87-88 (same).
23 The assurance game differs from the more familiar prisoner's dilemma in that the preferred
outcome for each player is mutual cooperation rather than defection from cooperation. See Amir
N. Licht, Games Commissions Play: 2X2 Games of International Securities Regulation, 24 YALE J.
INT'L L. 61, 112-13 (1999); see also MICHAEL TAYLOR, THE POSSIBILITY OF COOPERATION 18-i9
(1987).
24 I.R.C. § 61 (1994).
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tal on a residence basis,"2 because residence-country fiscal authorities
generally have no means of learning about the income that their resi-
dents earn abroad. Even though tax treaties contain an exchange-of-
information procedure, it is fundamentally flawed in two respects.
First, the lack of any uniform, worldwide system of tax identification
numbers means that most tax administrations are unable to match theinformation they receive from their treaty partners with particular
domestic taxpayers. Second, there are no tax treaties with traditional
tax havens,26 and routing the income through a tax haven suffices toblock the exchange of information. For example, if a Mexican national
invests in a U.S. bank through a Cayman Islands corporation, the
Mexican authorities would gain nothing from the exchange-of-
information article in the U.S.-Mexico tax treaty; given the Caymans'
bank secrecy, the American IRS would have no way of knowing that
the portfolio interest paid to the Caymans was beneficially owned by a
Mexican resident covered by the treaty.2 7
Even in the case of sophisticated tax administrations like the IRS,
tax compliance substantially depends upon either withholding at the
source or information reporting. When neither is available, as in the
case of foreign source income, compliance rates drop dramatically.28
The result is that much of the income from overseas portfolio in-
vestments escapes income taxation by either source or residence coun-
tries. Latin American countries provide a prime example: after the
enactment of the portfolio interest exemption, about $300 billion fled
from Latin American countries to bank accounts and other forms of
25 Joel Slemrod, Comments, in TANZI, supra note 14, at 141, 144.
26 "Traditional" tax havens are countries with a low tax rate and bank secrecy laws that protect
depositors' identities. For an attempt at definition, see ORGANIZATION FOR ECON. CO-
OPERATION AND DEV., HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION: AN EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE 21-25(1998) [hereinafter OECD REPORT]. By contrast, "production" and "headquarters" tax havenshave generally high tax rates that provide specific tax exemptions to foreigners; section II.B dis-
cusses the latter types. See infra pp. 1586-97.
27 See generally TANZI, supra note 14, at 78-89. The United States has negotiated exchange-of-information agreements with several Caribbean countries in an attempt to overcome this problem.
See Bruce Zagaris, OECD Report on Harmful Tax Competition: Strategic Implications for Carib-bean Offshore Jurisdictions, 98 WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY 220-17 (1998), available in WL 98 TNI220-17. However, because one holdout is sufficient to provide a haven, these efforts have thus far
been futile.
28 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, INCOME TAX
COMPLIANCE RESEARCH: GROSS TAX GAP ESTIMATES AND PROJECTIONS FOR 1973-1992, PUB.7285, at 6 (1988). Charles McLure estimates that Germany taxes only about IO to 20% of foreign
source interest income. See Charles E. McLure, Jr., Remarks at the VInth Munich Symposium onInternational Taxation (1989), reprinted in MUNICH SYMPOSIUM ON INT'L TAXATION,
INFLUENCE OF TAX DIFFERENTIALS ON INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS 55 (199o) [hereinaf-
ter MUNICH SYMPOSIUM].
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portfolio investment in the United States. 9 Most of these funds were
channeled though tax-haven corporations and therefore escaped taxa-
tion in the country of residence. Estimates of the capital flight from
all developing countries to the United States in the 198os range as high
as $148 billion in a single year.30
Nor is the problem limited to developing countries. Much of the
German portfolio interest exemption benefits German residents who
maintain bank accounts in Luxembourg, and much of the U.S. portfo-
lio interest exemption benefits Japanese residents who hold U.S.
Treasuries and do not report the income in Japan.3 1 It is questionable
how much tax even the United States actually collects on portfolio in-
come that its residents earn abroad other than through mutual funds.
One estimate puts capital flight from the United States between 198o
and 1982 as high as $25o billion.
32
Thus, in the absence of withholding taxes or effective information
exchange, income from foreign portfolio investments frequently es-
capes being taxed by any jurisdiction. This immunity from taxation is
particularly significant because the flows of portfolio capital across in-
ternational borders have been growing much faster than either world
gross domestic product or foreign direct investment (FDI).3 3  Current
29 See CHANDER KANT, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND CAPITAL FLIGHT I (Princeton
Studies in Int'l Fin. No. 8o, 1996); Charles E. McLure, Jr., U.S. Tax Laws and Capital Flight from
Latin America, 20 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 321, 349-50 (1989) [hereinafter McLure, Capital
Flight from Latin America]. McLure writes: "I must admit that, as Deputy Assistant Secretary of
the Treasury at the time this action [the adoption of the portfolio interest exemption] was taken, I
did not fight early enough, long enough, or hard enough against its enactment," mostly because of
the effect on Latin American countries. Charles E. McLure, Jr., International Considerations in
United States Tax Reform, in MUNICH SYMPOSIUM, supra note 28, at 1, 9 & n.12 [hereinafter
McLure, International Considerations]. It is interesting that these estimates were so high, consid-
ering that investing in some forms of U.S. holding (such as bank accounts or investment through
the Netherlands Antilles) was possible even prior to 1984. Apparently, the portfolio interest ex-
emption made a significant difference. In any case, the results hold regardless of when the practi-
cal abolition of withholding took place.
30 See KANT, supra note 29, at 21 tbl.3.
31 See Hiroshi Oda & Masabumi Yamane, Japan, in BUTTERWORTHS INTERNATIONAL GUIDE
TO MONEY LAUNDERING io9, iio (Richard Parlour ed., 1995); Tony Barber, Germans Find Tax
Evasion Good Sport, FIN. TIMES (London), June 29, I999, at 3; Mark Milner, Dresdner Tax Ar-
rests, GUARDIAN (London), Jan. 4, 1996, at 15.
32 See Michael Dooley, Comment, in CAPITAL FLIGHT AND THIRD WORLD DEBT 79, 79 (Don-
ald R. Lessard & John Williamson eds., 2987).
33 Foreign direct investment (FDI) out of the United States grew from $396 billion in i98o to
$1.024 trillion in 2997, while outbound portfolio investment grew from $62 billion in 198o to $1.446
trillion in 1997. Similarly, FDI into the United States grew from $126 billion in 198o to $752 billion
in 1997, while inbound foreign portfolio investment grew from $90 billion to $2.2 trillion in the
same period. See NATIONAL FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL, THE NFTC FOREIGN INCOME
PROJECT: INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, PART ONE: A
RECONSIDERATION OF SUBPART F 11 34, 41 (i999) [hereinafter NFTC PROJECT], reprinted in
NFTC Releases Subpart F Report, i999 TAX NOTES TODAY 58-17, available in WL 2999 TNT 58-
17; Russell B. Scholl, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, The International Investment Position of the
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estimates indicate that international capital flows amount to $i trillion
per day. Although this figure is much larger than income from capital,
it gives a sense of the magnitudes at stake.34
This situation has led such knowledgeable observers as Richard
Bird to write that the weakness of international taxation calls into
question the income tax's "very rationale" and renders its future "far
from bright."35  In section II.C, I try to assess the possible revenue
losses from portfolio investment abroad to determine whether they
really amount to a threat to the income tax. In Part V, I consider pos-
sible solutions.
B. Taxation of Multinationals: Permanent Establishments and
Headquarters and Production Tax Havens
Three types of jurisdictions may, under currently accepted rules,
impose a corporate income tax on income from the sale of goods or
provision of services across national borders: the demand jurisdiction,
the supply jurisdiction, and the residence jurisdiction. The demand
jurisdiction (where consumption of the goods or services takes place)
may impose a tax if the goods or services are provided through a
"permanent establishment" (which need only consist of some physical
presence in the demand jurisdiction).36 The supply jurisdiction (where
United States in 1997, SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, July 1998, 24, 32 tbl.i. In light of these
numbers, the literature that suggests that capital is immobile internationally is puzzling. For a
sample of that literature, see Martin Feldstein & Charles Horioka, Domestic Saving and Interna-
tional Capital Flows, 90 ECON. J. 314 (198o). For an explanation of capital immobility in terms of
information asymmetry, see Roger H. Gordon & A. Lans Bovenberg, Why Is Capital So Immobile
Internationally? Possible Explanations and Implications for Capital Income Taxation, 86 AM.
ECON. REV. 1057, 1059-73 (1996), and for an extension of that argument that derives implications
for optimal tax policy, see Assaf Razin, Efraim Sadka & Chi-Wa Yuen, Tax Principles and Capital
Inflows: Is It Efficient to Tax Nonresident Income? (Mar. 1996) (unpublished National Bureau of
Econ. Research Working Paper No. 5513, on file with the Harvard Law School Library). For a
recent review of the evidence and an argument that Feldstein and Horioka may have been wrong
in 198o and are probably wrong today, see Michael P. Devereux, Investment, Saving, and Taxation
in an Open Economy, 12 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL'Y 90, 91-1o6 (1996).
34 See Erik R. Peterson, Looming Collision of Capitalisms?, WASH. Q., Spring 1994, at 65, 66
(estimating that daily global capital movements increased to well over $i trillion by 1992); Peter I).
Sutherland, Sharing the Bounty, BANKER, Nov. 1998, at 6 (estimating that average daily foreign
exchange transactions grew from $15 billion in 1973 to $1.2 trillion in 1995 and that international
capital flows now exceed trade flows by a ratio of 6o to i).
35 Richard M. Bird, Shaping a New International Tax Order, 42 BULL. FOR INT'L FISCAL
DOCUMENTATION 292, 293, 299 (1988); see also Roger H. Gordon, Can Capital Income Taxes Sur-
vive in Open Economies?, 47 J. FIN. 1159 (1992); Jack Mintz, Is There a Future for Capital Income
Taxation?, 42 CANADIAN TAXJ. 1469 (1994). See generally Charles E. McLure Jr., Tax Policies for
the 21st Century, Keynote Address to the 5oth Congress of the International Fiscal Association,
Geneva (Sept. 1-6, 1996) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) [hereinafter McLure, Key-
note Address].
36 If the goods or services are provided through a subsidiary with a permanent establishment,
the demand jurisdiction may also impose a tax on the income attributable thereto.
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production of the goods or services takes place) may impose a tax on
the income attributable to such production. In addition, the residence
jurisdiction (where the corporation is incorporated or managed and
controlled) has a residual right to tax income that is not taxed at the
source of either demand or supply.
The argument of this section can be summarized as follows: Under
currently accepted rules, the jurisdiction most likely of the three to
want to tax multinationals on income derived therein, the demand ju-
risdiction, lacks the right to tax such income in an increasing number
of cases. The jurisdictions that do have that right, the supply and
residence jurisdictions, are unlikely to want to do so because of tax
competition. Thus, much of the income earned by multinationals from
cross-border transactions is likely to escape the income tax altogether.
i. Demand Jurisdictions and the Permanent Establishment Thresh-
old. - Demand jurisdictions, especially those that can attract corpora-
tions with large consumer markets, are most likely to impose signifi-
cant tax rates on both domestic and foreign corporations. Under the
current international tax regime, as embodied in the tax treaty net-
work, a seller is taxable in a demand jurisdiction only if it has a physi-
cal presence therein. The physical presence test can be satisfied by ei-
ther a "permanent establishment" or, in U.S. terms, a "trade or
business within the United States."37 Most often, the physical presence
takes the form of a branch or subsidiary of the corporation.
38
Traditionally, multinationals had to establish such a physical pres-
ence in demand jurisdictions to gain a significant market share or to
avoid tariff barriers. However, the tariff barriers have all but disap-
peared because of the GATT/WTO tariff reductions, and the rise of
electronic commerce has made selling large quantities of goods or
services into a demand jurisdiction without establishing a physical
presence there increasingly feasible.39 Therefore, although multina-
tionals currently pay some tax in demand jurisdictions in which they
have subsidiaries engaged in distribution, the limited tax base they
provide is rapidly diminishing in the face of technological develop-
ments. Governments cannot rely on receiving revenue from such cor-
37 I.R.C. § 864(b) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
38 See Avi-Yonah, international Taxation of Electronic Commerce, supra note 40, at 535.
39 Most authoritative discussions of taxation of electronic commerce conclude that the most
common forms of such commerce (a web page or even a server located in a jurisdiction) do not
amount to permanent establishments and thus do not meet the taxing threshold of the demand ju-
risdiction. See OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, SELECTED TAX POLICY
IMPLICATIONS OF GLOBAL ELECTRONIC COMMERCE I (1996), available at <http://www.ustreas.
gov/taxpolicy/internet.pdf>.
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porations in the future if the permanent-establishment requirement
remains unchanged. 40
2. Supply Jurisdictions and Production Tax Havens. - Because of
the coincidence between production and consumption in the developed
world, most supply jurisdictions, no less than (and often the same as)
demand jurisdictions, imposed significant income tax rates on both
domestic and foreign corporations. However, a crucial development in
the last decade or so has been the increasing prevalence of production
tax havens. A production tax haven is a jurisdiction that grants a tax
holiday to foreign production facilities located therein, but still levies
an income tax on domestic corporations and individual residents. This
type of haven differs from the traditional offshore tax haven, which
has no corporate income tax (and sometimes no significant tax at all).
This distinction is crucial because it means that a foreign investor in a
production tax haven can enjoy the benefits of government services,
which the government finances by taxing relatively immobile factors
of production such as labor and land, while the investor itself pays lit-
tle or no corporate income tax.
Tax competition has led to the proliferation of production tax ha-
vens. Currently, at least 103 countries offer special tax concessions to
foreign corporations that set up production or administrative facilities
within their borders.41 They include such developed countries such as
Belgium, Ireland, and Israel and such developing countries as Malay-
sia and India. The extent of the tax holiday varies, but in general, the
tax haven reduces its statutory tax rate to io% or less for foreign cor-
porations investing in specified types of facilities or areas within the
jurisdiction. However, the jurisdiction imposes a higher tax rate of be-
tween 30% and 40%42 on local corporations, a personal income tax at
even higher rates on resident individuals, and a VAT.43
Studies by economists have shown that such tax incentives are
quite widespread and that investments in these countries are signifi-
cant. For example, Altshuler and Newlon have studied the 1986 tax
returns of 617 U.S. multinational enterprises (MNEs) and report that
out of 1827 foreign subsidiaries ("controlled foreign corporations," or
CFCs) of such multinationals, 659 were located in countries with a tax
40 For a fuller exposition of this theme, see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, International Taxation of
Electronic Commerce, 52 TAX L. REV. 507, 507-23 (1997) [hereinafter Avi-Yonah, International
Taxation of Electronic Commerce]. For proposals to change the definition of "permanent estab-
lishment" to permit taxation without a physical presence, see section V.C.2 below.
41 See VERNON, supra note i, at 32 tbl.2-i (citing UNITED NATIONS, supra note i, at tbl.III.2).
42 A rate between 3o% and 40% is within the normal range for OECD members.
43 See generally PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, INDIVIDUAL TAXES z998: WORLDWIDE
SUMMARIES (1998) (listing income tax and VAT rates).
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rate below 20%. 44 These CFCs had assets of $51 billion and earnings
of $5.2 billion in 1986, which represented over 40% of the total assets
and earnings of all the CFCs.41 Similarly, Hines and Rice have docu-
mented the extent of U.S. investment in forty-one foreign tax havens
for 1982.46 They show that while the havens had only 1.2% of world
population and 3.0% of world GDP, their share of the foreign opera-
tions of U.S. MNEs was 26% of assets, 21.4% of equity, and 30.6% of
net income (but only 4.3% of employment and 4.2% of property, plant,
and equipment).47
Two specific examples may help to illustrate this phenomenon. In-
tel Corporation, a top-ten multinational, has operations in more than
thirty countries around the globe. The company states: "An Intel chip
developed at a design center in Oregon, might be manufactured at a
wafer fabrication facility in Ireland, packaged and tested in Malaysia,
and then sold to a customer in Australia. Another chip might be de-
signed in Japan, fabricated in Israel, packaged and tested in Arizona,
and sold in China."48 Specifically, Intel has major manufacturing fa-
cilities in Puerto Rico, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Ireland, and
Israel 49 - all jurisdictions that grant tax holidays.50
This phenomenon is not confined to high-tech corporations like In-
tel. For example, the eight General Motors car assembly plants built
since 199o are located in Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Poland, Thailand,
44 See Rosanne Altshuler & T. Scott Newlon, The Effects of U.S. Tax Policy on the Income Re-
patriation Patterns of U.S. Multinational Corporations, in STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL
TAXATION 72, 89, 92, 93 tbl.3.3 (Alberto Giovannini, R. Glenn Hubbard & Joel Slemrod eds.,
1993).
45 See id. at 93 tbl.3.3.
46 See James R. Hines, Jr., & Eric M. Rice, Fiscal Paradise: Foreign Tax Havens and American
Business, log Q.J. ECON. 149, 150-53 (I994).
47 See id. at 152 tbl.i The share of net income in the havens is much higher than that reported
for continental Europe (14.8%), which has 10.7% of world population and 34.5% of world GDP
See id.
48 <http://www.intel.com/intelintelis/sites.htm> (visited Feb. 1, 1999).
49 See Intel Corp., Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 for the Fiscal Year Ended December 26, 1998 (Form io-K), File No. o-6217, at 5,
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archivesedgar/dataso863/0001047469-99-oI 450.txt [hereinafter
Intel it-K].
S0 Intel has sales facilities in high-tax demand jurisdictions such as Japan, Germany, and the
United Kingdom. But the German office's mere existence does not allow Germany to tax Intel on
chips sold in Europe; it all depends on whether the income can be attributed to the office in Ger-
many, which it cannot be if the sale is negotiated and concluded elsewhere. Intel's tax liability is
further reduced if, through electronic commerce, Intel can eliminate the need for such permanent
establishments as the German office. In recent ads, Intel has boasted of selling over $i billion
worth of chips in electronic commerce.
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India, Indonesia, and China.5 1 Except for Mexico, all of these nations
are production tax havens.52
The rise of electronic commerce is likely to make it easier to locate
production facilities in tax havens. The Intel example, which involves
traditional, nondigitizable goods, is a case in point: Modern communi-
cation technology has enabled Intel to coordinate production across the
globe and to locate its production facilities in such production tax ha-
vens as Malaysia.5 3 When goods can be conveyed in digital form, such
as software, locating the entire operation in a tax haven is even easier:
the software can be written anywhere54 and transmitted elsewhere
over secure corporate intranets. Information services in general have
no inherent source; accordingly, online pornography, still one of the
most profitable types of electronic commerce, is run largely from Guy-
ana for both regulatory and tax-related reasons. 5
Are corporate decisions about where to locate influenced by the tax
regime in the host country? Economists have conducted several stud-
ies examining the importance of tax differentials in location decisions.
James Hines has recently summarized ten quantitative studies of U.S.
direct investment abroad and ten quantitative studies of foreign direct
investment in the United States. He concludes that although taxes are
not the only determinant of the location of investments, "[tihe answer
that emerges in a variety of contexts and from a variety of approaches
is that, in spite of all the other economic and political considerations
that are clearly very important, taxation exerts a significant effect on
the magnitude and location of FDI. ''56 Hines estimates that the studies
are generally consistent with a -0.5 elasticity of investment with re-
spect to current tax rates.5 7 Peter Wilson has corroborated these statis-
51 See Robyn Meredith, The Brave New World of General Motors, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1997,
§ 3, at i.
52 The Mexican site benefits from the North American Free T"Iade Agreement.
53 Intel's 1998 io-K states that an interruption in air traffic between the United States and In-
tel's overseas locations would have a material adverse effect on its operations. See Intel io-K, su-
pra note 49, at 5. This problem would not occur for digitizable goods.
54 For example, much such software is written in India or Israel, where Microsoft has major
operations. See Microsoft Worldwide Sites - Links to Office Contact Information & Worldwide
Web Sites <http://www.microsoft.com/worldwide> (visited Feb. 23, 2000).
55 See David R. Tillinghast, Comments on Professor Peroni's Paper on Reform of the U.S. In-
ternational Income Tax Rules, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1013, 1014 (1997).
56 James R. Hines, Jr., Tax Policy and the Activities of Multinational Corporations, in FISCAL
POLICY: LESSONS FROM ECONOMIC RESEARCH 401, 414-15 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1997) [herein-
after Hines, Tax Policy]; see also James R. Hines, Jr., Lessons from Behavioral Responses to Inter-
national Taxation, 52 NAT'L TAX J. 305, 308-19 (1999) (exploring the empirical evidence that in-
ternational tax regimes affect individualized corporate behavior).
s7 See Hines, Tax Policy, supra note 56, at 415; see also Michael P Devereux & Rachel Griffith,
Taxes and the Location of Production: Evidence from a Panel of U.S. Multinationals, 68 J. PUB.
ECON. 335, 362-63 (1998) (concluding, on the basis of a study of 1632 U.S. multinationals and
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tical findings in his interviews with managers from nine firms regard-
ing sixty-eight location decisions.58 He concludes that "tax considera-
tions largely dictate location decisions for business activities . .. such
as administrative and distribution centers."5 9 As for production loca-
tions, he finds that taxes are an important consideration in the location
decision, although they rarely dominate the decision process.
60
Studies have also demonstrated multinationals' ability to shift
profits to low-tax jurisdictions through transfer pricing or thin capi-
talization. For example, David Harris and his colleagues conclude, on
the basis of data from 200 U.S. manufacturing firms for the period
from 1984 to 1988, that having a subsidiary in Ireland or in one of the-
Asian "tigers" (Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong) -
all jurisdictions offering tax holidays for foreign investors - is associ-
ated with lower U.S. taxes as a fraction of U.S. assets or U.S. sales "in
a way that is consistent with tax-motivated income shifting."6' James
Hines has surveyed several studies on the financial behavior of multi-
nationals, including the use of debt and transfer pricing, and concludes
that "[tihe evidence indicates that the financial behavior of multina-
tional corporations is quite sensitive to tax considerations, though not
completely determined by them."62
Some recent studies based on data from U.S.-based multinationals
tend to bolster the view that tax competition has driven effective tax
rates down, and that this competition has made U.S. investment
abroad more sensitive to tax rates. Rosanne Altshuler, Harry Grubert,
and Scott Newlon used U.S. Treasury data from corporate tax returns
between 1984 and 1992 to assess the accuracy of these two contentions
for manufacturing affiliates of U.S.-based multinationals. 63 They find
where in Europe they decided to invest from 198o to 1994, that average effective tax rates similarly
affected these decisions).
58 See G. Peter Wilson, The Role of Taxes in Location and Sourcing Decisions, in STUDIES IN
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION, supra note 44, at 195.
59 Id. at 229.
60 See id. In general, as I argue below, taxes are usually not the dominant factor affecting real
investment decisions but can be determinative at the margin in the choice between two locations
that are otherwise equally attractive. See infra p. 1644.
61 David Harris, Randall Morck, Joel Slemrod & Bernard Yeung, Income Shifting in U.S. Mul-
tinational Corporations, in STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL TAXATION, supra note 44, at 277, 301.
62 Hines, Tax Policy, supra note 56, at 430-31.
63 See Rosanne Altshuler, Harry Grubert & T Scott Newlon, Has U.S. Investment Abroad Be-
come More Sensitive to Tax Rates? (Nov. 1997) (unpublished manuscript presented at National
Bureau of Econ. Research Int'l Taxation Conference, Nov. 14, 1997, on file with the Harvard Law
School Library). The authors calculate the average effective tax rates for foreign subsidiaries in
about 6o countries by dividing total income taxes paid by their total earnings and profits (a meas-
ure defined by the Internal Revenue Code that approximates "book" income). See id. at 8. As the
authors note, this measure is much better than theoretical calculations of either marginal effective
tax rates or average effective tax rates because such calculations make numerous assumptions and
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that average effective tax rates in manufacturing fell by more than
15% between 1984 and 1992.64 The statutory tax rates likewise fell by
14%, indicating that base-broadening measures did not offset rate re-
ductions. The authors also find that manufacturing firms may have
been more sensitive in this period in deciding where to locate their real
manufacturing capital.65 Their hypothesis holds when countries with
populations of less than one million, a category that includes most tra-
ditional tax havens, are excluded from the calculations. 66 The authors
conclude that their results are "consistent with increasing international
mobility of capital and globalization of production. '67
Whether the tax competition phenomenon is desirable will be con-
sidered in Part III below. It is important, however, to note that an in-
vesting multinational faces no additional cost by choosing a low-tax
jurisdiction - in contrast to the standard Tieboutian paradigm of tax
competition in the state and local context, in which individuals choose
jurisdictions based on their preferred levels of government services and
bear the cost of reduced services if they choose a lower-tax jurisdic-
tion.68 Here, the level of services provided by the host country is fixed
before the tax holiday and is based on the revenues that were collected
without regard to the tax holiday. Typically, the holiday jurisdiction
tries to provide the same level of services with the tax holiday in place,
replacing the revenue needed by increasing taxes on relatively immo-
bile factors of production (chiefly land and labor). The tax holiday
thus represents a pure windfall to a multinational that can choose
among several jurisdictions with similar levels of government services
but different tax rates.
use only rough approximations of country tax regimes. See id. at iO-ii. In addition, Treasury
data is superior to publicly available data because precise numbers are available for each CFC.
64 See id. at 11.
65 See id. at 18.
66 See id. at 17.
67 Id. at 18. A recent study by Harry Grubert examines the evidence of tax competition and
U.S. multinationals' response thereto based on U.S. Treasury data for 1984 and 1992. See Harry
Grubert, Tax Planning by Companies and Tax Competition by Governments: Is There Evidence of
Changes in Behavior? (Nov. 1997) (unpublished manuscript presented at National Bureau of Econ.
Research Int'l Taxation Conference, Nov. 15, 1997, on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
He finds that the mean average effective tax rate fell by almost io% from 1984 to 1992, but that
there was no notable convergence in tax rates. See id. at 17. Grubert interprets this as suggesting
that there was no tax competition, see id. at 18, but his conclusion does not follow from the data: it
is possible that countries with high tax rates in 1984 reduced them because of competition with
countries with low tax rates, but that the low-tax countries responded with further decreases, re-
sulting in a lower average rate overall but no convergence. Grubert also notes that there was no
convergence in the European Economic Community, see id. at 18, 21, which contradicts the find-
ings of the Ruding committee, see F. VANISTENDAEL & MALCOLM GAMMIE, THE RUDING
COMMITTEE REPORT ON EUROPEAN CORPORATE TAX HARMONISATION (1992).
68 See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 418
(1956).
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3. Corporate Residence Jurisdictions and Headquarters Tax Ha-
vens. - When the source country refrains from exercising its right to
tax (which it commonly does for the reasons described above), the cor-
porate residence jurisdiction can exercise its right to residual taxation.
However, this subsection argues that corporate residence jurisdictions
are unlikely actually to impose a current tax on the foreign source ac-
tive business income earned by multinationals whose headquarters are
located (or whose parent corporations are incorporated) therein, for
fear of driving those multinationals to reincorporate in headquarters
tax havens.
Most corporate residence jurisdictions either exempt their multina-
tionals' foreign source active business income from taxation ("exemp-
tion") or permit their multinationals to avoid paying tax on the income
earned by their foreign subsidiaries until the income is actually repa-
triated to the parent in the form of dividends or otherwise ("deferral").
For example, under current U.S. rules ("Subpart F"), deferral applies
to active business income earned by subsidiaries of U.S. parent corpo-
rations abroad.69 Significantly, deferral does not depend on whether
the income was taxed abroad. Under deferral, a U.S.-based multina-
tional can avoid paying taxes indefinitely on its active foreign source
income as long as it does not need to repatriate it.7o
The obvious solution to this problem would be to repeal deferral,
that is, to apply Subpart F to all income rather than limiting it to
mostly passive income, as the Kennedy administration originally sug-
69 See I.R.C. §§ 951-96o 0(1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
70 In the i98os, U.S. multinationals like GM were forced to repatriate profits because their U.S.
revenues were too low to sustain their dividend payouts to shareholders, but that need for revenues
may no longer be present. But see James R. Hines, Jr., & R. Glenn Hubbard, Coming Home to
America: Dividend Repatriations by U.S. Multinationals, in TAXATION IN THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY 161, 184 tbl.5.6 (Assaf Razin & Joel Slemrod eds., 199o).
Under the well-known Cary Brown formula, deferral is equivalent to exemption of the yield
on the amount deferred. See, e.g., E. Cary Brown, Business-Income Taxation and Investment In-
centives, in INCOME, EMPLOYMENT AND PUBLIC POLICY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ALVIN H.
HANSON (1948). Thus, the income earned on foreign source profits of U.S. multinationals becomes
exempt from U.S. tax. See David G. Hartman, Tax Policy and Foreign Direct Investment, 26 J.
PUB. ECON. 107, 116 (I985). Hartman argues that the tax on repatriation is unavoidable and
therefore that deferral of foreign source earnings makes no difference in terms of ultimate after-tax
yield. He concludes that FDI out of the reinvested earnings of foreign subsidiaries is unaffected by
home-country taxes. See id. at 1x6. For example, if the parent's tax rate is 30% and interest on
earnings is 1o%, ioo earned abroad and repatriated would be subject to tax of 30, leaving 70,
which would grow to 77 in the following year; if the ioo were left abroad, it would grow to i o and
be subject to tax of 33 when repatriated, likewise leaving 77. But Hartman assumes that there are
no other domestic taxes except the tax on dividends. If, more realistically, there were a tax of 30%
on the 7 of interest income in the first case, it would leave the taxpayer only 74.9, while in the sec-
ond case, the full 77 represents after-tax income, meaning that the yield is exempt.
Another way of stating the advantage of deferral is that if deferral lasts long enough, the pre-
sent value of any tax imposed when the income is eventually repatriated approaches zero.
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gested in i96i.71 This solution has been repeatedly suggested by vari-
ous administrations, incorporated in several recent legislative propos-
als, and endorsed by academic commentators.72 But it has never got-
ten off the ground; in fact, the recent trend has been in the opposite
direction. Code § 956A, which limited the ability of multinationals to
avoid repatriation by imposing current taxation rates on excess passive
assets held abroad, was repealed in i996, 73 and the extension of
"check-the-box" to foreign entities generally allows U.S. multinationals
to elect deferral regardless of the entity's foreign legal status as a cor-
poration or otherwise. 74
How has deferral been so successfully maintained against all criti-
cism, and why have other jurisdictions maintained an exemption for
foreign source active business income? Consider what would happen
if the United States were to end deferral. Parent corporations of new
multinationals, especially in new industries like electronic commerce,
would be less likely to incorporate in the United States. 75 Instead,
they would prefer to incorporate in countries that do not tax holding
corporations, such as Belgium. 76
Roger Gordon and Jeffrey MacKie-Mason have shown that firms'
decisions whether to incorporate are significantly affected by tax con-
siderations. 77 Similarly, the decision where to incorporate can be influ-
71 See Special Message to the Congress on Taxation, PUB. PAPERS 290, 294-97 (Apr. 20, 1961).
72 For discussions of various proposals to abolish deferral, see Daniel J. Frisch, The Economics
of International Tax Policy: Some Old and New Approaches, 47 TAX NOTES 58I (I990); Jane G.
Gravelle, Foreign Tax Provisions of the American Jobs Act of z996, 72 TAX NOTES 1i65 (1996);
and Peter Merrill & Carol Dunahoo, 'Runaway Plant' Legislation: Rhetoric and Reality, 72 TAX
NOTES 22 1 (1996).
73 See I.R.C. § 956A (1994), repealed by Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-188, § 150i(a)(2), iio Stat. 1755, 1825.
74 See, e.g., Robert J. Peroni, Back to the Future: A Path to Progressive Reform of the U.S. In-
ternational Income Tax Rules, 5i U. MIAMI L. REV. 975, 987-88 (1997) (noting that the check-the-
box rules create an "essentially elective deferred system"); see also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, To End
Deferral as We Know It: Simplification Potential of Check-the-Box, 74 TAX NOTES 219, 219-20
(0997) (same). In recent years, Congress has also expanded deferral by, for example, eliminating
the CFC/PFIC overlap and by limiting the application of Subpart F to the securities and insurance
industries. See I.R.C. §§ 951(), 954(h)-(i) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); see also I.R.S. Notice 98-35,
1998-27 I.R.B. 35, 35 (discussing the recent debate over and ultimate withdrawal of I.R.S. Notice
98-11, 1998-I C.B. 433, which attempted to limit the use of check-the-box to avoid Subpart F).
Grubert suggests that his data indicate that U.S. CFCs in Caribbean tax havens pay U.S. tax on
less than 50% of their book income, which indicates that they are effectively avoiding the applica-
tion of Subpart F (by using hybrids). See Grubert, supra note 67, at 20.
75 See, e.g., GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER, U.S. TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL INCOME:
BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM 96-97 (1092).
76 It should be noted that Belgium does tax other corporations quite heavily, and even has a
classical system (one that taxes corporations and shareholders separately), as does the United
States.
77 See Roger H. Gordon & Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason, Tax Distortions to the Choice of Organ-
izational Form, 55 J. PUB. ECON. 279, 280-8i (i994).
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enced by tax considerations.' 8 This can be demonstrated in several
ways. First, one can consider Wilson's evidence, gleaned from inter-
views with corporate management, that "tax considerations largely dic-
tate location decisions for ... administrative and distribution cen-
ters."7 9  Belgium and other jurisdictions that market themselves as
"corporate headquarters tax havens" seek to attract just such centers
engaged in supervising worldwide manufacturing operations. Like
production tax havens, such headquarters tax havens are proliferating
because of tax competition.
Second, one can consider industries that are taxed exclusively on a
residence basis because taxation at source is considered too difficult or
too likely to lead to multiple taxation. Prominent examples include the
shipping and commercial insurance industries, which are not subject to
source-based income taxation because they do not have permanent es-
tablishments and can locate their production in tax havens. In these
cases, the corporate residence is frequently also in a tax haven (often
Liberia or Panama for shipping, Bermuda for insurance) and therefore
no income tax is levied. (Excise taxes are typically levied at source as
a minimal but inadequate substitute.)
Third, there is evidence that even the current loose U.S. antidefer-
ral rules may have induced attempts to change corporate residence to
avoid them. The United States has recently imposed a tax on publicly
traded U.S. corporations that change the residence of their corporate
parent to another jurisdiction. 0 This rule was prompted by a well-
publicized case of a cosmetics distributor that reincorporated tax-free
in the Cayman Islands to avoid application of Subpart F to its future
subsidiaries.8 1
Reincorporating in Panama or in the Cayman Islands may be a
step most U.S. multinationals would be unwilling to take. But estab-
lishing the corporate headquarters and formal corporate residence in
Belgium, even when the entrepreneurs are U.S. residents, would seem
78 Average effective tax rates significantly affect the choice of corporate domicile. See Julie H.
Collins & Douglas A. Shackelford, Corporate Domicile and Average Effective Tax Rates: The Cases
of Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States, 2 INT'L TAX & PUB. FIN. 55, 56
('995).
79 Wilson, supra note 58, at 229.
80 See I.R.S. Notice 94-46, 1994-1 C.B. 356, 356-57.
81 See Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: Last Corporate Taxpayer Out the Door, Please Turn Out
the Lights, 1999 TAX NOTES TODAY 30-5, 4-6, available in WL 1999 TNT 30-5. Similarly, in
1982, McDermott Inc. changed its site of incorporation to Panama to avoid current U.S. tax on its
foreign source income. See James R. Hines, Jr., The Flight Paths of Migratory Corporations, 6 J.
ACCT. AUDITING & FIN. 447, 462-67 (199). McDermott's reorganization led to the enactment of
the "anti-inversion" provision, see Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 133(a), 98
Stat. 494, 667-68 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § I2 4 8(i) (1994 & Supp. H 1996)), which was ex-
panded in 1996, see Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188,
§ 1702(g)(i)(d), io Stat. 1755, 1872-73.
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to carry little business risk. 82 Moreover, the shares of most multina-
tionals are currently traded on several exchanges, diminishing the sig-
nificance of the country in which the parent is incorporated because
the shareholder-protection laws of the trading jurisdiction will typi-
cally apply. Although a move may be unlikely for established U.S.
corporations like General Motors or even Intel, 3 the major players in
new industries have yet to incorporate, and future incorporation deci-
sions may well be influenced by tax considerations.8 4
The Treasury discussion paper on taxation of electronic commerce
suggests that because of such considerations, "a review of current resi-
dency definitions and taxation rules may be appropriate."ss But it is
hard to see what definition of corporate residence can be adopted that
will avoid these problems. A definition that focuses on the corpora-
tion's place of management may prove unworkable because the rise of
corporate intranets has eliminated the need for corporate boards to
meet in one physical location. A rule that focuses on the residence of
shareholders is likewise problematic because (as stated above) the
shares of most multinationals now trade on several exchanges, leading
to many corporate residences and no clear way to divide the tax base
among them.8 6 As long as residence jurisdictions compete with each
other for the location of corporate headquarters, effective residence-
based taxation seems unlikely.
To sum up: Corporate income from cross-border transactions is in-
creasingly unlikely to be taxed in the demand jurisdiction because of
the absence of a permanent establishment. Such income is also un-
likely to be taxed in the supply jurisdiction because production can
take place in production tax havens. Finally, taxation by the corporate
residence jurisdiction is similarly unlikely because of deferral and
headquarters tax havens. Thus, unless the current rules are changed,
82 The anti-deferral rules do not apply to a closely held foreign corporation earning active busi-
ness income.
83 However, even established corporations may be acquired by foreign multinationals, as the
Daimler acquisition of Chrysler shows. If the majority of the shareholders in the new parent cor-
poration are foreign, such a transaction escapes I.R.C. § 367, so that any future growth of the com-
bined multinational can occur abroad free of the confines of Subpart F. See Treas. Reg. § 1.367(a)-
3(c) (as amended in 1999).
84 Interstate reincorporation has been common within the United States, where both corporate
and tax considerations have led many corporations to move to New Jersey and then to Delaware.
See PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE TO CORPORATION LAW 56-58(I993) (discussing New Jersey's role in this evolution); Henry N. Butler, Nineteenth-Century Juris-dictional Competition in the Granting of Corporate Privileges, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 129, 152-63(1985) (discussing the origins of jurisdictional competition for corporate sites).
85 OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, supra note 39, at 22-23.
86 Section IVC discusses the possibility of ending corporate taxation altogether and taxing all
income at the shareholder level, and rejects it on inter-nation equity grounds.
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such income is increasingly likely to escape taxation altogether. Part
I[I considers whether this situation is problematic.
C. Revenue Losses
The preceding discussion indicates that it is possible to avoid in-
come taxation on cross-border portfolio and direct investment. But
how much revenue is actually lost in this way? This question turns
out to be much harder to answer given the present state of the publicly
available data.
The recent OECD Report on harmful tax competition argues that
tax competition should be curbed primarily to prevent erosion of the
revenue bases of OECD member countries.87 At the very beginning of
the chapter containing its recommendations, the OECD Report states,
"Governments cannot stand back while their tax bases are eroded
through the actions of countries which offer taxpayers ways to exploit
tax havens and preferential regimes to reduce the tax that would oth-
erwise be payable to them."8 Unfortunately, the OECD Report con-
tains no numerical data to bolster its claim that tax bases are eroding
as a result of harmful tax competition. 9 Aggregate data on tax collec-
tions, which section I.B reviews, do not support the claim: there is no
evidence that overall revenue from the personal or corporate income
tax in OECD member countries has declined as a percentage of either
GDP or total tax revenue from 1965 to 1995.90 However, these data
do not distinguish between revenue from labor and revenue from capi-
tal, and it may be that a decline in the tax revenues from taxing capi-
tal is masked by a rise in revenues from taxing labor. This hypothesis
would be consistent with the findings on changes in the overall tax
mix reported below in section III.B.
This section will present the publicly available data on the revenue
effects of tax competition. Although these data are sparse and incom-
plete, some of them are quite suggestive.
x Personal Income Tax. - Assessing the revenue losses from tax
competition in the personal income tax context is difficult because it
87 See OECD REPORT, supra note 26, at 8, 14. This Report is discussed in detail in section VB.
88 Id. at 37.
89 See id. at 17 ("The available data do not permit a detailed comparative analysis of the eco-
nomic and revenue effects involving low-tax jurisdictions."). The Report does note, however, that
"the available data do suggest that the current use of tax havens is large, and that participation in
such schemes is expanding at an exponential rate." Id.
90 See infra section III.B. Data for 1995 through 1999 do suggest a declining trend in corporate
income tax rates in OECD and EU countries (from an average of 37.6% to 34.9% in the OECD
and from 39% to 36% in the EU). It is less clear whether this factor translates to lower effective
tax rates or lower revenues. See James R. Hines, Jr., Lessons From Behwvioral Responses to Inter-
national Taxation, 52 NAT'L TAX J. 305 (999).
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involves (illegal) tax evasion rather than (legal) tax avoidance.9 1 Al-
though a number of competing methods of approximating such losses
exist,92 each with its own problems, they all reach consistently high es-
timates.9 3 The available estimates of the untaxed portion of developed
countries' economies range from 6% to 20% of GDP in the United
States (in I98O) to 20% to 33% of GDP for Italy (in i982).94
These numbers, however, include much domestic tax evasion un-
related to tax competition. Chander Kant summarizes the available
data on capital flight using a variety of more relevant measures. 95
Given the wide availability of opportunities described in section II.A,
it is reasonable to assume that most departing capital is invested in
countries where it is not subject to taxation at its source. Although
Latin America accounts for the largest share of capital flight, virtually
all regions of the developing world experience this phenomenon.9 6 Es-
timates of capital flight from all developing countries for the period
from 198o to 1988 range from $I5 billion to $6o billion per year.9 7 The
91 In theory, it should be possible to obtain a good sense of the magnitude of revenue losses by
summing up the withholding taxes that are forgone by OECD member countries through measures
like the portfolio interest exemption. However, the most recent compilation of tax expenditure
data by the OECD does not contain these data because most countries (including the United
States) do not regard the reduction of withholding taxes as a departure from their normal tax base.
See OECD, TAX EXPENDITURES: RECENT EXPERIENCES (1996) [hereinafter TAX
EXPENDITURES]. The only exception is Canada, which estimates tax losses for each year from
1993 to 2000 of Cdn $325 million to $430 million from not withholding tax on interest on deposits
and Cdn $46o million to $550 million from not withholding on interest on long-term corporate
debt. See Department of Fin., Government of Can., TAX EXPENDITURES 1998, reprinted in 98
WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY 138-16, tbl.2 (1998), available in WL 98 WTD 138-6. Thus, Canada
estimates that it loses about Cdn $i billion (U.S. $650 million) per year by forgoing withholding -
although if it tried to collect this revenue unilaterally, the investments would presumably move
elsewhere.
92 The most commonly used is the national accounts method, which involves comparing the
base of a particular tax as estimated by the national accounts authorities and the base as reported
to the tax authorities after making appropriate adjustments. See VITO TANZI & PARTHO SHOME,
TAX EVASION: CAUSES, ESTIMATION METHODS, AND PENALTIES: A FOCuS ON LATIN AMERICA
13 (1993). Other techniques of direct approximation include the budget survey method, a direct
taxpayer survey, and the sampling method. Indirect methods, which focus on the underground
economy, include: the expenditure method, which assumes that evaded income will show up as
consumption; the physical input method, which assumes that certain inputs, such as electricity,
should relate to taxable outputs; and the monetary approach, which associates evasion with cur-
rency holding. See id. at 13-19.
93 See id. at I9-22 & tbl.3.
94 See id. at 20 tbl.3. For Portugal, a 1975 study estimated that 30% of earned income and 40%
of unearned income goes untaxed. See id. The estimates for developing countries are as follows:
Argentina (1989), 5o% of GDP; Bolivia (1986), 44% of GNP; Brazil (1989), 5o% of GDP; Chile
(1986), 14% to 32% of GNP; Dominican Republic (1986), 14% to 32% of GNP; Ecuador (1986),
30% to 32% of GNP; Guatemala (1986), 30% to 32% of GNP; Honduras (1986), 30% to 32% of
GNP; Mexico (1986), 30% to 32% of GNP; and Peru (x986), 35% of GNP. See id.
95 See KANT, supra note 29, at 5-o.
96 See id. at 5.
97 See id. at 21 tbl.5.
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total capital accumulated abroad from Latin America alone was esti-
mated in 1992 at $3oo billion.98 For developed countries, estimates are
rare, but Dooley estimates capital flight from the United States be-
tween 198o and 1982 at $25o billion.99
It seems reasonable to assume that the income from such capital is
untaxed by either the source country or the residence country.0 0 If so,
positing a io% average rate of return and a 5o% individual tax rate
would put the Latin American countries' revenue loss on $300 billion
of departed capital at about $15 billion per year. Though significant,
this figure is probably far too low because it assumes that the initial
capital investment represents after-tax income. If, more realistically,
one assumes that the migrating capital was never taxed, the lost reve-
nue from $3oo billion held abroad would be an initial $15o billion plus
an additional $15 billion per year, assuming the same 5o% tax rate.' 0 '
The total lost revenue for all developing countries may be as high as
twice that amount.
These very high numbers suggest that developing countries could
raise significant tax revenues were they able to tax the income that
their residents invest abroad. 10 2 Such revenue gains could be very im-
portant: the United Nations estimates that basic social services (such
as universal primary education) could be assured for all developing
countries for a mere $30 to $40 billion a year.10 3 The revenue gains for
developed countries (such as Germany) could also be quite large in ab-
solute terms, although much smaller as a percentage of total tax reve-
nues. Thus, tax competition seems to lead to significant tax base ero-
sion of the personal income tax, which is still a major - if not the
largest - tax base for most developed and developing countries.
2. Corporate Income Tax. - Estimating revenue losses from tax
competition in the corporate income tax context should be easier than
in the personal income tax area because, as explained in section II.B,
the revenue loss involves legal tax avoidance rather than illegal tax
evasion. Most developed countries defer taxing or exempt the active
98 See id. at , (citing Pedro-Pablo Kuczynski, International Capital Flows into Latin America:
What Is the Promise?, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE WORLD BANK ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON
DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 323 (Lawrence H. Summers & Anwar M. Shah eds., 1992)).
99 See Dooley, supra note 32, at 79.
100 See supra sections H.A-B.
101 This example assumes that it would be possible to tax the underlying capital, which may be
harder to tax than the income because it can be left in tax havens.
102 This suggestion assumes that the residence country, not the source country, would receive the
tax revenue. The solution that Part V proposes is intended to make residence-based taxation pos-
sible.
103 See UNITED NATIONS HUMAN DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1997,
at 112 box 6.4 (1997) [hereinafter HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT].
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business income of foreign subsidiaries of "their" MNEs, while devel-
oping countries grant explicit tax holidays to those subsidiaries.
Nevertheless, there is little publicly available data on revenue losses
resulting from deferral, from exemption by home countries, or from
preferential tax regimes in host countries. OECD member countries
are the home countries for about eighty-five percent of the world's
1VINEs.10 4  However, the OECD's most recent data on tax expendi-
tures reveal that no member countries, except for the United States
and France, quantify the revenue lost by granting exemption or defer-
ral to the foreign source active business income of their MNEs.105 The
United States estimates its 1997 revenue loss from "deferral of income
from controlled foreign corporations" at $2.2 billion, a figure it expects
to swell to $3.4 billion by 2003.06 France estimates the potential
revenue gain from taxing its MNEs on their foreign source profit in
1994 at i8 billion French francs (about $3.3 billion as of December
1994).l °7
These numbers are significant, but they represent only a small por-
tion of all MNEs. However, their true significance for each home
country can be assessed only by comparing these figures to other tax
expenditures and to the overall budget. For the United States, $3 bil-
lion is a small tax expenditure compared to the largest, which amount
to $5o billion or more.108 It is also a small figure in terms of corporate
income tax receipts - $189 billion in 1998.109 For France, on the
other hand, FF 18 billion in 1994 represented the second largest tax
expenditure in the budget.110 It also represented a larger share of to-
104 See UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT
1999: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND THE CHALLENGE OF DEVELOPMENT 5-6 tbl.I.i (1999)
[hereinafter WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT].
105 See TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 91, at 62 tbl.9, 112 tbl.i9.
106 Budget Analytical Perspectives, Chapter 5 - Tax Expenditures, 98 WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY
25-2 1, tbl. 5-i (1998), available in WL 98 TNT 25-21.
107 See TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 91, at 62 tbl.9 .
108 See Budget Analytical Perspectives, Chapter 5 - Tax Expenditures, supra note io6, at tbl.s-
x. The largest U.S. tax expenditures for FY 1999 were the exclusion of pensions ($72.375 billion),
insurance proceeds ($14.2oo billion), and the home mortgage interest deduction ($53.695 billion).
See id.
109 See Revenue Provisions in President's Fiscal Year 2ooo Budget: Hearing Before the House
Comm on Ways and Means, xo6th Cong. 103-04 (1999) (statement of Kenneth J. Kies, Managing
Partner, Washington National Tax Services, PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP).
110 France's largest tax expenditure for x 994 was the "quotient familial" system of allowances for
family size, which totaled FF 68 billion ($12.7 billion U.S.). Other significant tax expenditures
were the exemption of income from investment growth bonds (FF 18 billion), the reduced rate for
long-term capital gains (FF 14.5 billion), and the exemption of imputed income from in-kind
housing (FF 13.7 billion). No other expenditure exceeded FF io billion. See TAX EXPENDITURES,
supra note 9i, at 61-63 tbl.g.
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tal receipts from the corporate tax (FF ii9 billion in 1994)."' These
figures may explain why France was one of the OECD member coun-
tries most interested in pushing the tax competition issue.112
Information is also sparse for host countries that grant tax holidays
or other preferential treatment to foreigners. The OECD report on tax
competition gives no figures, except that total direct investment by G7
countries in traditional tax havens in the Caribbean and South Pacific
increased more than fivefold from 1985 to 1994, to more than $200
billion. 113 This represented "a rate of increase well in excess of the
growth of total outbound Foreign Direct Investment."'" 4  If one as-
sumes that the major motivation of such investment in traditional tax
havens is tax avoidance,' and therefore that most of the income from
the $2oo billion escapes the net of existing antideferral regimes, this
number would represent a significant loss of corporate tax revenue for
the G7 countries. 1 6
Two OECD member countries, Ireland and Belgium, have prefer-
ential tax regimes targeted at foreigners. Ireland provides a reduced
tax rate of io% to foreign MNEs that established manufacturing facili-
ties in selected areas (making it a "production tax haven")." 7 Belgium
grants near-complete tax relief to "centres de coordination" (making it
a "headquarters tax haven")." 8 Ireland's estimated revenue loss from
its reduced tax rate in 1991 and 1992 was 748.9 million Irish pounds
(about $1.2 billion).1 19 Belgium's estimated revenue loss from its
headquarters tax reduction in 1992 was 46 billion Belgian francs
III See OECD, REVENUE STATISTICS OF OECD MEMBER COUNTRIES, 1965-1995, at iii
tbl.45 (1996).
112 France co-chaired the OECD's Special Sessions on Tax Competition, which drafted a report
focusing entirely on corporate taxes. See OECD REPORT, supra note 26, at 7. The other co-chair
was Japan. See id.; infra p. 16o3.
113 See OECD REPORT, supra note 26, at 17.
114 Id.
115 This seems a reasonable assumption, given those countries' lack of other resources that
would attract investors there. See Hines & Rice, supra note 46, at 150-53.
116 If the $200 billion generates income at io% a year and the average corporate tax rate in G7
countries is 35% (both reasonable assumptions), the $200 billion invested in traditional tax havens
represents a yearly revenue loss of $7 billion. Interestingly, Grubert reports, based on U.S. Teas-
ury data, that even Subpart F, which is generally regarded as the toughest anti-deferral regime in
the world, captures only 50% of the income of CFCs in Caribbean tax havens. See Grubert, supra
note 67, at 20.
117 See TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 91, at 73 tbl.12. Ireland has agreed to eliminate its tax
haven for new projects by 2003 and for existing projects by 2o11; in its place, it is phasing in a low,
generally applicable tax rate, which will be fully in place by 2003. See Mary Walsh, Ireland -
z998 Tax Review, 98 WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY 251-11, 3-4 (1998), available in WNL 98 TNI 251-
'I.
118 See TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 9I, at 33 tbl.4.
119 See id. at 74 tbl.12.
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(about $1.5 billion).' 20 These numbers are relatively small, but far
from negligible in the budgets of Ireland and Belgium. Ireland's tax
expenditure on the production tax haven was the largest such expendi-
ture in its budget for the tax year 1991-92.121 Belgium's tax expendi-
ture for the headquarters tax haven was the fifth largest expenditure in
its 1992 budget.122
Tax expenditure figures are of doubtful accuracy, however. In par-
ticular, the U.S. figures (which are determined by methods that are
relatively sophisticated compared to those used to calculate other
countries' expenditures) may be understated because they do not take
into account any behavioral changes that shift income overseas, in-
cluding those caused by such legal changes as amendments to the cor-
porate tax laws. Thus, the $2 billion to $3 billion estimated annual
revenue loss from deferral is not an accurate estimate of the revenue
that would be lost were Subpart F (the principal U.S. antideferral re-
gime)1 23 repealed or severely curtailed, as some have suggested. 124  In
that case, U.S.-based MNEs would presumably shift revenues abroad,
resulting in increased tax revenue losses. Nor is the $2 billion to $3
billion figure necessarily even a good estimate of the revenue that
could be gained if Subpart F were expanded to cover all income be-
cause, as section ll.B suggests, such an expansion could encourage
more MNEs to incorporate outside the United States and further de-
prive it of tax income. 125  In addition, the U.S. lost-revenue estimate
has not changed (except for adjustments for inflation and other macro-
120 See id. at 34 tbl.4. It is not clear, however, whether this revenue could have been collected
absent that tax expenditure. Part IV offers a cost-benefit analysis of this issue.
121 The expenditure for the married person's allowance, at Ir £745.8 million, was almost as
large, and no other expenditure exceeded Ir £500 million. See id. at 73 tbl.i2.
122 The largest expenditure, at BF 112 billion, was the exemption of dividends. See id. at 33
tbl.4.
123 See I.R.C. §§ 951-961 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
124 See, e.g., HUFBAUER, supra note 75, at 136; NFTC PROJECT, supra note 33, i. The one-
year exception from Subpart F for "active financing income" of banks and insurance companies
was estimated to cost $1.4 billion, or about 5o% of the entire loss from deferral. See Letter from
Donald C. Lubick, Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, Department of the Treasury, to Senator
Byron Dorgan, 8 (Feb. 8, 1999), reprinted in Treasury Shares Dorgan's Concerns About CFC Ex-
tenders Provision, 1999 TAX NOTES TODAY 32-25, available in WL 1999 TNT 32-25. The foreign
sales corporation regime (recently challenged by the WTO) costs $2 billion. See Robert Goulder,
WTO Panel Issues Final Report Condemning U.S. FSC Regime, 1999 TAX NOTES TODAY 183-3,
1, 6, available in WL 1999 TNT 183-3.
125 Another issue that affects the accuracy of the estimate is that the revenue estimate assumes a
continuation of the Subpart F method of taxing MNEs, which uses a deemed dividend to the par-
ent rather than a consolidated approach. As a result, CFCs with losses do not reduce the revenue
estimate. In addition, repealing deferral implies treating all the interest expense of the MNE as
fungible, as opposed to the current rule that only U.S. interest is allocated based on worldwide as-
sets while foreign interest reduces foreign source income (and thus reduces the availability of for-
eign tax credits). If loss offsets and interest fungibility are both allowed, the $2 billion revenue es-
timate shrinks considerably. See Frisch, supra note 72, at 586.
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economic variables) since the i98os, even though Treasury data indi-
cate a significant reduction in the average effective foreign tax rate. 126
Available data, however, suggest that the total revenue to be gained
from repealing deferral is relatively small (although significant in rela-
tion to total U.S. corporate tax revenues from foreign source in-
come).127
On the other hand, the United States has the strictest antideferral
regime of all OECD member countries, and its corporate tax rate is
relatively low. A country like Japan, which has an ineffective antide-
ferral regime and a high effective corporate tax rate, 28 is likely to face
a much more significant loss from revenue deferral. This greater loss
may explain why Japan was at the forefront of the OECD effort to
combat harmful tax competition and co-chaired the OECD's Special
Sessions of the Committee on Fiscal Affairs, which drafted a report on
this subject. 29
Thus, the limited available data on revenue losses from competition
in the corporate income tax area suggest that these losses, although
significant, are probably much smaller than the potential losses in the
personal income tax area. On the other hand, revenue losses may vary
dramatically from country to country depending on their effective cor-
porate tax rates and the stringency of their antideferral rules. Some
countries, such as France and Japan, may suffer significant revenue
losses from corporate tax competition, even in terms of their overall
budgets. In other countries, such as the United States, those losses
may be relatively insignificant.
M. THE PROBLEM OF TAX COMPETITION FROM A GLOBAL
NORMATIVE PERSPECTIVE
In Part II, I argued that the combination of increased capital mo-
bility and tax competition leads to the likelihood that cross-border
126 See infra pp. 1622-24.
127 Altshuler and Newlon calculate from 1986 Treasury data that the United States collected
only $i.585 billion from $47 billion in foreign source income earned by 340 U.S.-based multina-
tionals (a 3.4% effective tax rate). See Altshuler & Newlon, supra note 44, at 90, 91 tbl. 3.2. Thus,
an additional $2 billion (to use the lower estimate) would more than double tax collections from
this source. The total foreign source income now is significantly higher because of the increase in
outbound foreign direct investment since 1986.
128 See LUCY CHENNELLS & RACHEL GRIFFITH, TAXING PROFITS IN A CHANGING WORLD
I5o tbl.I.4 (1997) (estimating the Japanese effective tax rate in 1994 (the most recent year) at be-
tween 40.3% (ATR) and 52.9% (EMTR)); Julie H. Collins & Douglas A. Shackelford, Corporate
Domicile and Average Effective Tax Rates: The Cases of Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, and
the United States, 2 INT'L TAX & PUB. FIN. 55, 61 tbl.2 (1995) (estimating the Japanese average
effective tax rate from 1982 to 1991 at between 52% and 57%). In both cases these are the highest
rates among the countries surveyed (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States).
129 See OECD REPORT, supra note 26, at 7; supra note 112.
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flows of capital will be taxed more lightly than either domestically in-
vested capital or domestic labor. In this Part, I attempt to evaluate
whether this situation is problematic from a global efficiency or equity
perspective. I then proceed to balance those considerations against
democratic countries' right to determine the size of their governments,
and to develop a distinction between harmful and acceptable forms of
tax competition.
A. Global Efficiency and Global Welfare
r. Capital Export Neutrality and Capital Import Neutrality. -
The traditional argument in favor of imposing the same tax rate on all
income from capital, whether invested at home or abroad, has been
made in the name of capital export neutrality (CEN), a concept first
developed by Peggy Musgrave.' 30 CEN refers to an investor's choice
between investing her savings in her country of residence or in a for-
eign host country. CEN exists when home- and host-country invest-
ments that earn the same pretax return also yield the same after-tax
return.131 CEN is violated, for example, if neither the home nor the
host country taxes the income from an investment in the host country,
while both tax an investment in the home country. In that case, the
investor would prefer to invest in the host country rather than in the
home country, even if the pretax yield on the domestic investment
were higher. 32 The result is a deadweight loss from a global efficiency
perspective because investments will not be allocated to their most
productive (highest-yielding) pretax uses. In the long run, as more
capital flows to host-country investments, the pretax returns on those
investments will fall and pretax returns on home-country investments
will rise until equilibrium is restored (when after-tax returns are
equalized). The deadweight loss, however, will remain the same be-
cause some less productive host-country investments will be made at
the expense of more productive home-country investments (that is,
130 See PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, UNITED STATES TAXATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT INCOME:
ISSUES AND ARGUMENTS (1969); see also James R. Hines, Jr., The Case Against Deferral: A Defer-
ential Reconsideration, 52 NAT'L TAX J. 385 (1999) (re-evaluating the validity of CEN analysis).
131 See RICHARD E. CAVES, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 227
(1982).
132 Assume, for example, that an investor faces a choice between a home-country investment
yielding xoo and a host-country investment yielding 70. In a tax-free world, the investor would
choose the home-country investment. Now assume that the home-country investment is taxed at
40% while the host-country investment is untaxed (if, for example, the host country does not tax
the investment income of nonresidents and the home country is unable to enforce its tax jurisdic-
tion on foreign source income). In that case the investor faces a choice between a home-country
investment yielding 60 (too minus 40 in tax) and a host-country investment yielding 70 (70 minus o
in tax). The investor would then choose the host-country investment even though it yields the
lower pretax return.
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capital will be oversupplied in the host country and undersupplied in
the home country).133
This traditional argument has led most economists to support resi-
dence-based taxation of worldwide income as the optimal tax rule for
international taxation because, in the absence of host-country taxes,
residence-based taxation maintains CEN. According to Razin and
Sadka, adopting the residence principle leads to an efficient allocation
of the world's pool of investment capital:
If a country adopts the residence principle, taxing at the same rate capital
income from all sources, then the gross return accruing to an individual in
that country must be the same, regardless of which country is the source
of that return. Thus, the marginal product of capital in that country will
be equal to the world return to capital. If all countries adopt the residence
principle, then capital income taxation does not disturb the equality of the
marginal product of capital across countries which is generated by a free
movement of capital....
... [If] residents of a country are not taxed on their income from for-
eign sources .... [and] the tax rate is not the same in all countries, then
the marginal product of capital is also not the same in all countries. In
this case the international allocation of the world stock of capital is not ef-
ficient. 13 4
The economic case against CEN is traditionally made in the name
of capital import neutrality (CIN). CIN requires that the earnings
from capital in a host country be taxed at the same rate for both do-
mestic and foreign investors.1 35 CIN is violated, for example, if for-
eign investors in a host country are taxed on their foreign investment
income at their home-country rate (as required by CEN) while the host
country does not levy an income tax on its citizens' investment income.
In that case, domestic (host-country) investors have a different net re-
turn on their investment in the host country than do foreign (home-
country) investors. The results are that intertemporal marginal rates
133 See Assaf Razin & Efraim Sadka, International Tax Competition and Gains from Tax Har-
monization, 37 ECON. LETTERS 69, 69-70 (ig9i) (hereinafter Razin & Sadka, International Tax
Competition].
134 Id. If governments cannot effectively tax foreign source income, Razin and Sadka advocate
capital controls, or if those are not feasible, subsidies to domestic investment. See Assaf Razin &
Efraim Sadka, Optimal Incentives to Domestic Investment in the Presence of Capital Flight 9
(1989) (unpublished IMF Working Paper); see also ASSAF RAZIN & EFRAIM SADKA, CAPITAL
MARKET INTEGRATION: ISSUES OF INTERNATIONAL TAXATION --6 (David Horowitz Inst. for the
Research of Developing Countries Paper No. 4/9o, 1989) ("[O]ptimal policy requires an efficient
allocation of capital between investment at home and abroad so that the marginal product of do-
mestic capital must be equated to the world rate of interest . .. ."). Razin and Sadka derive this
result from an application of Peter Diamond and James Mirrlees's concept of "production effi-
ciency." Peter A. Diamond & James A. Mirrlees, Optimal Taxation and Public Production I: Pro-
duction Eficiency, 61 AMER. ECON. REV. 8 (197).
135 See CAVES, supra note 131, at 227.
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of substitution (that is, the choice between present and future con-
sumption) will differ between countries, and the international alloca-
tion of world savings will be distorted. 136
In a classic article, Thomas Horst showed that if tax rates vary
among countries, it is impossible to achieve CEN and CIN simultane-
ously.137 How, then, is one to choose between policies that assure the
efficient allocation of world investments on the one hand (CEN) and
world savings on the other (CIN)? Horst showed that the choice de-
pends on the relative elasticities (that is, responsiveness to taxation) of
the supply and demand of capital. If the supply of capital is fixed, so
that savings rates are not responsive to taxation, and the demand for
capital is elastic, CEN is preferred because it ensures an efficient allo-
cation of the home country's supply of capital. If the demand for capi-
tal is fixed while the supply is elastic, CIN is preferred because it en-
sures an efficient satisfaction of the host country's demand for
capital. 138
Horst argued that the most plausible assumption in the absence of
empirical evidence is that the elasticities of supply and demand for
capital are the same and are somewhere between zero (fixed) and one
(perfect elasticity). Thus, a policy that falls between CEN and CIN is
warranted. 139 Why, then, do most economists prefer CEN to CIN?'40
Empirical evidence suggests that the elasticity of demand for capital is
considerably greater than the elasticity of supply - that the choice be-
tween saving and consuming is less responsive to taxes than is the
136 See Razin & Sadka, International Tax Competition, supra note 133, at 70. In terms of the
previous example, see supra note 132, the home-country investor prefers the domestic investment
(yielding ioo before tax) over the host-country investment (yielding 7o before tax) when both are
subject to a tax of 40% (yielding an after-tax return on the domestic investment of 6o and an after-
tax return on the foreign investment of 42). In the case of CEN, however, he will have a lower af-
ter-tax yield (6o) than will a host-country investor in the host country who faces a o% tax rate (70).
All factors being equal as between home- and host-country residents, after-tax savings will thus be
lower in the home country.
137 See Thomas Horst, A Note on the Optimal Taxation of International Investment Income, 84
Q.J. ECON. 793 (1980).
138 See id. at 796.
139 See id. at 797. Horst acknowledges that the U.S. policy meets his criteria but argues that the
United States's compromise between CEN and CIN would be only coincidentally correct accord-
ing to the criteria he suggests. See id. at 797 n.5.
140 In addition to Razin and Sadka, several authors evince a preference for CEN over CIN on
the assumption that foreign source income can be effectively taxed. See, e.g., Michael R Devereux
& Mark Pearson, European Tax Harmonisation and Production Efficiency, 39 EUR. EcON. REV.
1657, 166o (1995) (stating that "an optimal tax structure would preserve production efficiency but
not exchange efficiency [the efficient allocation of savings]" and that "CEN is a necessary condition
for production efficiency'); James Levinsohn & Joel Slemrod, Taxes, Tariffs, and the Global Corpo-
ration, SI J. PUB. ECON. 97, 1o4-o5 (x993) (arguing that "[t]he optimality of levying taxes that do
not discriminate by location is ... preserved when strategic considerations are introduced," but
supporting the reduction of taxes on foreign source income if tax policy cannot discriminate be-
tween strategic and nonstrategic sectors (emphasis omitted)).
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choice among alternative investment vehicles. For example, in a re-
cent article on the efficiency of the investment tax credit, Austan
Goolsbee finds that the demand elasticity of investment exceeds 1.0.141
Other empirical studies examining aggregate data on savings flows
suggest that the elasticity of savings with respect to the rate of return
is small, while the elasticity of aggregate investment is probably
higher.142 According to a 1994 OECD study, "there is no clear evi-
dence that taxation affects the overall level of savings by house-
holds."1 43  The basic reason seems to be that many individuals have
fixed targets for the amount of savings they hope to have at retirement.
If this is so, a cut in the tax rate on savings would lead them to reduce,
rather than increase, their saving rate because a lower before-tax sav-
ing rate would then enable them to reach their targets in the same
amount of time.144
In addition to those arguments based on CIN, other arguments for
rejecting CEN as the optimal policy stem from "national neutrality."
The issue underlying this debate is the proper treatment of host-
country taxes. CEN implies that they should be credited by the home
country and, moreover, that the credit should be unlimited (that is,
that taxes at rates exceeding the home-country rate should be refund-
able), so as to leave the investor with equal after-tax rates of return on
home- and host-country investments. 145 However, some economists
have argued that host-country taxes should be deducted as costs rather
than refunded as credits, so as to maximize the home country's na-
tional income, which includes both tax revenues and home firms' after-
141 See Austan Goolsbee, Investment Tax Incentives, Prices, and the Supply of Capital Goods,
113 Q.J. ECON. 121, 145 (1998); see also Frisch, supra note 72, at 584 n.io (pointing out that to as-
sume zero elasticity for the demand for capital is unrealistic because it requires not only that capi-
tal be used inelastically in the production of goods, but also that all consumers' demands for goods
with differing capital intensities be inelastic). There are also indications that demand elasticity for
capital may be increasing over time. See Altshuler, Grubert & Newlon, supra note 63, at 2 (re-
porting an increase in the elasticity of investment to tax-rate differentials from 1.8 in 1984 to 2.8 in
1992).
142 See Devereux, supra note 33, at 1oi.
143 OECD, TAXATION AND HOUSEHOLD SAVING 3 (1994). The voluminous literature examin-
ing the effect on saving rates of cutting the capital gains tax reaches the same conclusion. See, e.g.,
Calvin H. Johnson, The Consumption of Capital Gains, 55 TAX NOTES 957, 970 (1992); George R.
Zodrow, Economic Analyses of Capital Gains Taxation: Realizations, Revenues, Efficiency and
Equity, 48 TAX L. REV. 419, 480 (1993); Bruce Anderson, Note, Strategic Choice Taxation: A Solu-
tion to the Federal Revenue Crisis, 1995 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 281, 314.
144 See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 574 (3d
ed. 1995).
145 In fact, however, no country grants an unlimited foreign tax credit (the U.S. credit has been
limited since 1921) because it invites host countries to raise tax rates at the expense of the home-
country treasury.
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tax profits.146 Skeptics have pointed out that such "national neutral-
ity" policies are likely to lead to retaliation, which ultimately would
hurt the home country as well as violate CEN.147
Other economists have argued that a credit would lead the host
country to raise its tax rate to capture increased tax revenue, and that
the home country would then respond by raising its own rate to gain
some of the benefits from restricting capital flows, resulting in too little
trade.148 However, this line of analysis ignores evidence that the uni-
lateral adoption of the foreign tax credit by the United States in
I9I8149 has led to a cooperative outcome that prevents double taxation
and maximizes world welfare. 150 In a cooperative game, the credit
method turns out to be superior to the exemption or deduction method
(which would be required by the CIN and national neutrality argu-
ments, respectively) because it attains the efficient allocation of capital
without requiring rate harmonization or side payments. 5 1
In an influential article, Daniel Frisch contends that the CEN/CIN
debate is obsolete because it ignores changes in the world economy
that have taken place since the I96OS. His main argument is that port-
folio investments are more important determinants of efficient capital
allocation than is FDI and, therefore, that CEN should be imple-
mented for the former purpose but not for the latter. 5 2 However, the
fact that portfolio investment now exceeds FDI does not mean that the
latter is unimportant in allocating investment, and applying CEN to
portfolio investment should not preclude applying it to FDI as well.
The location studies summarized above indicate that taxation has a
major influence on multinationals' decisions to locate their investment
capital.5 3
146 See, e.g., Martin Feldstein & David Hartman, The Optimal Taxation of Foreign Source In-
vestment Income, 93 Q.J. ECON. 613, 617 (i979).
147 Frisch, supra note 72, at 583-84; see also NFTC PROJECT, supra note 33, 307-311.
148 See Eric W. Bond & Larry Samuelson, Strategic Behaviour and the Rules for International
Taxation of Capital, 99 ECON. J. io99, 1104-07 (1989).
149 See I.R.C. § 9oi (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
150 See Gordon, supra note 35, at i6o-6i (arguing that source-based taxation of capital is sub-
optimal when capital is mobile). Immobile factors must bear the burden of the tax because taxing
them directly is more efficient and does not deter inbound investment. However, the survival of
such source-based taxation can be explained by the United States enacting the credit as a "Stackel-
berg leader," that is, taking into account the reaction of other countries.
151 See Eckhard Janeba, Corporate Income Tax Competition, Double Taxation Treaties, and
Foreign Direct Investment, 56 J. PUB. ECON. 311, 322 (I995).
152 See Frisch, supra note 72, at 587-91.
153 See supra pp. 1590-92. If CEN is applied to portfolio investment and corporate and share-
holder taxes are not integrated, then CEN for portfolio shareholders requires equalizing the corpo-
rate tax rate for the corporations they invest in, which in turn requires that both CEN and CIN
apply at the corporate level. See Devereux & Pearson, supra note 140, at 166o. However, if port-
folio shareholders receive a credit for corporate taxes paid (similar to the "indirect" credit given to
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Other economists have suggested that the Musgrave model for
CEN overlooks or oversimplifies other important considerations.
First, some scholars have suggested that foreign business operations
may complement domestic activities that are particularly valuable due
to intrinsic positive externalities, such as research and development
(R&D) or domestic job creation.15 4 However, even assuming that were
the case (although the evidence is not compelling), it would be better to
subsidize such activities directly because not all MNEs engage in them
to the same extent. 55
Second, Michael Devereux and Glenn Hubbard have argued that
oligopolies may generate more profits by expanding their output and
that this characteristic justifies treating such firms (Boeing, for exam-
ple) more favorably from a tax perspective. 5 6 But this argument as-
sumes that important international oligopolies exist, that governments
can commit in advance to their tax policies so as to encourage the ex-
pansion of output, and that treating foreign income more favorably for
tax purposes encourages total output. None of these assumptions is
free from doubt. 57
Third, the Musgrave model for CEN assumes a first-best world in
which there are no other economic distortions (such as other taxes),
and in which the value of an additional unit of capital therefore equals
its marginal product. Yet other taxes do in fact exist, such as the per-
sonal income tax on dividends, which may justify lighter taxation of
corporate income earned abroad. 58 However, there is no particular
reason to limit the relief to foreign source income, and if broader relief
is justified, the appropriate solution is some form of integration, rather
than relief at the corporate level.
5 9
corporate shareholders under U.S. law), maintaining shareholder-level CEN requires only CEN at
the corporate level.
154 See Hines, supra note 13o, at 395.
155 Indeed, R&D is subsidized through the tax system. See James R. Hines, Jr., On the Sensitiv-
ity of R&D to Delicate Tax Changes: The Behavior of U.S. Multinationals in the z98os, in
STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 149, 149-5' (Alberto Giovannini, R. Glenn Hubbard &
Joel Slemrod eds., 1993).
156 See Michael P. Devereux & R. Glenn Hubbard, Taxing Multinationals 5 (x999) (unpublished
Columbia University working paper, on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
1s7 See Hines, supra note 13o, at 395-96.
158 See id. at 397; Robert A. Green, The Future of Source-Based Taxation of the Income of Mul-
tinational Enterprises, 79 CORNELL L. REV. i8, 34 (1993).
159 It is possible to achieve integration at either the corporate or the shareholder level, but in
practice, it is almost always done at the shareholder level (through dividend exemption or an impu-
tation credit) to avoid automatic extension of integration to foreign shareholders. See ALVIN C.
WARREN, JR., ALI FED. INCOME TAX PROJECT, INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND
CORPORATE INCOME TAXES: REPORTER'S STUDY OF CORPORATE TAX INTEGRATION 50-52
(1993); Michael J. Graetz & Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Introduction to Integrating Corporate and Indi-
vidual Income Taxes, 1999 TAX NOTES TODAY 186-89, 10-13, available in WL 1999 TNT 186-
89.
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The most influential argument against adopting CEN for U.S.-
based multinationals derives not only from economic considerations,
but also from political ones: that CIN is necessary to preserve the
competitiveness of U.S. multinationals vis-A-vis multinationals head-
quartered in other countries. 160 For example, assume that a U.S. mul-
tinational competes with a German multinational in a host country
that does not tax either foreign investor. If the United States taxes the
U.S. multinational on its profits from the host country while Germany
exempts the profits of its multinational, the U.S. multinational argua-
bly faces a higher cost of capital and therefore a competitive disadvan-
tage. 16 1
Whatever the overall merit of this argument, 162 it implicitly as-
sumes that only unilateral, noncooperative action is possible in the
field of international taxation. However, as the cooperative ventures
discussed in Part V make clear, it is quite conceivable that all OECD
members (a group that includes the home countries of about eighty-
five percent of all multinationals) could be persuaded to adopt CEN-
based policies, which would address the competitiveness issue, at least
in the short run.163 Thus, from the perspective of this Article, the
competitiveness issue is irrelevant because the solutions discussed
herein are all multilateral and are based on cooperative, concerted ac-
tions by the United States and its major trading partners.
To sum up, CEN still appears to be the best guide for taxing cross-
border investment, including both portfolio investment and foreign di-
rect investment. Neither the economic nor the political arguments
against it are persuasive. Thus, to the extent that tax competition
leads to the undertaxation of cross-border income as compared to do-
mestic income, as described in Part II, CEN militates in favor of
curbing such tax competition. However, as discussed below in section
III.C, not all tax competition is equally harmful, and CEN should
160 See Frisch, supra note 72, at 584-85; NFTC PROJECT, supra note 33, i.
161 However, if the German multinational sets its prices to maximize profits, it will charge the
same as the U.S. multinational, and no competitive disadvantage need result. For a discussion of
the conditions under which there may be a competitive disadvantage, see Susan Rose-Ackerman,
Unfair Competition and Corporate Income Taxation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1017 (1982); and Richard
Steinberg, "Unfair" Competition by Nonprofits and Tax Policy, 44 NAT'L TAXJ. 351 x99).
162 For a critique, see Frisch, supra note 72, at 585-91. The fundamental problem with the
competitiveness argument is its assumption that the welfare of U.S.-based multinationals is identi-
cal with U.S. national welfare. This assumption is problematic when all multinationals have both
U.S. and foreign shareholders and employees. However, as Part II argues, ending deferral unilat-
erally might be counterproductive if it led new multinationals to incorporate their parents outside
the United States and existing U.S. multinationals to become subsidiaries of foreign multinationals.
163 In the long run, such curbs on tax competition for OECD members may only lead to the rise
of non-OECD-based multinationals. See iqfra pp. I665-66. From a world welfare perspective,
CEN clearly should apply to all multinationals, not just U.S. multinationals. Because of the diffi-
culties in applying CEN on a residence basis, Part V develops a source-based approach to CEN.
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therefore be balanced against other considerations that favor allowing
some forms of tax competition.
2. Welfare Economics and Public Choice. - In this section, I focus
on the economic arguments for and against tax competition from a
welfare economics perspective. The economic analysis of tax competi-
tion typically begins with Charles Tiebout's seminal 1956 article, A
Pure Theory of Local Expenditures.164 Tiebout addresses the problem
of providing public goods in a local-government context and shows
that, in that situation, the problem of knowing true voter preferences
for public goods and avoiding free riders is resolvable.1 65  The key to
Tiebout's solution is the assumption that individuals can move be-
tween localities offering fixed but different levels of public services fi-
nanced through benefits taxes.' 66 Tiebout shows that the optimal out-
come in terms of satisfying individuals' preferences can be achieved
because individuals will sort themselves geographically based on their
differing preferences, paying different levels of benefits taxes, and the
final outcome will not be inferior to market-based outcomes for private
goods.167 The implication of Tiebout's analysis is that tax differentials
among jurisdictions are socially desirable because they maximize the
ability of individuals to satisfy their preferences and, therefore, that ac-
tions to harmonize tax rates are inefficient.
Tiebout's analysis depends on two crucial assumptions: first, that
individuals are completely mobile between taxing jurisdictions; and
second, that all taxes are benefits taxes and represent payments for
goods and services provided by the government, rather than taxes
based on people's ability to pay, which have distributive goals.' 68
When either assumption is relaxed, Tiebout's analysis becomes less ac-
curate. 169 At the international level, both of Tiebout's assumptions are
problematic. As I argue above, restrictions on immigration impede in-
dividuals' ability to move between countries, and the main form of
taxation is an income tax with explicitly distributive goals. Neverthe-
less, I argue below that Tiebout's analysis retains some validity at the
164 Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956).
165 See id. at 417-18, 424.
166 See id. at 418-19.
167 See id.
168 Another assumption, discussed below, is that one jurisdiction's provision of public goods cre-
ates no positive or negative externalities on other jurisdictions.
169 For a direct criticism of the Tiebout model in the international context, see Peggy B. Mus-
grave & Richard A. Musgrave, Fiscal Coordination and Competition in an International Setting,
in MUNICH SYMPOSIUM, supra note 28, at 59, app. 81-84 (989) [hereinafter Musgrave & Mus-
grave, Fiscal Coordination]. Even Charles McLure, who generally favors tax competition at the
local level, see infra p. 1614, admits that tax competition may be harmful at the international level
because of distributive considerations and limited mobility. See McLure, supra note 28, at 101-02.
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international level for generally applicable corporate tax-rate differen-
tials among countries.
Following Tiebout, an extensive public finance literature focuses on
tax competition at the local level, concentrating specifically on the
types of taxes available to the local jurisdiction. As noted earlier, Tie-
bout's model assumes that jurisdictions levy only benefits taxes. What
happens in jurisdictions that use distortionary taxes, such as taxes on
capital, instead of benefits taxes or lump-sum taxes? George Zodrow
and Peter Mieszkowski show that in such a case, the supply of public
services will be less than optimal. 170  They analyzed the supply of
public services in a situation in which capital is mobile and the only
options available to local government are a nondistorting lump-sum
tax and a tax on capital (for example, a property tax).171 Under such
circumstances, communities would levy only the head tax for fear that
the tax on capital would drive out investment. However, if the head
tax had to be reduced (for example, for political reasons), the level of
public services would fall below the optimal level.172
Zodrow and Mieszkowski's analysis has generated several studies
that focus on the negative effects of the tax competition that occurs
when jurisdictions must tax a mobile factor, such as capital. For ex-
ample, David Wildasin has reconceptualized the analysis as a fiscal ex-
ternality: when a jurisdiction raises its taxes on capital, it causes a flow
of capital to other jurisdictions that increases their tax revenues. Con-
sequently, the first jurisdiction's desire to avoid the externality will
lead to an insufficient supply of government services in that jurisdic-
tion.' 73
170 See George R. Zodrow & Peter Mieszkowski, Pigou, 7iebout, Property Taxation, and the
Underprovision of Local Public Goods, 19 J. URB. ECON. 356, 368-69 (1986). The same result ob-
tains when the government provides services to businesses as long as perceived capital responsive-
ness to changes in the tax on capital does not fall too drastically as the level of public services in-
creases. The Zodrow and Mieszkowski model implicitly assumes that only capital is mobile
between jurisdictions, which is a realistic assumption at the international level but not at the na-
tional level.
171 See id. at 358.
172 See id. at 368.
173 See David E. Wildasin, Jnterjurisdictional Capital Mobility: Fiscal Externality and a Cor-
rective Subsidy, 25 J. URB. ECON. 193, 194 (1989). A subsidy from a higher level of government
can correct the inefficiency, but Wildasin shows that very high subsidy rates (on the order of 40%)
are needed. Obviously, at the international level there is at present no higher level of government
to provide the subsidy. Wildasin also estimates the allocative inefficiency caused by inadequate
local government spending; in his model, it could amount to 20% of spending at the margin. This
estimate depends on the elasticity of demand for public goods. It also depends on the type of pub-
lic goods involved. See Michael Keen & Maurice Marchand, Fiscal Competition and the Pattern of
Public Spending, 66 J. PUB. ECON. 33, 34-35 (1997) (showing that tax competition leads to the un-
derprovision of public goods that benefit immobile consumers, such as recreational facilities, social
services, or redistributional payments, and the overprovision of public goods that benefit mobile
capital, such as infrastructure). If governments can compete by providing public goods to industry,
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Sam Bucovetsky and John Wilson have extended this analysis to
situations in which a tax on wages, as well as a tax on capital, is pos-
sible. 174  Because labor is relatively immobile, one could argue that
taxes on wages would prevent the underprovision of public services
that would otherwise result from the fear of driving capital elsewhere;
such wage taxes would be like Pigouvian head taxes or Tieboutian
benefits taxes. However, Bucovetsky and Wilson show that even with
wage taxation, the supply of public services will continue to be ineffi-
ciently low because a tax on labor tends to reduce the labor supply in
the taxing country.' Capital will then flow out of the taxing country,
and as a result, wages and labor supplies will rise in other countries,
creating the same kind of positive externality as a tax on capital. 176
Notwithstanding this analysis, Bucovetsky and Wilson also show that
worldwide taxation of capital, if it were possible, would result in the
efficient provision of public goods. 7'
If tax competition is harmful in these ways, why do countries not
attempt to coordinate their tax policies? Studies by Wilson, Bucovet-
sky, and Ravi Kanbur and Michael Keen address this issue.' 78  These
authors show that in a tax competition situation, the residents of
smaller regions tend to benefit because small countries perceive capital
elasticity to be higher and therefore undercut larger countries' tax
rates.'7 9 Thus, even if the combined tax revenue from both large and
small regions would rise to the optimal level under a system of tax co-
ordination, the residents of the smaller regions would object because
they gain more from tax competition. The same political difficulties
make restrictions on tax competition in the international setting less
likely because smaller countries are more likely to be tax havens.'8 0
Although most of the public finance literature has tended to favor
restrictions on tax competition from a utilitarian perspective of welfare
curbing tax competition will require curbing such subsidies as well. See Clemens Fuest, Interju-
risdictional Competition and Public Expenditure: Is Tax Co-ordination Counterproductive?, 52
FINANZARCHIV 478, 492-94 ('995). The OECD is, in fact, working on limiting such subsidies.
See Marian Murphy & Udo Pretschker, Public Support to Industry, OECD OBSERVER, Feb./Mar.
1997, at I1, 14.
174 See Sam Bucovetsky & John Douglas Wilson, Tax Competition with Two Tax Instruments, 21
REGIONAL SCI. & URB. ECON. 333, 333-45 (199).
175 See id. at 342-43.
176 See id.
177 See id. at 345-49.
178 See S. Bucovetsky, Asymmetric Tax Competition, 30 J. URB. ECON. 67, 167-68 (i9gi); Ravi
Kanbur & Michael Keen, Jeux Sans Frontires: Tax Competition and Tax Coordination When
Countries Differ in Size, 83 AMER. ECON. REV. 877, 883 (1993); John Douglas Wilson, Tax Compe-
tition with Interregional Differences in Factor Endowments, 21 REGIONAL SCI. & URB. ECON.
423, 424-26 (xggi); John Douglas Wilson, Theories of Tax Competition, 52 NAT'L TAXJ. 269, 278-
79(999).
179 See, e.g., Kanbur & Keen, supra note 178, at 883.
180 Part V discusses the problem of tax havens. See infra pp. 165 2-74.
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maximization, a different mode of analysis by public finance econo-
mists yields opposite results. A fundamental assumption of the studies
cited above is that governments are benevolent - that they seek to
maximize the utility of their residents. However, as the public choice
literature shows, governments may also be considered Leviathans that
seek to maximize their revenues in their own self-interest without re-
gard for the good of the general citizenry. From this perspective, tax
competition may be beneficial because it constrains governments' ten-
dency to grow.18'
In an influential article, 8 2 which he wrote while serving as Presi-
dent Reagan's Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax
Policy, Charles McLure makes a forceful statement of the public choice
perspective on tax competition. McLure criticizes the literature on tax
competition and public finance for assuming that taxes must be levied
on mobile capital. 8 3 If governments can employ benefits taxes and
individuals are mobile, the Tiebout analysis indicates that the problem
of underprovision of public services will not arise. McLure then ar-
gues that at the state and local level, benefits taxes are both feasible
and desirable.8 4 However, the core of McLure's argument is that "tax
competition is, on balance, good" because it forces governments to be
more attentive to the desires of voters, thus mitigating the Leviathan
problem.18 5
The first prong of McLure's argument is problematic at the inter-
national level, given the limited mobility of individuals and the rele-
vance of distributive concerns.8 6 However, the Leviathan prong has
been quite influential. 187 Most of the literature addressing this issue
considers two questions: First, is either the Leviathan model or the be-
nevolent model an accurate description of governments? Second, if
governments are neither completely self-serving nor completely be-
nevolent, what are the implications for tax competition?
On the first question, Wallace Oates has studied whether the extent
of fiscal decentralization, which enables tax competition to take place,
181 The classic statement of this view comes from Geoffrey Brennan and James Buchanan. See
GEOFFREY BRENNAN & JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE POWER TO TAX: ANALYTICAL FOUNDA-
TIONS OF A FISCAL CONSTITUTION 1-33 (ig8o); Geoffrey Brennan & James M. Buchanan, Tax
Instruments as Constraints on the Disposition of Public Revenues, 9 J. PUB. ECON. 301, 3oi-18
(1978); Geoffrey Brennan & James M. Buchanan, Towards a Tax Constitution for Leviathan, 8 J.
PUB. ECON. 255, 258-60(5977).
182 Charles E. McLure, Tax Competition: Is What's Good for the Private Goose Also Good for the
Public Gander?, 39 NAT'L TAX J. 341 (1986).
183 See id. at 341-43.
184 See id. at 343-44.
18s Id. at 346.
186 McLure himself agrees. See McLure, supra note 28, at 101-02.
187 See, e.g., Fuest, supra note 173, at 478-80; Musgrave & Musgrave, Fiscal Coordination, su-
pra note 169, at 64 (responding to McLure).
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is negatively correlated with the size of the public sector, as the Levia-
than model suggests, in forty-three countries (based on IMF data) and
in the forty-eight contiguous U.S. states .1 8  In both cases, Oates finds
no relationship between the degree of decentralization and the size of
the public sector. Dani Rodrik advances a hypothesis that may ex-
plain this result: more open economies with more tax competition tend
to correlate with more extensive social insurance programs because
voters demand government insurance against the risks associated with
an open economy.18 9 Thus, the empirical data are at best inconclusive
and do not support the Leviathan model.
Jeremy Edwards and Michael Keen have directly compared the
Leviathan and benevolent views of government from the perspective
of tax competition. 190 They point out that both views are extreme
cases of a more plausible model, in which policymakers value both the
welfare of their citizens and the surplus they extract from them for
their own uses. 11 Using the model developed by Zodrow and Miesz-
kowski (who assume that governments are benevolent), they ask
whether tax competition is beneficial if policymakers -act to maximize
the welfare of citizens, if they act to maximize tax revenues, or if their
goals fall somewhere in between.1 92 They show that if coordination
leads to a small increase in the tax on mobile capital, the policymak-
ers' welfare will unambiguously increase.1 93 The welfare of a repre-
sentative citizen may also increase "if and only if the elasticity of the
tax base exceeds the policy-maker's marginal propensity to waste tax
revenue."1 94 For example, if it is estimated that the elasticity of capital
to tax increases is 0.4, then coordination is beneficial as long as gov-
ernment wastes less than forty percent of the capital tax revenue on
bureaucrats rather than using it to benefit citizens. Edwards and
Keen also show that the benefits of coordination are greater the higher
one estimates the deadweight loss from taxation because coordination
makes the tax closer to an unavoidable lump-sum tax.' 95 Thus, if the
deadweight loss from the tax is thirty cents on the dollar, they calcu-
late that coordination is desirable as long as an increase of revenues by
188 See Wallace E. Oates, Searching for Leviathan: An Empirical Study, 75 AM. EcON. REV.
748, 750 (1985).
189 See DANI RODRIK, HAS GLOBALIZATION GONE Too FAR? 59-63 (997) [hereinafter
RODRIK, GLOBALIZATION]. This issue is discussed more extensively in section IVA. See infra pp.
1635-36.
190 See Jeremy Edwards & Michael Keen, Tax Competition and Leviathan, 4o EUR. ECON. REV.
113, 114-15 (1996).
191 See id. at 1i5.
192 See id. at 115-16 (citing Zodrow & Mieszkowski, supra note 170).
193 See id. at 122-23.
194 Id. at 125.
195 See id. at 129.
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one dollar does not increase socially unproductive public expenditure
by more than twenty-three cents.
Applying Edwards and Keen's analysis requires that one define
and quantify government waste of tax revenue. However, their analy-
sis indicates that even relatively low estimates of the elasticity of capi-
tal to taxation and of the deadweight loss from taxation require a very
high estimate of government waste for the Leviathan model to be per-
suasive.
In sum, this perspective persuasively contends that undertaxation
of cross-border capital flows is problematic from the standpoint of effi-
ciency because it leads to deadweight losses. Such losses decrease
global welfare and are unlikely (except under extreme assumptions re-
garding the extent of governmental waste) to be adequately compen-
sated by benefits flowing from increased tax competition.
B. Equity: The Tax Mix
Equity in international taxation has two aspects: inter-individual
equity and inter-nation equity. Inter-individual equity considerations
determine the proper rate of taxation on cross-border transactions. 196
Inter-nation equity considerations determine the proper division of the
tax base among countries. 197 In this section, I concentrate on the im-
plications of inter-individual equity for determining proper tax rates; I
consider issues of inter-nation equity in Part IV.
The following example illustrates the traditional inter-individual
equity analysis of international taxation: Suppose individual A earns
ioo in income from domestic sources while individual B earns ioo in
income from domestic sources and ioo in income from foreign sources.
Vertical equity requires taxing B more than A because B has more in-
come, but if foreign source income is excluded, B and A will be taxed
the same. Thus, under-taxation of foreign source income is inconsis-
tent with inter-individual equity.
196 Analysis of inter-individual equity usually proceeds in terms of horizontal and vertical eq-
uity, although some commentators have argued that the former is merely a subset of the latter. See
Louis Kaplow, Horizontal Equity: Measures in Search of a Principle, 42 NAT'L TAXJ. 139, 143-44
(1989); Paul R. McDaniel & James R. Repetti, Horizontal and Vertical Equity: The Mus-
grave/Kaplow Exchange, i FLA. TAX. REV. 607, 621 (i993); Richard A. Musgrave, Horizontal Eq-
uity, Once More, 43 NAT'L TAX J. 113, 114 (iggo). Although this distinction is not crucial for the
following discussion, which focuses on the broader distributive consequences of undertaxing capi-
tal, the issue can be conceptualized as one of vertical equity.
197 See, e.g., Nancy H. Kaufman, Fairness and the Taxation of International Income, 29 LAW &
POL'Y INT'L BuS. 145 (199S); Peggy B. Musgrave, International Tax Base Division and the Multi-
national Corporation, 27 PUB. FIN. 394 (1972) [hereinafter Musgrave, International Tax Base Divi-
sion]; Richard A. Musgrave & Peggy B. Musgrave, Inter-nation Equity, in MODERN FISCAL
ISSUES 63 (Richard M. Bird & John G. Head eds., 1972) [hereinafter Musgrave & Musgrave, Inter-
nation Equity].
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The problem with this argument, when couched in such general,
impersonal terms, is that it disregards the parties' ability to respond to
taxation by shifting the source of their income. Suppose, for example,
that A's income is interest income that she can easily shift to a foreign
income source, whereas B's domestic source income is labor income
that she cannot so easily move. In that case, taxing B the same as A is
not problematic from an equity perspective because A can easily en-
sure that she pays less tax than B by shifting the source of her income
(or else other people will adjust their investments so that in equilib-
rium the after-tax returns to A and B will be equal). In that case, as
Boris Bittker has shown, the equity violation turns into a violation of
efficiency.198
The inter-individual equity argument requires a broader frame-
work, one that takes into account the relative mobility of capital and
labor.199 In general, as Part I argues, the present age of globalization
can be distinguished from the preceding one (dating from 1870 to
1914) by the fact that capital is much more mobile than labor. This
higher mobility is the result of three historical changes that took place
between 1914 and i98o. First, during the 192os, all developed coun-
tries placed extensive restrictions on immigration, making large
198 See Boris I. Bittker, Equity, Efficiency, and Income Tax Theory: Do Misallocations Drive
Out Inequities?, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 735, 738 (1979).
199 This distinction is somewhat artificial in theory because all capital is earned at some point
primarily from labor. Thus, economists would emphasize that the argument (with regard to the
consumption versus the income tax) really concerns whether differential tax rates should be ap-
plied to future versus current consumption. However, given that most societies have a lopsided
distribution of capital, and thus of income from capital, I consider it meaningful to distinguish be-
tween the majority of citizens who earn only labor income (many of whom cannot afford to save
and therefore have no significant savings or income from savings at any point in their lives) and the
small (in most countries) minority who earn significant income from capital. This distinction is
particularly significant in the cross-border context because most capital investment overseas, and
certainly most capital invested other than in widely held mutual funds (in which evasion is not an
issue), is held by the richest segment of society. For example, a i997 survey found that, in the
United States, 68% of all stock is held by the wealthiest 5% of households. See MARTHA STARR-
MCLUER, STOCK MARKET WEALTH AND CONSUMER SPENDING 14 tbl.2 (Federal Reserve Bd.
Fin. & Ec. Discussion Series No. 1998-20, 1998), available at <http://www.bog.frb.fed.us/pubs/fedsl
1998/i99820/I9982opap.pdf>. The income of that segment derives to a large extent from (previ-
ously accumulated) capital, not current labor. See Henry J. Aaron & Alicia H. Munnell, Reassess-
ing the Role for Wealth Transfer Taxes, 45 NAT'L TAX J. xI 9, 132, 130-32 (1992) ("[T]he role of be-
quests in wealth accumulation is clearly controversial and unresolved.... [T]he central finding is
that intergenerational wealth transfers are of sufficient size to establish a potential role for wealth
transfer taxes to affect the distribution of wealth."); Anne L. Alstott, The Uneasy Liberal Case
Against Income and Wealth Transfer Taxation: A Response to Professor McCaffery, 51 TAX L. REv.
363, 366 (1996). The half of American families whose annual incomes are below $50,000 have less
than $12,500 in total financial assets and thus must depend almost entirely on labor earnings for
survival. See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & JERRY L. MASHAW, TRUE SECURITY: RETHINKING
AMERICAN SOCIAL INSURANCE 69 (igg). It is in this sense that the current discussion focuses on
the relative undertaxation of capital income as a distributive issue.
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movements of labor in response to taxation very difficult.200 Second,
during the i98os, all developed and many developing countries relaxed
their capital controls, reducing significant barriers to capital mobility.
Finally, technological changes, from the development of electronic
banking to the rise of the Internet, have made instantaneous, world-
wide funds transfer possible. As noted above, international capital
movements now approximate $I trillion a day, a figure that exceeds
the annual GDP of most countries.
Given these changes and the difficulty of taxing foreign source in-
come from capital (as explained in Part II above), economists have
predicted a shift from taxes on capital (the relatively mobile factor) to
taxes on labor and land (the relatively immobile factors).20 Thus, the
public finance literature's standard recommendation for small, open
economies is to refrain from levying any taxes on capital because its
mobility may result in the tax burden being shifted to domestic labor
and land, which can be taxed directly with greater ease.20 2
Has there been such a shift from taxes on capital to taxes on labor?
A good place to test this hypothesis would be the "tax mix," that is, the
relative percentage of various types of taxes in total tax revenues, in
OECD member countries from 1965 (before the relaxation of exchange
controls) to the present. Table 2 summarizes the data from I965 to
1995.203
200 An exception is highly skilled labor, which migrates much more easily. Thus, tax competition
raises the same issues for highly skilled labor as it does for capital. See, e.g., ASSAF RAZIN &
EFRAIM SADKA, TAX BURDEN AND MIGRATION: A POLITICAL ECONOMY PERSPECTIVE 8 (Na-
tional Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 5850, x996); Jagdish N. Bhagwati & John
Douglas Wilson, Income Taxation in the Presence of International Personal Mobility: An Over-
view, in INCOME TAXATION AND INTERNATIONAL MOBILITY 1, 3 (Jagdish N. Bhagwati & John
Douglas Wilson eds., 1989). The following discussion assumes that highly skilled labor is akin to
capital (which is realistic in the sense that it is hard to distinguish the return on capital from that
on labor for entrepreneurs), and the equity analysis will focus on low-skilled labor.
201 See, e.g., TANZI, supra note. T4, at 138-39; Gordon, supra note 35, at 1161; Tanzi, supra note
3, at 27.
202 See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 35, at 116I; Razin, Sadka & Yuen, supra note 33, at 2. This rec-
ommendation is modified if the taxes imposed by the host country can be credited in the home
country. For a discussion of this issue, see below at section IV.B.2, p. 1642 & nn. 313-314.
203 This table is taken from Jeffrey Owens & Jacques Sasseville, Emerging Issues in Tax Reform9 tbl.i (Oct. 1997) (unpublished manuscript presented at the Joint IFA/OECD Seminar, New Delhi,
India, on file with the Harvard Law School Library). For more detailed data for the period from
1975 to 1992, including figures for non-OECD members, see Asegedech WoldeMariam, Summary
Tax Structure Tables, 1975-92, in TAX POLICY HANDBOOK app. (Parthasarathi Shome, Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, ed., 1995).
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TABLE 2. STRUCTURE OF TAXATION IN
OECD COUNTRIES, 1965-95
(percentage of total revenues)
Type of Tax 1 1970 1975 1:8o 1985 199o 1994 1995
Personal 26 28 30 31 30 29 27 27
income
Corporate 9 9 8 8 8 8 8 8
income I I I I
Social 18 20 22 22 22 23 25 25
security I
Property 8- 7 6 5 5 6 6 5
General 12 14 13 14 16 17 18 18
consumption
Other goods 26 22 19 18 18 14 15 15
and services
These data suggest the following conclusions. First, the data
should be interpreted in light of an overall tendency for government
revenues to grow as a percentage of GDP, not only in OECD member
countries, but also in most developing countries. °4  This trend has
continued in OECD member countries, whose average government
revenues reached 37.6% of their GDP in 1994.20 However, the rate of
growth has been considerably less steep in the i98Os and early 1990S
than in the i970s.2 °6  As Part IV discusses, the overall growth in the
tax burden can be explained by the growing role of the state in pro-
viding social insurance. The slower recent growth can be explained
by the political and practical obstacles to raising taxes to expand social
insurance programs. The growth in overall government revenues sig-
nifies that the 25% of total revenues attributed to social security (pay-
roll) taxes in 1995 represents a significantly higher percentage of GDP
204 Between the period from 1975 to 198o and the period from 1986 to 1992, the unweighted av-
erage of the percentages of GDP represented by OECD countries' tax receipts rose from 30% to
34.3%. See WoldeMariam, supranote 203, at 289 tbl.x, 293 tbl.5. The same periods saw increases
in the unweighted average from 20.5% to 21.7% in African countries, see id. at 295 tbl.7, 299
tbl.ii; from 16.6% to x8.9% in non-OECD Asian countries, see id. at 301 tbl.13, 303 tbl.17; and
from 19.3% to 19.7% in non-OECD Western Hemisphere countries, see id. at 307 tbl.25, 311 tbl.29.
Only in Middle Eastern countries was there a decline (from 37.5% to 28.3%, which includes non-
tax oil revenues, but tax revenues also declined from 15.7% to 13.6%). See id. at 304 tbl.19, 3o6
tbl.23.
205 See Owens & Sasseville, supra note 203, at 7. For a sample of industrialized countries (the
European countries, Canada, Japan, and the United States), government expenditures reached an
average of 49% of GDP in i994. See RODRIK, GLOBALIZATION, supra note 289, at 5o tbl.4.1.
206 See Owens & Sasseville, supra note 203, at 8 fig.i.
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than the 26% of total revenues attributed to taxes on "other goods and
services" (such as excise taxes and tariffs) in 1965.
Second, the data in Table 2 indicate that revenues from both the
corporate and personal income taxes have remained steady as a per-
centage of total tax revenues (although they have risen in absolute
terms, as have total revenues). In OECD member countries, revenues
from the personal income tax were 26% of total tax revenues in 1965
and 27% in 1995.207 Revenues from the corporate income tax in the
same years were 9% and 8% respectively. o0 Although the corporate
income tax is more important than the individual income tax in devel-
oping countries, the same flat relation holds for those countries as
well.209 However, because the income tax reaches both labor and capi-
tal, this flat relation may mask a shift in the tax burden from capital to
labor.2 10 The flatness is striking because in most OECD member
countries, tax rates have gone down in recent years.21'
207 See id. at 9 tbl.i. This flatness masks a slight rise in the late 197os (to a peak of 31% i 1980)
and a subsequent decline. See id.
208 See id. This average masks considerable inter-country variation. For example, in New
Zealand, revenues from the individual income tax declined from 62.6% of total tax revenues for the
period from 1975 to 1980 to 53.6% for 1986 to 1992, while revenues from the corporate income tax
declined from io.8% to 8.3%. See WoldeMariam, supra note 203, at 290 tbl.2, 294 tbl.6. In the
United States, revenues from the individual income tax stayed flat during those periods, at 46.6%
for 1975 to 198o and 46.1% for 1986 to 1992, while revenues from the corporate income tax de-
clined from 14.7% to 9.8%. See id.
209 In African countries, revenues for the individual income taxes from 1975 to 1g8o and 1986 to1992 represented 10.2 % and 11.4% of total tax revenues, respectively, while the figures for the cor-
porate income tax were 17.5% and 17.1%. See WoldeMariam, supra note 203, at 296 tbl.8, 300
tbl.12. A small decline in revenues can be observed in non-OECD Asian countries over the same
time spans (from 15.4% to 14.7% in the individual tax and from 19.7% to 16.9% in the corporate
tax). See id. at 301 tbl.14, 303 tbl.18. In non-OECD Western Hemisphere countries during these
years, there was a small decline in the individual tax's percentage (from 8.5% to 6.4%) and a small
rise in the corporate tax's (from 13.2% to 14.0%). See id. at 308 tbl.26, 31o tbl.28.
210 The individual income tax typically reaches income from both labor and capital, but the tax
rate on capital, even in developed countries, varies greatly with the type of asset. See Jeffrey
Owens, Tax Reformrfor the 21st Century, 14 TAx NOTES INT'L 583, 591 (1997) (calculating effec-
tive tax rates on pensions, housing, equities, and certificates of deposit for OECD members). For
1983, Gordon and Slemrod have calculated that the United States collected no tax on capital. See
Roger H. Gordon & Joel Slemrod, Do We Collect Any Revenue from Taxing Capital Income?, in 2
TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 89, 89 (Lawrence H. Summers ed., 1988). However, the changes
made in the 1986 Act may have modified this analysis. The incidence of the corporate income tax
is notoriously hard to assess; a recent estimate has put it in the long run as partly falling on capital
and partly on labor, see U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND
CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS: TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE 321-26 (1992). This incidence may
shift with changes in market conditions, including globalization. See Arnold C. Harberger, TheIncidence of the Corporation Income Tax, 70 J. POL. ECON. 215, 216 (1962) (basing the conclusion
that the incidence is on all capital on a closed-economy model). See infra section IV.B.3, pp. 1647-
48 (discussing incidence and its implications).
211 See CHENNELLS & GRIFFITH, supra note 128, at 31-35; Owens & Sasseville, supra note 203,
at ii; Owens, supra note 2 io, at 585-86.
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Third, both OECD member countries and developing countries
have seen a rise in taxes on consumption, which are usually considered
taxes on labor. In OECD member countries, general consumption tax,
or value-added tax (VAT), revenues rose from 12% of total tax reve-
nues in 1965 to 18% in 1995.212 In developing countries, general con-
sumption taxes rose from 25.5% of total tax revenues for the period
from 1975 to 198o to 31.8% for the period from 1986 to 1992. Most of
this increase can be explained by a rising tax rate. Jeffrey Owens and
Jacques Sasseville show that almost every OECD member country
that has a VAT (all OECD members except the United States) has
raised the standard rate since the tax was introduced.2 13
Fourth, OECD member countries have increased their payroll (so-
cial security) taxes to fund social insurance programs, from 18% of to-
tal tax revenues in 1965 to 25% in 1995.214 The majority of OECD
member countries raised more revenue in 1995 from social security
taxes than from the income tax.215 This trend can be explained by the
expansion of social insurance programs, as a result of the aging popu-
lation, and by increases in unemployment benefits, which are discussed
in Part IV.216
These four conclusions come together as follows: From I965 to
1995, governments all over the world increased substantially the per-
centage of GDP collected as tax revenues. As revenues from both the
individual and corporate income taxes have been generally flat - as a
percentage of total revenues - over this period, the increase in total
tax revenues was financed by increases in consumption taxes in all
countries and in payroll taxes in developed countries. Because both
consumption taxes and payroll taxes fall on labor, whereas income
taxes may be imposed on both labor and capital, the data are consis-
212 To some extent, this rise was offset by a decline in revenues from tariffs and excises (classi-
fied as other goods and services), but given the rise in overall government revenues, it represents a
significant increase in the tax burden.
213 The only exceptions are Canada and Switzerland, which only introduced the VAT in the
I9gos. See Owens & Sasseville, supra note 203, at 12 & tbl.4. Australia will introduce a VAT on
July x, 2000, see Tom Allard, Senate Ticks GST, and Prices Are on the Way Down, SYDNEY
MORNING HERALD, June 29, 1999, at i, available in 1999 WL 19376199, leaving the United States
as the only OECD member without a VAT, see Jeffrey Owens, What Chance for the Virtual Tax-
man?, OECD OBSERVER, Oct./Nov. 1997, at 16, 17-18.
214 See Owens & Sasseville, supra note 203, at 9 tbl.i. The rise between the periods from i975 to
I98O and from 1986 to 1992 was less pronounced (from 24.9% to 25.6%), see WoldeMariam, supra
note 203, at 290 tbl.2, 292 tbl.4, which suggests that most of the rise took place in the early 1970s.
215 See Owens & Sasseville, supra note 203, at 13.
216 See infra pp. 1632-33, 1638. Payroll taxes are less important in developing countries, where
government employment and government spending on general programs are more significant than
direct social insurance. In non-OECD countries, payroll taxes tended to remain flat between the
periods from 1975 to I98O and from 1986 to 1992.
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tent with the shift from taxing capital to taxing labor predicted as a
consequence of globalization.
In addition, more specific data on trends in income taxation suggest
that the effective tax rate on income from capital may be declining.
Effective tax rates can be measured in three ways. First, the model
developed by Mervyn King and Don Fullerton calculates a country's
effective marginal tax rate (EMTR), the difference between the pretax
and the post-tax rates of return for the marginal investment, by using
a simulated investment project and by assuming certain inflation and
interest rates.217 Second, a similar model yields the effective average
tax rate (EATR), the difference between the project's value in the ab-
sence of tax and its value in the presence of tax.218 The EATR is rele-
vant for a project that earns some economic rent, as most projects fi-
nanced by multinationals do. Finally, another mode of computation of
effective tax rates attempts to calculate the actual average tax rate(ATR) based on financial data published by firms in their financial ac-
counts. The ATR differs from the EMTR and EATR in that it is
based on actual firm-level data and not on hypothetical assump-
tions.219 The quality of the data available for ATR calculations, how-
ever, varies greatly from country to country.220
The virtue of all three methods is that they take into account both
changes in the statutory tax rate and changes in the tax base. Thus, if
tax reform leads to a reduction in the statutory rate that is offset by
widening the tax base, as most I98os-era tax reforms in OECD mem-
ber countries aimed to do, effective tax rates should remain un-
changed. 221 Lucy Chennells and Rachel Griffith report the results
from calculating EMTRs, EATRs, and ATRs for a sample of ten
OECD member countries over the period from 1979 to 1994.222 They
find that domestic EMTRs declined from an average of 21.7% in 1979
to 20.5% in 1994.223 Similarly, domestic EATRs, which are more rele-
vant for foreign direct investment, declined over the same period from
21.7% to 17.9%.224 Finally, ATRs based on actual accounting data for
six of the countries - Australia, France, Germany, Japan, the United
217 See CHENNELLS & GRIFFITH, supra note 128, at 37, 40 (citing THE TAXATION OF INCOME
FROM CAPITAL: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM,
SWEDEN, AND WEST GERMANY (Mervyn King & Don Fullerton eds., 1984)).
218 See id. at 38.
219 See id. at 4o-41.
220 Most ATR calculations are based on the income tax footnote as summarized in the
COMPUSTAT database and represent the ratio of the net provision for current taxes to net pretax
income. Data based on tax returns are superior but are not usually available.
221 For an overview of tax reforms in the Ig8os, see CHENNELLS & GRIFFITH, supra note 128, at
26-30.
222 See CHENNELLS & GRIFFITH, supra note 128, at i.
223 See id. at 46 tbl.4.2.
224 See id. at 53 tbl.4.4.
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Kingdom, and the United States - declined from 40.0% in 1985 to
32.6% in 1994.215 Because these calculations are based on corporate
income taxes, they can be assumed to fall on income that is mobile
relative to labor income.2 26
Harry Grubert's data, based on actual tax returns, offer further
confirmation of this decline in effective corporate tax rates.2 27 Grubert
studied changes in the average effective tax rates in a sample of sixty
countries for the period from 1984 to I992 and supplemented the sam-
ple with published financial data for the years after 1992. He found
that ATRs fell from 32.9% in 1984 to 23% in 1992.228 Statutory rates
also fell, but by less than did effective rates - from 41.2% to 33.4%.229
Moreover, the decline in ATRs was largest in countries with a popula-
tion of less than I5 million, which are likely to be more sensitive to
capital flows, and smallest in countries with more restrictions on capi-
tal flows. Thus, the data are consistent with the hypothesis that capi-
tal mobility may be driving down effective rates on income from capi-
tal.230
Rodrik has calculated unweighted average effective tax rates on
capital and labor for France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the
United States for the period from 1970 to I991.231 The data indicate
that taxes on both capital and labor in those countries went up in tan-
dem from 1970 until about i98I, but that since then, taxes on capital
have gone down while taxes on labor have continued to rise.
2 32
Finally, a series of studies has used data from national income ac-
counts to calculate tax rates. The advantage of this method is that it
uses actual revenues to compute effective tax rates on consumption,
22S See id. at 63 tbl.4.6.
226 Chennells and Griffith argue that their data do not exhibit tax competition because there is
little evidence of convergence. See id. at 8o. But, as noted above in Part II, until taxes reach o%,
tax competition can lead to a general downward trend without any convergence taking place. See
supra note 67.
227 See Grubert, supra note 67. Grubert uses Form 5471, which a corporation files for every
CFC and which includes foreign taxes paid and net income reported. See id. at 8.
228 See id. at 30 tbl.8.
229 See id.; see also Altshuler, Grubert & Newlon, supra note 63, at 11 (finding a decline of more
than 15% in ATRs and a 14% drop in statutory tax rates between 1984 and 1992, which indicate
rate reductions that were not compensated for by base-broadening).
230 Grubert notes that there was little convergence and that reductions in tax were lower in the
EU and argues that these points militate against the tax competition explanation. See Grubert,
supra note 67, at 17-18. But as I explain above, tax competition does not imply convergence, see
supra note 67, and EU tax rates may have been kept up by the need to fund generous social insur-
ance programs, see infra p. 1634. As I explain below in Part IV, however, this ability to tax capital
to fund social insurance may not last. See infra pp. 1633-34.
231 See RODRIK, GLOBALIZATION, supra note 189, at 63-64.
232 See id. at 65 fig.4.4.
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capital, and labor separately.233 Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar calculated
tax rates for the G7 countries from 1965 to 1988 and found that al-
though taxes on consumption and capital income tended to be station-
ary,234 "the tax rate on labor income has followed an increasing trend
in all countries. '235 In another study, Mendoza and his colleagues used
the same methodology to calculate tax rates for eighteen OECD mem-
ber countries for the period from 1965 to 1991.236 They then calcu-
lated a regression relating those data to a measure of "lagged open-
ness," defined as the sum of imports plus exports divided by total
output in the economy for the previous year.23 7 They found that taxes
on labor respond positively to increases in lagged openness while taxes
on capital respond negatively.238 That is, as an economy becomes
more open to capital flows, it tends increasingly to shift the tax burden
from capital to labor.
What are the equity implications of these data? Because labor is
generally less mobile than capital, a decline in taxes on capital and a
rise in taxes on labor usually involves a change in the tax burden that
cannot be offset by income shifting and that therefore tends to violate
vertical equity. More broadly, because the rich save more than the
poor, taxes on labor, such as consumption and payroll taxes, are gener-
ally more regressive than taxes on capital or on savings. Thus, a shift
in the tax burden from capital to labor tends to render the tax system
more regressive. Such a tax system is also less capable of redistribu-
ting resources from the rich to the poor.239 As a result, the overall dis-
tribution of income in a society tends to become more inequitable
233 For this purpose, taxes on consumption comprise general taxes on goods and services and
excise taxes. Taxes on labor comprise the portion of the individual income tax that falls on wages,
social security taxes - both employee and employer portions - and payroll taxes. Taxes on capi-
tal comprise the portion of the individual income tax that falls on non-wage income, corporate in-
come taxes, property taxes, and taxes on financial transactions.
234 See Enrique G. Mendoza, Assaf Razin & Linda L. Tesar, Effective Tax Rates in Macroeco-
nomics: Cross-Country Estimates of Tax Rates on Factor Incomes and Consumption, 34 J.
MONETARY ECON. 297, 307-o8, 306 tbl.I, 3o8 tbl.3 (1994).
235 Id. at 308; see also id. at 307 tbl.2.
236 See ENRIQUE G. MENDOZA, GIAN MARIA MILESI-FERRETTI & PATRICK ASEA, ON THE
INEFFECTIVENESS OF TAX POLICY IN ALTERING LONG-RUN GROWTH: HARBERGER'S
SUPERNEUTRALITY CONJECTURE 4 (Centre for Econ. Policy Research Discussion Paper No. 1378,
1996). These countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the
United Kingdom, and the United States. See id. at 18.
237 See DANI RODRIK, THE NEW GLOBAL ECONOMY AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: MAKING
OPENNESS WORK 28 fig.2.I, 24-40 (1999).
238 See MENDOZA, MILESI-FERRETTI & ASEA, supra note 236, at 28-29.
239 A graduated consumption tax of the cash flow type can be progressive, but this phenomenon
does not apply to the VAT, which typically has only one or two rates. In addition, the exclusion of
income from savings from the tax base means that in most plausible scenarios, even a cash flow
consumption tax will be less progressive than the income tax. Payroll taxes tend to be regressive
because they are typically proportional and capped at a certain level of income.
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compared to a proportional distribution, as measured by the Gini coef-
ficient.2 40
The range of before-tax incomes widened in the 198os and 199os in
several OECD countries, including the United Kingdom and the
United States. Given the alterations in tax patterns surveyed above,
this development means that the change in after-tax distribution of in-
come is likely to be greater with an increase in the Gini coefficient.
2 41
This pattern is not limited to OECD member countries. The evidence
from Latin America indicates that as countries have opened their bor-
ders, income inequality has tended to rise.242  For example, in Chile,
which led the trend of Latin American trade and investment liberaliza-
tion, the Gini coefficient rose from 0.46 in 1971 to 0.58 in 1989, one of
the largest jumps ever witnessed in a single country over such a short
period of time.2 43
As capital mobility has increased since the relaxation of exchange
controls in the early 198os, taxes on capital have tended to decrease
and taxes on labor to increase in both developed and developing coun-
tries. Because labor is less mobile than capital, it is generally not able
to turn the inequity into an efficiency by moving to countries with
lower tax rates. Moreover, because capital income accrues dispropor-
tionately to the rich, the shift in tax burden from capital to labor has
tended to make all societies less equitable in terms of the distribution
of income or wealth. Remedying this situation calls for finding ways
to tax capital despite its relatively high mobility. These methods will
be explored in Part V.
C. Democracy: Two Types of Tax Competition
The preceding two sections have focused on the ways in which tax
competition on income from capital can be harmful: It can lead to an
inefficient global allocation of capital. It can also force governments to
use relatively regressive forms of taxation and limit their ability to use
taxes on capital for redistributive purposes. These efficiency and eq-
uity considerations all support the conclusion that tax competition
should be limited.
240 The Lorenz curve is the relationship between the percentage of income and the percentage of
individuals in a society. A straight Lorenz curve implies that the distribution of income in a society
is completely equal, meaning that the bottom 5o% of the people has 5o% of the income. The Gini
coefficient is the ratio of the area above the Lorenz curve to that below the diagonal. A zero Gini
coefficient indicates complete equality; a Gini coefficient of i means that all income accrues to one
individual, or that income is distributed in a completely unequal way. See Howell H. Zee, Taxa-
tion and Equity, in TAX POLICY HANDBOOK, supra note 203, at 30, 32.
241 See Owens & Sasseville, supra note 203, at 35.
242 See generally DANI RODRIK, THE NEW GLOBAL ECONOMY AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:
MAKING OPENNESS WORK 13-14 (1999) [hereinafter RODRIK, NEW GLOBAL ECONOMY].
243 See id. at 14.
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However, these considerations must be balanced against another:
Tax competition can reflect the divergent preferences of citizens of
democracies for particular government sizes. In fact, the level and
type of taxation are among the most important decisions made by vot-
ers in democracies, and those decisions provide an image of the society
citizens prefer. From a welfare economics perspective, tax competition
is beneficial to the extent that it reflects these voter preferences. Thus,
it is necessary to inquire whether it is possible to distinguish between
types of tax competition that are likely to reflect such preferences and
those that are less likely to do so. A clear case can be made for limit-
ing the latter type of tax competition; the case for limiting the former
type - tax competition that reflects preferences for the desirable size
of government - is more problematic.
We can start with the Tiebout model, in which tax competition -
or at least differences in tax rates among jurisdictions, as Tiebout as-
sumes that the rates are fixed - is beneficial because it enables citi-
zens to maximize their welfare by moving to the jurisdiction that re-
flects their personal tax preferences. 44  On its face, this model is
inapplicable to the problem that lies at the heart of this Article - the
problem of how to tax mobile capital in an open economy - because
on the international level individuals cannot easily move from one
country to another and because taxes are used to redistribute wealth as
well as to pay for government goods and services.
However, the Tiebout model remains useful to consideration of in-
ternational tax competition. First, even though citizens cannot move
from country to country, they can vote in democratic countries, and
given the salience of the tax issue in politics, it seems likely that their
votes actually affect the level of government taxation and spending.2 45
Thus, one can envisage a situation in which the world is divided intojurisdictions with different levels of public spending, each of which
depends on the wishes of the majority of each country's citizens.
Second, the focus in tax competition has been on source-based cor-
porate taxes. 246 These taxes are much closer to the benefits taxes Tie-
244 See Tiebout, supra note 68, at 418.
245 The level and form of taxation have been crucial issues in recent elections in Australia, Can-
ada, Japan, and the United States. See, e.g., Richard J. Vann & Graeme S. Cooper, Report of Aus-
tralia's Business Tax Review and the Government's Response, 1999 WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY 191-6,
available in WL 1999 WTD 191-6; Larry M. Greenberg, Canadian Elections Promise Acid Test on
Lower Taxes or Improved Services, WALL ST. J., June 2, 1999, at A21; Hold On, Japan's Busy,ECONOMIST, Sept. 12, 1998, at 39; Alison Mitchell, Republicans Looking Right and Left for the
Best Tax Cut Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1999, at AI3.
246 Source-based taxation on portfolio income of individuals is also at issue, but only as a back-
stop for residence-based taxation; if residence-based taxation of individuals could be ensured, noproblem would arise, even if tax competition meant zero source-based taxation. For corporations,
however, residence-based taxation is implausible, as Part V argues. See infra p. 1666 & n. 451, pp.1670-71. A different type of benefit analysis applies to individual investors: those investors who
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bout described than is generally recognized. They are not a significant
factor in redistribution; in fact, their incidence is both unknown and
possibly inconstant from year to year. Instead, they represent both a
payment to the source country for the costs it incurs to enable invest-
ment by a multinational and a way of ensuring source countries, par-
ticularly developing source countries, an adequate tax base.
247
This leads to an important distinction: If a multinational invests in
a country with a small public sector, it will probably have to incur
more costs or earn lower profits than if the public sector were larger.
For example, it may have to invest in training for its workers because
the government provides inadequate public education, or it may have
to build its own transportation systems because the government does
not supply adequate infrastructure. In that case, it would be inappro-
priate to penalize the multinational by taxing it at a higher rate -
such as its home-country rate - to offset the lower taxes levied by the
host country.2 48  If the multinational faces lower profits, the incentive
to locate in the low-tax country would be limited, and therefore the
negative effects of tax competition would be curtailed as well.
But this argument holds true only if the public sector is smaller as
a result of a generally applicable tax decrease. If, on the other hand,
the government decides to maintain high taxes on immobile factors,
such as labor and land, and to grant the multinational a targeted tax
holiday, or equivalently to subsidize it with targeted expenditures on
training and infrastructure, the multinational reaps a windfall. Hav-
ing made the decision to invest somewhere, the multinational can then
choose the location that offers it the best tax and subsidy package,
aware that because the general level of taxation on domestic labor and
land is high, it will not have to incur additional costs.
Thus, this line of analysis suggests a distinction between generally
applicable tax decreases that reduce the overall size of the public sec-
tor and tax decreases or subsidies that are limited only to foreign in-
vestors. In the former case, the tax reduction represents the wishes of
the electorate and does not confer a windfall on foreign investors. In
the latter case, the electorate is unlikely to be involved, because tax
holidays to foreign investors are rarely the subject of political attention
reside in high-tax countries but earn untaxed overseas income free-ride on the benefits provided by
the high-tax country, that is, they do not pay the price of civilization.
247 For an argument that source-based corporate income taxation is correlated with costs im-
posed, see Avi-Yonah, International Taxation of Electronic Commerce, supra note 4o , at 520-2 I.
For a discussion of the inter-nation equity rationale for allowing developing countries to tax multi-
nationals, see below at Part IV.
248 Although the tax paid by the multinational in its home country would be lower to the extent
that its deductible costs in the low-tax country are higher, this decrease is the equivalent of grant-
ing a deduction rather than a credit for the forgone host-country tax. It would not compensate the
multinational for its lower profit.
1627
HeinOnline  -- 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1627 1999-2000
HARVARD LAWRE VIEW
even if they are made public.2 49 Moreover, the tax holiday represents
a windfall to the multinational because the multinational benefits from
a large public sector financed by high, generally applicable taxes.
The same distinction can also be made from a Leviathan perspec-
tive, under which overall tax reductions may be beneficial, especially if
they stem from the voters' mandate and if they result in smaller gov-
ernments. By contrast, targeted incentives aimed at foreigners do not
produce similar positive effects, as the reductions' relative size is too
small to affect the overall size of government. In fact, targeted tax in-
centives can themselves be seen as a form of government waste: they
enable elected officials to boast about job creation in the short run
without engaging in an adequate cost-benefit analysis of the revenues
lost in the long run. 250 The costs of targeted tax incentives - lost
revenues and congestion problems - are likely to be less salient politi-
cally than the immediate benefits from job creation, especially when
unemployment is a central political issue.
I suggest, therefore, that the line between beneficial and harmful
tax competition be drawn between general tax reductions that apply to
all taxpayers, domestic and foreign, and targeted tax reductions that
are granted only to foreign investors. Under this definition, harmful
tax competition includes both production and headquarters tax havens,
because these are typically granted only to foreign multinationals. It
also includes reductions in withholding taxes that are aimed solely at
attracting foreign capital, unless measures are taken to ensure resi-
dence-based taxation.251 Finally, harmful tax competition includes
traditional offshore tax havens with a low or zero tax rate, if the tax
base is confined almost entirely to foreign investors.25 2 Such investors
have no real business operations in the tax haven and therefore suffer
no detriment from the small size of the public sector. However, harm-
ful tax competition does not include overall reductions in the tax rate
that apply to all taxpayers in a jurisdiction when the tax base includes
significant numbers of domestic taxpayers.
249 A rare exception to this rule is the benefit package that Alabama granted Mercedes-Benz,
which was widely criticized because the dollar amount of incentive per job created was three times
the amount any state had previously paid to a foreign investor. This affair became an election is-
sue and contributed to Governor Jim Folsom's 1994 defeat. See Allen R. Myerson, 0 Governor,
Won't You Buy Me a Mercedes Plant?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. I, 1996, § 3, at i.
250 Most studies of targeted tax benefits designed to attract investment in both the state and in-
ternational context have found that, although these benefits are effective in attracting the invest-
ment, see supra pp. i59o-9i; infra pp. 1643-44, the returns to the host country are insufficient in
the long run to compensate for the lost revenues, see supra pp. 16ol-02; infra pp. 1646-47.
251 Because individual income taxes should be levied primarily by the home country, reducing
withholding taxes is acceptable if residence-based taxation is ensured.
2S2 "Almost entirely" requires a definition: perhaps a tax incentive of 90% or more, the benefits
of which redound to foreigners, would qualify. Traditional tax havens would generally cross this
line. Although one can imagine marginal cases, the distinction would be clear in most situations.
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A possible objection is that the preceding sections' arguments
against tax competition on efficiency and equity grounds apply to all
forms of tax competition, not just to harmful tax competition as de-
fined above. After all, a generally applicable tax decrease, which I ex-
clude from the definition of harmful tax competition above, can draw
a large flow of capital from one country to another and result in an in-
efficient allocation of capital and in limitations on the home country's
ability to redistribute income equitably.
However, as noted above, such considerations need to be balanced
against the ability of voters in democratic countries to determine the
desirable size of their public sector, even if this approach has potential
adverse consequences for other countries. This judgment is both a
normative and a practical one: as the failed attempts to impose mini-
mum tax rates in Europe show, countries are highly reluctant to give
up their right to set generally applicable tax rates, because that right is
a core attribute of sovereignty. 5 3 However, they would be more likely
to relinquish their right to target tax incentives at foreigners if they
knew that the main reason for granting the incentive was fear that the
capital would otherwise flow to another country that grants such in-
centives. In this kind of assurance game situation, multilateral action
can achieve the best outcome for all concerned. 54
The distinction that I propose between harmful and beneficial tax
competition can be illustrated by two examples drawn from recent
U.S. history. Ronald Reagan was elected president in 198o on the ba-
sis of explicit promises to reduce the size of the federal government
and to cut taxes. In 1981, he fulfilled the latter pledge by signing the
largest individual and corporate tax decrease in U.S. history. In par-
ticular, the adoption of the accelerated cost recovery system (ACRS)
and an investment tax credit (ITC) meant that new capital investment
by corporations would be more than expensed, resulting in negative
tax rates on normal corporate profits. This result, in turn, led to a
proliferation of tax shelters for individuals, so that in 1983, according
to Gordon and Slemrod, the United States collected no net tax whatso-
ever on capital income.255
2S3 In 1975, the European Commission proposed a directive for uniform minimum and maxi-
mum corporate tax rates. The Council never adopted the directive, which was withdrawn in 199o.
See Commission Communication to Parliament and the Council, Guidelines on Company Thxation
(SEC go/o6oi final, Brussels, Apr. 20, 199o) (withdrawing Corporation Tax Directive, COM(75 )3 92
final). The Ruding committee made a similar proposal, see RUDING REPORT, supra note i9, at
202, which was never seriously considered.
254 For a more detailed discussion of how such cooperative outcomes can be implemented, see
below at Part V.
2SS See Gordon & Slemrod, supra note 21o, at 89. The 1981 tax cuts were partially reversed in
1982. See Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, tits. II-IV, 96
Stat. 324, 411-671. The Tax Reform Actof z986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, ioo Stat. 2o85, largely elimi-
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The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA),25 6 together with
the Reagan defense buildup, also caused a burgeoning budget deficit.
A flow of foreign capital into the United States, at least in part the di-
rect result of lower tax rates, financed this deficit. Hans-Werner Sinn
estimates that the ACRS and ITC generated a flow of between $i tril-
lion and $1.5 trillion, or seven percent of the world's capital stock at
that time, into the United States from 1981 to 1984.27 This influx of
foreign capital was predictable because, in the absence of an increase
in domestic (private) savings and given a decline in aggregate (public
and private) savings, additional investment to finance the deficit could
come only from abroad.25 8
Sinn also argues that the consequences of this inflow were clearly
beneficial to the United States and detrimental to the rest of the world:
The first half of the [I98OS] was characterized by enormous capital im-
ports into the United States accompanied by a strong dollar and a high
world interest rate level. Most countries suffered from this situation.
Europe was driven into the worst recession of the post-war period, and
the developing countries were shaken by one debt crisis after another. A
number of countries were unable to meet their interest obligations, and a
collapse of the world banking system was avoided only by strenuous ef-
fort. The United States alone seemed to have benefited: despite the high
interest rate it enjoyed a significant consumption and investment boom. 25 9
Thus, Sinn would have supported action by the EU to curb such tax
competition from the United States by, for example, taxing its residents
on their U.S.-source income. But it is unlikely that the United States
would have agreed to cooperate in such a move (and thereby to forgo
the benefits of its tax reduction). Without U.S. cooperation, it is un-
likely that Europe could have succeeded in taxing its individual resi-
dents on their U.S. source income.2 60
Moreover, from a normative perspective, the United States could
argue that it has no obligation to maintain a larger public sector than
nated tax shelters, broadened the tax base, and reduced rates. The 1986 Act was intended to be
revenue neutral so that it would preserve the overall tax cut of Ig81. See Joel Slemrod, The Eco-
nomic Impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, in Do TAXES MATTER? THE IMPACT OF THE TAX
REFORM ACT OF 1986 I, 2-3 (Joel Slemrod ed., 199o). Consequently, budget deficits persisted
through the i98os. The 1986 Act led many foreign governments to reduce their rates and broaden
their base. See John Whalley, Foreign Responses to U.S. Tax Reform, in Do TAXES MATTER?, su-
pra, at 286, 286-87, 288 tbl.9.I.
256 Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172.
257 See Hans-Werner Sinn, United States Tax Reform 198r and 1986: Impact on International
Capital Markets and Capital Flows, in MUNICH SYMPOSIUM, supra note 28, at 25, 31.
258 See McLure, International Considerations, supra note 29, at 7. McLure states, however, that
"[r]elatively few seem to have appreciated the full international consequences of these actions." Id.
259 HANS-WERNER SINN, CAPITAL INCOME TAXATION AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION 224-25(1987).
260 Most of the capital inflow took the form of individual portfolio investment, which, as I argue
in section II.A, is difficult to tax unilaterally on a residential basis.
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its citizens desired and that its citizens were entitled to the tax cuts
they supported, even if those cuts had negative incidental effects on
Europe. The U.S. government's primary obligation is the welfare of
the citizens who elect it, not that of Europeans.
However, consider as a counterexample the portfolio interest ex-
emption enacted in 1984 to facilitate financing the same deficit. As
Part II describes, this provision targeted foreigners exclusively. 61 It
was not widely discussed in Congress or elsewhere and was passed
largely at the behest of the Treasury and U.S. banks.2 62 As a provision
aimed solely at foreigners, it had a relatively small impact on the over-
all size of government; the tax expenditure budget does not even in-
clude it. But the results for Latin American countries, which lost $300
billion in capital flight as a direct result of the exemption's enactment,
were devastating. 263 In part because of the lack of public exposure
that the provision received, the administration apparently did not fore-
see these results. 2 64 If these effects were indeed foreseeable, perhaps
the government should have chosen other means to reduce the cost of
borrowing (for example, by maintaining the Netherlands Antilles
treaty or renegotiating the treaty with Japan).
Therefore, I recommend that proposals to curb tax competition
(such as the current EU and OECD proposals) be evaluated based in
part on the extent to which they observe the above distinction, as well
as on their likely effectiveness in practice. In particular, proposals that
would have limited the United States's ability to enact ERTA are un-
likely to succeed in practice; proposals that would have prevented the
enactment of the portfolio interest exemption are much more likely to
prove successful. In Part V, I attempt such an evaluation.
IV. THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF TAX COMPETITION FROM
EACH COUNTRY'S PERSPECTIVE
In Part III, I discussed the arguments from a global perspective for
and against tax competition. However, it is not an authoritative
"world tax organization" that designs international tax rules, but each
country acting separately with its own interests in mind. Thus, in this
Part, I analyze the costs and benefits of tax competition from the per-
spectives of the affected countries, turning first to developed welfare
states and then to developing and transition economies. Finally, I
analyze how tax competition affects the division of tax revenues
261 See supra p. 1579.
262 The banks also succeeded in inserting a provision to deny the benefits of the exemption to
foreign banks. See I.R.C. § 881(cX3)(A) (1994).
263 See McLure, Capital Flight from Latin America, supra note 29, at 343-46.
264 See McLure, International Considerations, supra note 29, at 8-9.
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among countries, a division that relates to the concept of inter-nation
equity.
A. Developed Countries and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State
The welfare state, which began over a century ago with Bismarck's
social insurance scheme (financed by a comprehensive income tax),265
now faces a severe fiscal crisis. The fundamental problem is an aging
population - the result of the post-World War II baby boom and an
increasing life span, together with a decreasing number of births. The
result has been a significant increase in almost every OECD member
country's "dependency ratio," defined as the ratio of the young (those
under age twenty) and the elderly (those above the retirement age for
public pensions) to the working-age population. For example, in Ja-
pan the dependency ratio will rise from about 40% in 1995 to a peak
of 6o% in 2045; in Germany it will rise from 30% in 1995 to over 6o%
in 2035. Even in the United States, which has relatively high fertility
and immigration rates, the dependency ratio will rise from about 20%
in 1995 to 40% in 2035.266 In the OECD generally, the percentage of
the population over 6o will rise from 18.2% in 1990 to 27.0% in 2020
and will peak at 31.2% in 2050.267
The fiscal implications of this "old age crisis" are profound.268 The
OECD has published fiscal scenarios for its members based on their
starting positions in 2000, their various demographic changes, and
their budgets' susceptibility to the effects of aging under existing ar-
rangements for public pensions and public health spending. 69 The
projections indicate that by 203o, all of the OECD members studied
except Ireland will experience a budget deficit, ranging from o.5% of
GDP in Belgium to 8.7% of GDP in Japan.270
"Generational accounting" is helpful in analyzing the tax implica-
tions of this phenomenon. Generational accounting compares the es-
timated lifetime net tax rates facing future generations with the rate
today's newborns must pay to finance current government programs
265 See, e.g., ALEXANDER HICKS, SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND WELFARE CAPITALISM 13 (1999).
266 See DEBORAH ROSEVEARE, WILLI LEIBFRITZ, DOUGLAS FORE & ECKHARD WURZEL,
AGEING POPULATIONS, PENSION SYSTEMS AND GOVERNMENT BUDGETS: SIMULATIONS FOR 20
OECD COUNTRIES 27 fig.i (OECD Econ. Dep't Working Paper No. 168, I996).
267 See McLure, Keynote Address, supra note 35, at 3.
268 WORLD BANK, AVERTING THE OLD AGE CRISIS: POLICIES TO PROTECT THE OLD AND
PROMOTE GROWTH 1 (4994) [hereinafter AVERTING THE OLD AGE CRISIS]; see also ESTELLE
JAMES, PROTECTING THE OLD AND PROMOTING GROWTH: A DEFENSE OF AVERTING THE OLD
AGE CRISIS 2 (World Bank Policy Research Dep't Working Paper No. 1570, 1996).
269 See ROSEVEARE, LEIBFRITZ, FORE & WURZEL, supra note 266, at 5-6.
270 See id. at 21 tbl.5. The OECD study projects that the United States will be roughly in the
middle, with a deficit of 3.8% of GDP. See id. For more data on the old age crisis and its fiscal
implications, see OECD, MAINTAINING PROSPERITY IN AN AGEING SOCIETY 9-26 (1998); and
OECD, NEW DIRECTIONS IN HEALTH CARE POLICY 13-19 (1995).
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without change. 71 Kotlikoff estimates that for future generations in
the United States, the net tax rate will be an impossibly high 84%.272
To equalize lifetime net tax rates of current newborns and future gen-
erations from 2oo6 onward, Kotlikoff estimates, it will be necessary ei-
ther to increase federal income taxes by 6i%, to cut transfer payments
by 43%, or to reduce federal purchases by (an impossible) Jo9%.273
The picture is similar for other countries: the generational imbalance
for males -- the increase in net tax payments for future generations
required to finance future benefits at current rates - ranges from 27%
in Germany to 446% in Italy.2 74
An OECD study concludes: "Where major fiscal pressures have
been identified ... some policy action will be needed to redress im-
balances. Without such action, government dissaving could also lead
to significant reductions in national savings in some countries .... ,,27s
The OECD study identifies three policy options: to increase the
workforce through immigration; to increase taxes or cut other expendi-
tures; or to cut health and pension programs.2 76 The first option is un-
realistic given the number of immigrants required. The second option
is likewise untenable because to cut other expenditures by the neces-
sary amount would require, for example, that the United States elimi-
nate all defense spending and that Japan cut double its projected ex-
penditures on general public services and defense. As for raising taxes,
"[g]iven concerns about existing overall tax burdens, the option of
raising taxes is not considered further."277  The third option, cutting
social programs, is the only viable alternative remaining.
271 See The Erosion of the American Dream Hearing Before the House Comm. on the Budget,
1o4th Cong. 28--29 (1996) (statement of Laurence J. Kotlikoff, professor of economics, Boston Uni-
versity). Net tax. payments are taxes paid less transfers received; lifetime net tax rates are the pro-
jected net tax payments divided by the present discounted value of projected earnings. See id. at
29.
272 See id. at 3o-31.
273 See id. at 32-33 & chart 2. All of these may seem politically impossible, but if the United
States were to introduce a VAT, revenues would likely exceed 6o% of current federal revenues from
the income tax. (In other OECD members, VAT revenues almost equal income tax revenues.) In
general, it is unclear why a debate on the future of social insurance in the United States has to as-
sume revenue neutrality, a point illustrated in GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 199, at 177.
274 See WILLI LEIBFRrrz, DEBORAH ROSEVEARE, DOUGLAS FORE & ECKHARD WURZEL,
AGEING POPULATIONS, PENSION SYSTEMS AND GOVERNMENT BUDGETS: How Do THEY
AFFECT SAVING? 40 tbl.i i (OECD Econ. Dep't Working Paper No. i56, 1995).
275 Id. at 17. The last point refers to the possibility that the government may finance its budget
deficit through borrowing. This practice is generally considered to have adverse effects on the
economy because it crowds out private investment options. See, e.g., Theodore P. Seto, Drqfling a
Federal Balanced Budget Amendment That Does What It Is Supposed to Do (and No More), io6
YALE L.J. 1449, 1463 (x997); Herbert Stein, The Significance of Budget Deficits, in A NATION IN
DEBT: ECONOMISTS DEBATE THE FEDERAL BUDGET DEFICIT 235, 238-39 (Richard H. Fink &
Jack C. High eds., 1987).
276 See LEIBFRITZ, ROSEVEARE, FORE & WURZEL, supra note 274, at 18-23.
277 Id. at 21.
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The OECD study's conclusion regarding taxes seems too broad.
The key questions are what types of taxes are involved and in which
countries. In the United States, for example, because overall taxation
amounts only to about 30% of GDP, there appears theoretically to be
considerable opportunity for raising additional revenues (for example,
by means of a VAT) before reaching European levels of public expen-
diture (about 50% of GDP). In Europe, the possibility of raising taxes
is much more limited. VAT rates in many European countries now ex-
ceed 20%,278 which is about as high as a consumption tax can go be-
fore the incentive to consume elsewhere becomes too significant and
enforcement costs swallow the additional revenues. Payroll taxes cur-
rently fund most social insurance, but given the high level of unem-
ployment in Europe, it seems counterproductive to raise payroll tax
rates even further.27 9 In addition, high payroll tax rates may create in-
efficient incentives for employers to hire part-time or foreign workers
whose wages are not subject to the same rates. 280
Still remaining for consideration is the option of raising more reve-
nue through the income tax. Raising income taxes risks exacerbating
current distortions - which inhere in Europe's current high rates of
income tax - in the choices of whether to work and whether to save
or consume. However, as Part II explains, income from cross-border
investments is currently taxed at effective rates much lower than the
generally applicable ones. Therefore, to tax such income at rates that
approximate the rates on domestic investment would both advance
world efficiency and equity and raise more revenue to help address the
fiscal crisis described above.281
This rationale may explain the EU's and OECD's interest in
curbing "harmful tax competition" even though there may be insuffi-
cient evidence of actual erosion of the tax base. The potential for ero-
sion certainly exists, and OECD governments are acutely aware that,
at least until 2050 or so, they will need every penny they can collect in
taxes to sustain their promises to the baby boom generation. Because
of the demographically predictable need for additional revenues and
the potential for tax-base erosion resulting from globalization, it is not
278 See OECD, CONSUMPTION TAX TRENDS 13 tbl.I.5 (2d ed. 1997) (showing rates at 20% or
above in io OECD member countries).
279 See OECD, IMPLEMENTING THE OECD JOBS STRATEGY 63-64 (1997); OECD, MAKING
WORK PAY: TAXATION, BENEFITS, EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT 65 (1997); OECD, THE
OECD JOBS STUDY: TAXATION, EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT 68 (1995).
280 See Jack M. Mintz, Is National Tax Policy Viable in the Face of Global Competition?, 1999
WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY 128-20, 31, available in WL 1999 WTD 128-20.
281 However, as discussed above, it is unclear how much revenue a government can raise in this
way, and it is unlikely that sufficient revenues would be available even in the ideal scenario. The
numbers may be more significant for developing countries.
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surprising that the developed countries are taking actions to shore up
the income tax base even before any significant erosion has occurred.
This analysis will appear to many readers to beg the question: why
should the welfare state not be drastically reduced? Political realities
may coerce governments to maintain existing programs, but from a
normative perspective, it is less clear that governments should dole out
billions in pensions and health care expenditures for the elderly, espe-
cially when the private sector can assume some of the burden.
There are two answers to this question, both of which ultimately
depend on normative value judgments that not everyone may share.
The first answer is given by Dani Rodrik: failure to maintain existing
social insurance programs invites a political backlash against global-
ization and a return to 192os-style protectionism and isolationism.182
Rodrik points out an empirical relationship between economies be-
coming more open to investment and increased spending on social in-
surance programs. Calculating the relationship between openness and
the size of government yields an "unmistakable positive association"
that is not exclusive to OECD countries. 2 3 This relationship is attrib-
utable to social insurance's role in minimizing exposure to increased
external risk. Opening the economy to competition from abroad in-
creases risk to both income and consumption due to increased speciali-
zation and the difficulty of diversifying human capital. 2 4  Theoreti-
cally, decreased exposure to domestic risks (that is, the ability to invest
abroad) could offset such increased risk, but Rodrik shows empirically
that for 105 countries, increased openness results in a net absolute in-
crease in risk to both income and consumption. 28 5 The risk appears in
terms of both income insecurity (for example, loss of employment) and
income volatility (extreme fluctuations as a result of more frequent job
shifts). In terms of distributional effects, the increased risk probably
falls on the less mobile factors in society (primarily unskilled and semi-
skilled labor), as increasing income disparities suggest.28 6
Social insurance programs can reduce such risks. The most direct
mechanism of risk reduction is unemployment insurance, which can
hedge against increased risk to income levels as well as against the job
volatility that results from globalization. Pensions and health care
282 See RODRIK, GLOBALIZATION, supra note 189, at 49-69. For a critique of Rodrik's ap-
proach, see Paul B. Stephan, Book Review, x8 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 246 (1997).
283 RODRIK, GLOBALIZATION, supra note 189, at 52.
284 See id. at 55.
285 See id. at 57.
286 See Peter Gottschalk & Mary Joyce, The Impact of Technological Change, Deindustrializa-
tion, and Internationalization of Trade on Earnings Inequality: An International Perspective, in
POVERTY, INEQUALITY, AND THE FUTURE OF SOCIAL POLICY 197, 197-228 (Katherine McFate,
Roger Lawson & William Julius Wilson eds., 1995) (measuring income inequality trends in the
United States relative to those in other OECD countries).
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coverage can also play a major role in reducing lifetime uncertainty
over income, which increases individuals' willingness to tolerate expo-
sure to external risks.28 7
If governments cut social insurance programs as a result of the fis-
cal crisis described above, these buffers against the risks inherent in
globalization disappear. Such cuts can give rise to massive social resis-
tance - for example, the French strikes of 1996, which were sparked
by the need to cut social programs to meet the Maastricht budgetary
guidelines for monetary union. It is no accident that, as Europe
moved closer to economic integration in the i9gos, voters in almost all
European countries elected left-of-center governments on platforms of
protecting social insurance programs.288  At the same time, extreme
right-wing parties committed explicitly to resisting globalization saw
increases in their support. 28 9 As Rodrik points out, the danger is that
the erosion of social insurance programs could lead to a retreat from
the commitment to openness that characterized the i98os and early
1990s. 2 90 Assuming - as most critics of the welfare state do - that
globalization is itself a positive phenomenon, and remembering the
previous retreat from globalization, which led to worldwide depression
and world war, such an outcome would be unfortunate, to say the
least.
The second argument in favor of social insurance programs is
purely normative. To make it, one must distinguish between social in-
surance and social assistance, both of which are parts of the modern
welfare state.291 Social assistance is government aid designed to en-
sure every citizen a basic level of resources for living. By contrast, so-
cial insurance is designed, more minimally, to ensure that citizens who
are unable to work because of (young or old) age, disability, health, or
temporary unemployment can replace the income they had while
working.292 Social insurance, unlike social assistance, is related to em-
ployment status and typically to contributions paid by the worker.
287 See RODRIK, GLOBALIZATION, supra note 189, at 58.
288 See Unsocialist Realism, ECONOMIST, Oct. 3, 1998, at 66; Martin Walker, Europe's Third
Way Labs: Tony Blair's Formula for Reform Is Contagious on the Continent, NEW DEMOCRAT,
May/June 1999, at 8.
289 See Tony Judt, The Social Question Redivivus, FOREIGN AFF., Sept./Oct. 1997, at 95, 96.
290 See RODRIK, GLOBALIZATION, supra note 189, at 9; see also DANI RODRIK, TRADE, SOCIAL
INSURANCE, AND THE LIMITS TO GLOBALIZATION 4 (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working
Paper No. 5905, 1997).
291 For the definitions of these terms, see JOHN DITCH, JONATHAN BRADSHAW, JOCHEN
CLASEN, MEG HUBY & MARGARET MOODIE, COMPARATIVE SOCIAL ASSISTANCE: LOCALISATION
AND DISCRETION (i997), which discusses social assistance systems in Germany, the Netherlands,
Sweden, and Switzerland; and i TONY EARDLEY, JONATHAN BRADSHAW, JOHN DITCH, IAN
GOUGH & PETER WHITEFORD, SOCIAL ASSISTANCE IN OECD COUNTRIES x5 (x996) [hereinafter
SOCIAL ASSISTANCE].
292 See GRAETZ& MASHAW, supra note 199, at 27-28.
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This Article focuses on social insurance rather than social assis-
tance for two reasons. First, social insurance is more clearly linked to
the pressures resulting from globalization, because globalization may
result in increased income insecurity and volatility for those who have
or had jobs. Second, social insurance enjoys far broader acceptance
among OECD members than does social assistance: all OECD mem-
ber countries have some form of social insurance programs, which are
very popular, whereas only some OECD members have social assis-
tance programs, which enjoy much less popular support.2 93
Social insurance is popular precisely because in a market economy
people may lose their source of income due to factors beyond their con-
trol. No one can escape being too young or too old to earn a living,
nor is it possible to forestall illness, disability, or unemployment caused
by such uncontrollable factors. Ex ante, everyone faces a similar like-
lihood of suffering from such income disruptions: "there but for the
grace of God go I." Thus, it is not surprising that social insurance
programs designed to prevent such risks from threatening a reasonable
standard of living are so widespread. As Michael Graetz and Jerry
Mashaw state: "[S]ocial insurance thus represents one of the greatest
triumphs of twentieth-century domestic public policy .... [S]ocial in-
surance is a crucial underpinning of a vibrant market economy."
294 . It
seems unrealistic, given the data about inequality,295 to expect most
people to supplement even predictable declines in income purely from
their own savings.
Moreover, the private market may be an inadequate substitute for
many social insurance programs, for a variety of reasons. First, the
risk can be too uncertain for private insurance companies to predict
actuarially. Second, risks can co-vary in ways that threaten all policy-
holders at once, like the demographic changes described above. If the
risk is not adequately diversifiable, private insurance may become im-
possible to obtain. Third, adverse selection may occur if the potential
insured know the risks much better than the insurers, resulting in
overrepresentation of high risks in the insurance pool and possibly
leading to premiums so high that they price all low and moderate risks
out of the market. Finally, there may be cases of extreme moral haz-
ard when the insured changes her behavior to increase the risk.
2 96
293 Support for social assistance is particularly attenuated in the United States. See i SOCIAL
ASSISTANCE, supra note 291, at 12. For a measure of the programs' support in the United States,
see Virginia P. Reno & Robert B. Friedland, Strong Support but Low Confidence: What Explains
the Contradiction?, in SOCIAL SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 178, 178-94 (Eric R. Kingson &
James H. Schulz eds., 1997).
294 GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note i99, at 4, 8.
295 See sources cited supra note 286.
296 See GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 199, at 296-99; Lawrence H. Thompson & Melinda M.
Upp, The Social Insurance Approach and Social Security, in SOCIAL SECURITY IN THE 21ST
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Government insurance can alleviate these problems, at least theo-
retically, with a combination of taxation and regulation. The uncer-
tainty problem can be overcome by paying compensation when the
risk materializes and levying taxes at that point to pay the costs. Co-
variance of risk is addressable because governments do not go out of
business; they can borrow and then tax to meet their debts. Adverse
selection disappears with a government mandate to insure everyone,
and effective regulation (for example, requiring the unemployed to
seek work) can reduce moral hazard.297
As argued above, globalization results in increased job insecurity,
income volatility, and income disparity, which enhance rather than re-
duce the need for government-provided social insurance. The risks
posed by globalization are inherently uncertain and covariant, falling
on many people at once in an unpredictable pattern. In addition, both
adverse selection and moral hazard problems are inherent in those
risks. Adverse selection occurs because insurance companies are typi-
cally less able to assess an employee's chances of being displaced by
global competition than is the employee herself (or her employer, who
in a typical private market provides the insurance). And moral hazard
is the major problem in providing unemployment insurance, as the
employee is generally able to take many steps to mitigate or exacerbate
the risk.
Unemployment insurance is not the only type of social insurance
affected by globalization. The largest social insurance expenditures
are for pensions and health care costs. Although these costs depend,
for the most part, on demographic trends that are unrelated to global-
ization, the risk of inadequate income during old age or illness also de-
pends on the availability of private savings. If employees have to save
primarily to cover periods of temporary unemployment, they may not
have enough to compensate for loss of income resulting from disability
or old age. Particularly in a system like that in the United States, in
which both pensions and health insurance are tied to permanent, full-
time employment, the decline of full-time, unionized jobs with at-
tached benefits is directly linked to globalization and the increasing
need for government-mandated social insurance.298
CENTURY, supra note 293, at 3, 5. For discussions from a European perspective of the appropriate
public/private mix in providing social insurance, see OECD, PRIVATE PENSIONS AND PUBLIC
POLICY (1992); and Martin Rein & Eskil Wadensj6, The Emerging Role of Enterprise in Social
Policy, in ENTERPRISE AND THE WELFARE STATE i, 1-33 (Martin Rein & Eskil Wadensj6 eds.,
1997).
297 See GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 199, at 297; OECD, BENEFIT SYSTEMS AND WORK
INCENTIVES 49-50 (1998).
298 For a strong critique of the U.S. social insurance system, see GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note
199, at 26-46. See also Michael J. Graetz, The Troubled Marriage of Retirement Security and Tax
Policies, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 851 (1987) (arguing that current policies provide inadequate retire-
1638 [Vol. 113:1573
HeinOnline  -- 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1638 1999-2000
2000] GLOBALIZATION, TAX COMPETITION, AND FISCAL CRISIS
Faced with this demographic challenge, developed countries must
prevent the erosion of their individual and corporate income tax bases,
which still provide the largest source of revenue in almost all OECD
member countries. At least in Europe, increasing other taxes (specifi-
cally, the VAT and payroll tax) to cover any shortfall in income tax
revenues is not a viable alternative for the reasons discussed above.2 99
Moreover, as globalization increases income disparity, using the pro-
gressive income tax to fund social insurance programs that reduce such
disparities seems particularly appropriate.
Given the extent of the fiscal crisis described above, however, no
amount of change in income taxes is likely to produce sufficient reve-
nue to preserve existing social insurance programs unchanged in all
OECD member states. In particular, the imposition of effective in-
come taxation on cross-border transactions, as this Article advocates,
would not suffice to solve fiscal deficits; some existing programs must
be changed, though in ways that are consistent with their normative
underpinnings, such as increased use of means-testing.300 But there is
a strong normative case in favor of ensuring that globalization leaves
sufficient income tax revenues to fund whatever social insurance pro-
grams can and should be retained.
B. Developing Countries and Tax Incentives
The analysis above suggests that developed countries are interested
in protecting their income tax base from tax competition with devel-
oping countries, and that they have adequate normative grounds for
wishing to do so. But what about developing countries? Are they not
interested in engaging in tax competition to attract foreign investors,
and should they not resist any attempt by developed countries to pre-
vent them from so doing?
Several arguments need to be addressed here. First, one might con-
tend that developing countries need tax revenues less than developed
ment income security for low- and moderate-income employees); Jeffrey S. Lehman, To Conceptu-
alize, To Criticize, To Defend, To Improve: Understanding America's Welfare State, ioi YALE L.J.
685 (1991) (reviewing THEODORE R. MARMOR, JERRY L. MASHAW & PHILIP L. HARVEY,
AMERICA'S MISUNDERSTOOD WELFARE STATE (i99o)). For a discussion of the vulnerable posi-
tion of retirees in the United States and Canada, see OECD, THE TRANSITION FROM WORK TO
RETIREMENT 119-25 (1995).
299 Arguably, even in the United States, social insurance programs can only be preserved by us-
ing general tax revenues, which come primarily from the income tax. See GRAETZ & MASHAW,
supra note 199, at 285-87. However, as Graetz and Mashaw recognize, the U.S. social insurance
system is so grossly inadequate that to expand it to adequate levels would require adopting a VAT,
as every other OECD member country has done.
300 European countries are largely moving in this direction. See I SOCIAL ASSISTANCE, supra
note 291, at 23. But see Eric R. Kingson & James H. Schulz, Should Social Security Be Means-
Tested?, in SOCIAL SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 293, at 41 (arguing against
means-testing on political grounds).
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countries because they are not welfare states and are therefore less af-fected by the fiscal crisis described above. Second, one can make an
economic case that developing countries should refrain from taxing
any foreign investment. Finally, one might argue that tax competitionis the only way for developing countries to attract crucially needed for-
eign investors, even if doing so imposes a cost on developed countries.
i. Do Developing Countries Need Tax Revenues? - A common
misperception is that the fiscal crisis described above is a problem
unique to OECD members. In fact, as fertility rates go down andhealth care improves, dependency ratios are expected to increase in
other geographic areas as well. 30 ' Outside the OECD and the transi-
tion economies, the dependency ratio was less than io% in the 1990sbut is projected to rise to just below 30% by 2,00.302 Nor is it accu-
rate to say that social insurance programs are unique to developed
countries. Spending on pensions in several Central and Eastern Euro-pean countries (transition economies) has already reached proportions
of GDP comparable to those in the OECD member countries.30 3 Out-
side the transition economies, direct spending on social insurance is
much lower, but other forms of government spending effectively fill a
social insurance role. In Latin America, for instance, a number of
countries have implemented extensive government employment and
procurement programs.30 4
Furthermore, the normative case for social insurance applies to de-
veloping countries with even greater force because widespread povertyin these countries makes the consequences of unemployment much
more severe. 3os But the need for tax revenues in developing countries
extends far beyond social insurance. In some developing countries, tax
revenues are needed to ensure the very survival of organized govern-
ment, as the recent Russian fiscal crisis demonstrated.306 In other,
more stable developing countries, tax revenues are needed primarily to
301 See, e.g., AVERTING THE OLD AGE CRISIS, supra note 268, at 303 tbl.3.i.302 See McLure, Keynote Address, supra note 35, at 3. This statistic excludes Central and East-
ern Europe, where the ratios are as high as in Western Europe.303 See AVERTING THE OLD AGE CRISIS, supra note 268, at 142 box 4.7.
304 See K. SUBBARAO, ANIRUDDHA BONNERJEE, JEANINE BRAITHWAITE, SONIYA CARVALHO,
KENE EZEMENARI, CAROL GRAHAM & ALAN THOMPSON, SAFETY NET PROGRAMS ANDPOVERTY REDUCTION: LESSONS FROM CROSS-COUNTRY EXPERIENCE 138-44 (1997).305 The UN has estimated that the world could ensure access to basic social services for all its
people for a mere $30 to $4o billion a year. See HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 103,
at ii2 box 6.4 (1997).
306 See, e.g., Andrew Higgins & Mark Whitehouse, Russia Crisis Deepens as Duma RejectsPremier, WALL ST. J., Sept. x, 1998, at Aio; Meltdown in Russia, ECONOMIST, Aug. 29, z998, at
47.
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provide for adequate education (investment in human capital), which
many regard as the key to promoting development.
307
One could also argue that because the governments of many devel-
oping countries are inefficient, corrupt, and/or authoritarian, they de-
serve no additional tax revenues. Although this description undoubt-
edly fits many third-world countries, it is far less accurate today than
it was twenty years ago. Democracy is more prevalent now than in
i98o,30 and corruption is declining (in part because of recent OECD
efforts to combat it and in part because of constraints imposed by
globalization itself).309 Moreover, arguments from desert seem more
relevant to the amount of direct aid given to developing countries than
to the design of these countries' tax rules. While direct aid can be tar-
geted at those countries whose governments seem able to use it best, it
is doubtful that tax rules can be targeted in this way.3
10 It seems in-
appropriate to refrain from designing general tax rules that would en-
able all developing countries to raise needed revenues merely because
in some cases those revenues might be used for undesirable ends, such
as lining an official's pockets or enabling a dictator to wage war more
effectively. In fact, insofar as the tax rules are directed to foreign in-
vestment, those investments are more likely over time to flow to coun-
tries with less corruption and more democratic governments.
311
2. Should Developing Countries Tax Foreign Investors? - Econo-
mists make a more powerful argument in favor of allowing developing
countries to engage in tax competition when they contend that small,
open economies should generally refrain from taxing foreign inves-
tors.312 The argument goes as follows: If an economy is small, it must
accept worldwide prices (including interest rates) as given. If it is
open, foreign investors can choose to invest there or elsewhere. Be-
cause foreign investors will not accept an after-tax yield that is lower
than the yield available elsewhere (which, by definition, the small
economy cannot affect), they cannot be made to bear the burden of
307 See, e.g., OECD, HUMAN CAPITAL INVESTMENT: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 8
(1998); Amartya Sen, Development Thinking at the Beginning of the XXI Century, in ECONOMIC
AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT INTO THE XXI CENTURY 531, 540-42 (Louis Emmerij ed., I997).
308 See RODRIK, NEW GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 242, at 82-100, 1o5-o.
309 See SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, CONSEQUEN-
CES, AND REFORM 185-87, 189 (1999).
310 U.S. attempts to tailor tax rules to the practices of certain developing countries (such as their
support for terrorism) have not had encouraging results, at least if their purpose was to deter the
targeted behavior. See JAMES R. HINES, JR., TAXED AVOIDANCE: AMERICAN PARTICIPATION IN
UNSANCTIONED INTERNATIONAL BOYCOTTS (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper
No. 6116, 1997); Canute R. Miller, Third World Views of the Ends and Means of United States Tax
Policy, in UNITED STATES TAXATION AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 83, 91-102 (Robert Hel-
lawell ed., 198o).
311 See RODRIK, NEW GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 308, at 96-99.
312 See, e.g., Razin & Sadka, International Tax Competition, supra note 133.
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any tax imposed by the capital-importing country. The tax will then
necessarily be shifted to less mobile factors in the host country, such as
labor and/or land. Because taxing those factors directly is more effi-
cient, this view holds that a small open economy should only tax do-
mestic labor, land, and (if it can) domestic capital invested either do-
mestically or overseas, but not foreign capital.
This argument seems quite valid as applied to portfolio investment,
which can earn the worldwide rate of interest free of tax in many loca-
tions around the world. The only effective way to tax such portfolio
investment is on a residence basis, although as an administrative mat-
ter, coordinated, source-based backup withholding may be needed to
enforce the tax. As applied to FDI, however, the argument is less
valid, for two reasons.
First, the argument presupposes that a foreign tax credit is not
available for the tax. If a foreign tax credit is available in the inves-
tor's home country, the investor is unaffected by the host-country tax(since she would have to pay the tax to either the home or host juris-
diction). Thus, if the host country refrains from taxation, it is merely
giving away revenue to the home country. This situation is relatively
rare for portfolio investment because (as argued above) home countries
are rarely able to tax such investment, making the credit irrelevant.313
However, in the case of direct investment, the credit is generally avail-
able, and therefore host countries should not refrain from taxing the
investor.314
Second, the argument assumes that the host country is small and
that the investing MNE can earn similar returns elsewhere. This
premise, in turn, assumes a competitive market situation. However, an
extensive body of literature on MNEs suggests that they typically exist
in order to earn economic rents - super-normal returns that result
from an imperfect market.3 1
- In a perfectly competitive market, it
313 Host-country taxation does make sense in the case of banks. For example, in the U.S.-
Mexico tax treaty, the withholding tax rate on interest (4.9%) is precisely geared to the amount
available for credit to U.S. banks (because a 5% or greater tax would be in a separate basket). See
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Re-
spect to Taxes on Income, Sep. 18, 1992, U.S.-Mex., art. ii, S. TREATY Doc. No. 103-7 (1993).
314 See TIMO VIHERKENTTA, TAX INCENTIVES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 71-139 (1991). The credit's wide availability raises a question that
has puzzled economists: why do home countries grant the credit? See Bond & Samuelson, supra
note 148, at O99. The answer lies in the history of the credit, which was enacted under heavy
pressure by MNEs wishing to avoid double taxation. See Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O'Hear,
The "Original Intent" of U.S. International Taxation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1021, 1044-51 (i997). In any
case, it would be strange to argue in favor of abandoning an already existing credit system that ad-
vances world welfare for a system that would at best enhance only national welfare.
315 See Jean-Frangois Hennart, The Transaction Cost Theory of the Multinational Enterprise, in
THE NATURE OF THE TRANSNATIONAL FIRM 81, 8i-85 (Christos N. Pitelis & Roger Sugden eds.,
1991).
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generally makes more sense for MNEs to operate through independent
distributors, given the transaction costs of operating directly in foreign
markets. It thus may make sense for MNEs to engage in FDI only in
imperfectly competitive markets - where rent-seeking is possible.
If an investor earns rents in a country, that country is not only not
perfectly competitive, but also not "small" in the economic sense -
that is, the investor has a reason to be there and not elsewhere. There-
fore, any tax imposed on such rents (as long as it is below ioo%) will
not necessarily drive the investor to leave, even if the investor is un-
able to shift the burden of the tax to labor or landowners. However,
the host country will not be able to tax the rent if the MNE can credi-
bly threaten to go elsewhere to earn the same rent.316 This situation,
probably the most common, 317 would require coordinated action to en-
able all host countries to tax the rent earned within their own borders.
3. Do Developing Countries Need to Offer Tax Incentives to Attract
Foreign Investment? - The standard advice given by international in-
stitutions like the World Bank and the IMF to developing countries is
to refrain from offering tax incentives to foreign investors. For exam-
ple, the IMF's Tax Policy Handbook states that "[t]he IMF maintains
a widely held view that tax incentives of all sorts have proved to be
largely ineffective, while causing serious distortions and inequities in
corporate taxation."318 In the i980s, an IMF mission to Indonesia suc-
cessfully advocated the abolition of all tax incentives for foreigners.
Similarly, a World Bank study of Central and Eastern Europe recom-
mended eliminating all tax incentives and instead levying a low, gen-
eral corporate tax rate.319 In attracting foreign investors, it is argued,
a country's overall business climate (which includes such factors as a
stable government, a well-educated workforce, and good infrastruc-
ture) is much more important than specific tax incentives.320
316 For example, the rent could be the result of possessing a unique intangible (an "ownership-
specific" advantage, to use the terminology developed by Dunning). See JOHN H. DUNNING,
EXPLAINING INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION 3 (1988). Such an intangible could be a patent or
another form of know-how, such as a manufacturing technique that reduces costs drastically.
317 See Hennart, supra note 315, at 96-98.
318 Janet Stotsky, Summary of IMF Tax Policy Advice, in TAX POLICY HANDBOOK, supra note
203, at 279, 282.
319 See JACK M. MINTZ & THOMAS TSIOPOULOS, CORPORATE INCOME TAXATION AND
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 1t (1992); see also OECD,
TAXATION AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: THE EXPERIENCE OF THE ECONOMIES IN
TRANSITION 30 (1995) ("In most econometric studies on the question, the foregone tax revenue
[from tax incentives] has exceeded the increase in the desired investment.").
320 See OECD, PROMOTING FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 53
(993) ("Do not build a programme around tax holidays."); see also Jack M. Mintz, Corporate Tax
Holidays and Investment, 4 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 8x (199o) (arguing that tax holidays are
often ineffective).
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This view is also widely shared by academics, who agree that there
is little evidence that tax incentives attract foreign investment effec-
tively. For example, Peter Enrich argues in the intranational context:
[F]or as long as [U.S.] states have been racing to outdo each other in the
tax breaks they offer, economists and other researchers have been search-
ing for evidence of the influence of states' tax policies on the vitality of
their economies. The conclusion from these efforts has been, at best, in-
conclusive.
All the evidence points to a single conclusion: state tax incentives are a
thoroughly unproven tool for promoting economic development.321
If one accepts this conclusion, then it is relatively easy to agree
with Enrich that constraining countries' ability to engage in tax com-
petition does them no harm. But even in the intranational context,
more recent studies based on improved methodology have tended to
conclude that taxes do play a more important role in business location
decisions than Enrich suggests.3 22 In the international context, where
tax rates are much higher, the impact of taxation is even more decisive.
As Hines and others have shown, taxes play a crucial role in deter-
mining investment location, at least when international sites are oth-
erwise equivalent. 323
Moreover, it is hard to dispute that in some cases tax incentives
have played an important role in improving the general welfare of a
nation's citizens. The most frequently cited case is Ireland, which was
severely economically depressed in the early 198os but now has the
fastest-growing GDP in Europe, with income per capita exceeding that
of the United Kingdom This growth was the result of massive foreign
investment, attracted by such factors as an educated, English-speaking
workforce and an elaborate system of targeted tax holidays.324
How, then, can one argue that developing countries should not
grant tax holidays to foreign investors even if they generally need the
revenues and if doing so is the only way to attract mobile busi-
321 Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints on State
Tax Incentivesfor Business, r io HARV. L. REV. 377, 389-92 (1996) (footnotes omitted).
322 See, e.g., JOHN D. DONAHUE, DISUNITED STATES 92-119, 171-82 (1997) (reaching conclu-
sions opposite to Enrich's but supporting the same policy objectives).
323 See Eric Bond, Tax Holidays and Industry Behavior, 63 REV. ECON. & STAT. 88 (g8i); Mi-
chael J. Boskin & William G. Gale, New Results on the Effects of Tax Policy on the International
Location of Investment, in THE EFFECTS OF TAXATION ON CAPITAL ACCUMULATION 201 (Martin
Feldstein ed., 1987); Hines, supra note 90.
324 See OECD, OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS 1998-1999: IRELAND 52-54 (ig); John Murray
Brown, Ireland: Eve of an Emerald Era, FIN. TIMES (London), Sept. 22, 1998, at Survey i; Rob
Norton, The Luck of the Irish, FORTUNE, Oct. 25, 1999, at 194.
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nesses? 325  A recent case study focuses on Intel's decision to invest
$300 million in Costa Rica.3 1 6 Intel was attracted to Costa Rica pri-
marily by non-tax factors, such as political stability, a general com-
mitment to economic openness, and an excellent educational system;
Costa Rica granted it no specific tax breaks or other subsidies.327 But
Intel clearly would not have made the investment without Costa
Rica's general regime of tax holidays for foreign investors, given the
availability of such holidays in Costa Rica's competitors (principally
Mexico).328 Several studies have reached similar conclusions on a
broader scale. For example, a ground-breaking study by Stephen
Guisinger and his colleagues concludes that tax incentives are crucial
in attracting foreign investment because countries that do not have
them cannot compete with countries that do.32 9 Guisinger defines
competitiveness by asking, "[W]ould a foreign investment project have
located in a particular country if that country had eliminated its [tax]
incentives and disincentives while other countries maintained [tax] in-
centive policies at existing levels?" 330 Using that definition, Guisinger
finds that tax incentives are essential to attracting foreign investment.
Guisinger and his colleagues critically assume, however, that devel-
oping countries have "no opportunity for cooperative agreements lim-
iting incentive policies."331 The solutions to the international tax com-
petition problem discussed below presuppose precisely such a
multilateral mechanism. Thus, one can argue that given the need for
foreign investment tax revenues, developing countries would in general
refrain from granting tax incentives if they could be assured of re-
maining competitive. When they do grant tax incentives, it is precisely
because of competition from other developing countries. For example,
in 1996, Israel gave Intel $600 million in tax incentives to avert the
threatened relocation of its investment to Ireland,33 2 and Indonesia re-
cently reintroduced its foreign investment tax incentives under pres-
325 However, investment need not necessarily come from overseas sources. See Dani Rodrik, The
Global Fix, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 2, 1998, at 17, 17-19. In some situations, it may be better to
promote domestic investment even if FDI is more glamorous. See Bernard Avishai, Israel's Fu-
ture: Brainpower, High Tech - and Peace, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov.-Dec. 9xgi, at 50, 5 1; Debra K.
Rubin with Neal Sandier, Rebuilding a Nation, ENGINEERING NEWS-REC., Apr. 27, 1998, at 30,
30-39.
326 See DEBORAH SPAR, ATTRACTING HIGH TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENT: INTEL'S COSTA
RICAN PLANT (z998).
327 See id. at 8-io.
328 See id. at io-ix.
329 STEPHEN E. GUISINGER & ASSOCS., INVESTMENT INCENTIVES AND PERFORMANCE
REQUIREMENTS 37-39 (1985).
330 Id. at 39.
331 Id.
332 See Robert Lenzner, Investing, Not Giving, FORBES, Dec. 18, x995, at io6.
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sure to increase investment after the Asian crisis of 1997 and 1998 and
to compete with incentives offered by Malaysia and Singapore.333
Thus, restricting developing countries' ability to compete for for-
eign investment by offering tax incentives does not truly restrict the
countries' autonomy or run counter to their interests.3 34  Whenever
competition from other countries drives a developing country to pro-
vide tax incentives, eliminating the competition does not hurt the de-
veloping country and may aid its revenue-raising efforts, assuming it
can attract investment by other means. Whenever tax incentives are
not offered for fear of competition, however, the developing country
remains free to lower its generally applicable tax rates.
The Irish case illustrates this distinction. Ireland was able to bene-
fit from the tax incentives it offered foreign investors precisely because
it was the only EU member to offer them. That is, Ireland had no real
competition given the reality of European tariff barriers and the other
EU members' high tax rates.335  But Ireland could have achieved the
same result by maintaining a lower general tax rate, which it recently
implemented as its preferential regime came under heavy EU fire. 336
In a typical tax competition scenario, however, one developing country
is competing directly against another's preferential regime. Because
both countries need the revenue, lowering the general tax rate is typi-
cally not an option for either. Competition limited to foreign invest-
ment is feasible, but it still hurts both countries by costing them reve-
nues, especially if the incentives cancel each other out.337 In this case,
it would be in both countries' interest to see competition eliminated if
a cooperative solution could be found.
In summary, from the perspective of a typical developing country,
the revenue loss from granting targeted tax holidays appears unlikely
to be adequately offset by the benefits flowing from the resulting in-
vestment, because such a country competes for investment not against
every other country in the world, but against a limited subset of coun-
tries with characteristics similar to its own. When an MNE decides to
333 See, e.g., World Watch: Indonesia Seeks to Spur Investment, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 1999, at
A17.
334 For a similar conclusion in the context of U.S. states, see DONAHUE, supra note 322, at 115-
ig; and Enrich, supra note 32!, at 467.
335 See Gimme Shelter, ECONOMIST, Jan. 29, 2000, at Survey 15, 17.
336 See id. at 16.
337 The additional revenues generated by taxing employees or suppliers of the foreign investor
might conceivably more than make up for the revenue lost in granting the preferential regime.
However, if the investment would have been made even without tax incentives, then those reve-
nues could have been generated in addition to direct FDI taxes. In general, there is no evidence
that direct investment is motivated solely or even primarily by tax reasons; rather, taxes are crucial
in investment decisions only to the extent that they are a factor in deciding among locations that
enjoy other similar advantages. See GUISINGER & Assocs., supra note 329, at 39-41; Hines, Tax
Policy, supra note 56, at 405-o6.
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look for an investment location, it engages in a process of analysis
reminiscent of Fernand Braudel's three levels of historical change. 338
It first eliminates countries that are unsuitable because of long-term
factors, such as geography and climate, and then eliminates countries
that are unsuitable because of shorter-term factors under only limited
government control, such as labor costs, education levels, or political
instability. Finally, the MNE conducts an auction among the remain-
ing countries that focuses on the factors under direct government con-
trol, such as tax holidays and other forms of subsidy. In this determi-
native auction, the developing country is likely to find itself forced to
offer subsidies merely because other countries offer them, not because
it would choose to do so on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis inde-
pendent of tax competition.
Two additional points need to be made from a developing-country
perspective. The first concerns the question of tax incidence. Because
the tax competition most relevant to developing countries involves the
corporate income tax, it is important to assess the incidence of that tax
in evaluating the welfare effects of collecting it. Unfortunately, even
after decades of analysis, no consensus exists on its incidence. While
older studies tended to conclude that the tax is borne exclusively by
shareholders or capital providers, more recent studies suggest that the
tax is borne to a significant extent by consumers or labor.3 39 Another
possibility is that the individuals who own shares at the time of the
tax's imposition or increase immediately bear the tax, which is capi-
talized into the price of the shares thereafter.340 It is unlikely that this
debate will be resolved anytime soon (in fact, the incidence may be
shifting over time, especially if globalization enables corporations to
shift more of the tax burden to labor). However, from the perspective
of a developing country deciding whether to collect taxes from an
MNE, three out of the four possible alternatives for incidence (current
shareholders or capital providers, old shareholders, and consumers) are
largely residents of other jurisdictions, and therefore, the developing
country gains - from a national welfare perspective - by collecting
the tax. And even if some of the tax is shifted to labor in the devel-
oping country, one could argue that as a matter of tax administration,
338 See FERNAND BRAUDEL, THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE MEDITERRANEAN WORLD IN
THE AGE OF PHILIP II, at xiv (Sian Reynolds trans., HarperCollinsPublishers 2d rev. ed. abr. 1992)
(1966).
339 See, e.g., JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 141-46 (5th ed. 1987). The 1992
Trl'easury report on integration concluded that the tax falls on shareholders in the short run, but
either on capital alone or on capital and labor in the long run. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY,
supra note 21o, at 326.
340 See PECHMAN, supra note 339, at 144.
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collecting the tax from MNEs is more efficient (as well as more politi-
cally acceptable) than attempting to collect it from workers.
The second point relates to the public versus private use of funds.
A developing country may want to collect taxes from MNEs even if it
geherally believes that the private sector uses resources more efficiently
than does the public sector. The taxes that a developing country fails
to collect from a foreign MNE may indeed be used by the private sec-
tor - but in another jurisdiction, where they provide no benefit to the
developing country. One solution that developing countries employ is
to refrain from taxing MNEs so long as they reinvest domestically, but
to tax them when they remit the profits abroad. However, such taxa-
tion of dividends and other forms of remittance is subject to the same
tax competition problem that I discussed above. Thus, overcoming the
tax competition problem appears in most cases to be in the interest of
developing countries. The question that remains is how to do so in the
face of the collective action problem described earlier.
C. Inter-Nation Equity and the Division of Global Tax Revenues
Having established that both developed and developing countries
need tax revenue, can we decide how to divide the available revenue
between them? This question relates to the concept of inter-nation eq-
uity, which Peggy Musgrave first developed.3 41 As she articulates it,
the concept relates primarily to the question of entitlement - that is,
which country was entitled to the revenue - and has been used to de-
fend the prevalent practice of source-based taxation against the prefer-
ence for residence-based taxation that accompanies CEN.342
This formulation of inter-nation equity, however, is problematic be-
cause it is vague and does not readily lead to practical recommenda-
tions. Even a preference for source- over residence-based taxation is
not very meaningful without a coherent notion of the source of income.
Most income comes from multiple sources, and economists have gener-
ally concluded that assigning income to a single source is a meaning-
less exercise (albeit a necessary one for legal and tax purposes).3 43 If
so, then any generally acceptable sourcing rule is unobjectionable as
an economic matter, but a concept of inter-nation equity that is based
on sourcing offers no guidance in determining specifically how much
income a country is "entitled" to tax.
341 See Musgrave, International Tax Base Division, supra note I97; Musgrave & Musgrave, In-
ter-nation Equity, supra note 197; see also Kaufman, supra note 197, at 153.
342 See Musgrave & Musgrave, Inter-nation Equity, supra note 197, at 73.
343 See, e.g., Hugh J. Ault & David F. Bradford, Taxing International Income: An Analysis of the
U.S. System and Its Economic Premises, in TAXATION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 70,
at ii, 30-31.
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Perhaps some progress can be made by relating inter-nation equity
to inter-individual equity, its better-known cousin.344 It is widely ac-
cepted that redistributive income taxation can be justified by consid-
erations of vertical equity and the declining marginal utility of in-
come. 345  But there appears to be no sound theoretical reason to
restrict redistribution to members of any single tax jurisdiction. If
there were a world taxing authority, it would be justified in redistrib-
uting wealth on a worldwide basis.
Given that there are many taxing jurisdictions, redistribution in
practice takes place within countries, not between them, a fact that is
justifiable on political grounds ("no taxation without representation").
Explicit redistribution among countries is rare, especially given wide-
spread dissatisfaction with foreign aid. But this analysis suggests that
those who design international tax rules should seek to take into ac-
count the relative wealth of the countries involved. In federal states,
explicit redistributive mechanisms that transfer wealth from the richer
to the poorer provinces are common.346 If there were a world federal
taxing authority, it could analogously redistribute revenues from richer
to poorer countries, not only directly, through transfer payments, but
also indirectly, through tax rates. For example, whenever a transaction
took place between two jurisdictions, the poorer one could explicitly be
allowed to retain a larger share of the revenue (for example, in inverse
proportion to its GDP).347
Currently, there is no world taxing authority, nor is one likely to be
established in the near future.348 But some of the current practice of
international taxation can be interpreted as reflecting concern for the
relatively greater revenue needs of poorer countries. In particular, the
widespread acceptance of the source country's right to levy its tax first
and of the imposition of the burden of alleviating double taxation on
the residence country partly reflects the position of the poorer (capital-
importing) countries in the 192os. This position was accepted by the
League of Nations and (subject to certain limits, such as the perma-
344 On the distinction between the two, see Kaufman, supra note 197.
345 See Kaplow, supra note 196, at 139, 144. For a recent exposition of the utilitarian case for
progressive taxation, see Martin J. McMahon, Jr. & Alice G. Abreu, Winner-Take-All Markets: Eas-
ing the Case for Progressive Taxation, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 1 (1998).
346 See, e.g., Albert J. Radler, Germany, in HUGH J. AULT, COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION:
A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 49, 49 (1997)
347 See PEGGY BREWER RICHMAN [Musgrave], TAXATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT INCOME:
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 79 (1963).
348 See infra Part V, pp. 1652-74.
1649
HeinOnline  -- 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1649 1999-2000
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
nent establishment concept) enshrined in the model treaties that form
the foundation of the current international tax regime.3 49
Thus, I argue that the concept of inter-nation equity can be given
practical meaning in the design of international tax rules if it is inter-
preted as embodying explicit redistributive goals. More specifically,
when a choice is presented between two otherwise comparable alterna-
tive rules, one of which has progressive and the other regressive impli-
cations for the division of the international tax base between poorer
and richer countries, the progressive rule should be explicitly preferred
to the regressive one. In the absence of a world taxing authority that
can redistribute tax revenues directly, and given the paucity of foreign
aid from developed to developing countries, such a concept of inter-
nation equity has the best chance of achieving meaningful distributive
goals.
The problem of tax competition, as described in Part II, is a good
illustration of such a choice. The problem breaks down into two com-
ponents: portfolio and direct investment. For portfolio investment, the
home country of the invested capital may be either a developed or a
developing country, while the host country is typically a developed
country. For direct investment, the home country of the invested capi-
tal is typically a developed country, while the host country may be ei-
ther a developed or a developing country.350
Tax competition undermines the ability of both home and host ju-
risdictions to tax income from cross-border portfolio and direct in-
vestments. In each case, it is possible to design solutions that empha-
size either home-country (residence) or host-country (source) taxation.
For portfolio investment, for example, a nation could have either a fi-
nal withholding tax, which would accrue to the host jurisdiction, or a
refundable withholding tax, which would be refunded upon proof that
the income was reported to the home jurisdiction. The first solution
would favor host countries; the second, home countries.35I As home
countries are, on average, poorer than host countries, inter-nation eq-
uity would suggest choosing the second solution over the first.
349 See Avi-Yonah, International Taxation of Electronic Commerce, supra note 40, at 534-35;
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of International Taxation: A Proposal for Simplification, 74
TEX. L. REV. 1301, 1303-04 (1996); Graetz & O'Hear, supra note 314, at 1023.
350 See WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT, supra note 104, at 18-24.
351 The EU, as section V.A.2 reports below, has opted for a two-track method in which countries
can choose between the exchange of information, which favors home countries, and a refundable
withholding tax, which likewise favors home countries but to a lesser extent (some investors would
prefer to forego the refund if the rate were lower than the home-country rate). See Proposal for a
Council Directive to Ensure a Minimum of Effective Taxation of Savings Income in the Form of
Interest Payments Within the Community COM(98)295 final at 3-5. The OECD prefers pure ex-
change of information. See OECD REPORT, supra note 26, at 46.
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Similarly, for direct investment, it is possible to design a regime
that allocates corporate tax revenues entirely to the home (residence)
country. For example, a corporation could be assigned a residence
based on the residence of its shareholders and the corporate tax reve-
nues allocated to that country.352 Or a nation could implement a form
of corporate-shareholder integration that eliminates the corporate tax
base and allocates all revenues to the home country of the sharehold-
ers.35 3 Alternatively, the corporate tax could be abolished and share-
holders taxed on their holdings on a mark-to-market basis.35 4  All of
these solutions favor home- over host-country taxation.
Another set of potential solutions to tax competition would main-
tain the existing preference for host-country (source) taxation of direct
investment. Part V proposes one such solution. From an inter-nation
equity perspective, this solution is preferable precisely because in the
direct investment context, host jurisdictions are generally poorer than
home jurisdictions.355 If one accepts the need for redistribution in
general, taking such distributive considerations explicitly into account
in the international tax context would represent a significant step for-
ward.
352 See Richard L. Doernberg, Electronic Commerce and International Tax Sharing, 98
WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY 60-43, 36-38 (1998), available in WL 98 WTD 60-43.
353 See Alberto Giovannini & James R. Hines, Jr., Capital Flight and Tax Competition: Are
There Viable Solutions to Both Problems?, in EUROPEAN FINANCIAL INTEGRATION 172, 194-95
(Alberto Giovannini & Colin Mayer eds., '99i).
354 See Joseph M. Dodge, A Combined Mark-to-Market and Pass-Through Corporate-
Shareholder Integration Proposal, 50 TAX L. REV. 265, 266-67 (1995) (proposing taxing sharehold-
ers on unrealized increases in the value of their shares); Daniel Halperin, Will Integration Increase
Efficiency? - The Old and New View of Dividend Policy, 47 TAX L. REV. 645 (1992).
355 This rationale draws additional strength from the corporate tax's relative importance to de-
veloping countries, compared with its relative insignificance for most developed countries. See
supra p. 1620 & n.2o9. Almost none of the current literature on international taxation discusses
such distributive issues. But see Chang Hee Lee, Impact of E-Commerce on Allocation of Tax
Revenue Between Developed and Developing Countries, 18 TAX NOTES INT'L 2569 (1999) (dis-
cussing the likely revenue and equity impact of e-commerce on developing countries).
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V. SOLUTIONS36
A. E U Proposals and Critique
On December i, 1997, the Council of the European Union (EU)
adopted a "package to tackle harmful tax competition in the European
Union."35 7 The package was based on the work of the Commission of
the EU, particularly that of the Tax Working Group headed by Fiscal
Affairs Commissioner Mario Monti. The package ultimately com-
prised three measures: a nonbinding "code of conduct" for business
taxation; 358 a draft directive on taxation of savings;35 9 and a draft di-
rective on taxation of cross-border interest and royalty payments.360
r. The Code of Conduct. - In some ways the most interesting of
the three proposals, the code of conduct has had a significant impact
on both the actions of member states and the related work of the
OECD.61 The code is a "political commitment," not a legally binding
document,362 but it has the support of all member states, at least on
paper.
The code addresses business tax measures that "affect, or may af-
fect, in a significant way the location of business activity in the Com-
munity."3 63 The tax measures affected include any measure applied by
356 The discussion below does not consider the possibility that the mobility of capital could or
should be restricted directly. Most economists would reject such proposals, and no scholar advo-
cates them for longer-term investments. For the development of the OECD's view, see OECD,
CONTROLS ON INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MOVEMENTS (1982); CENTRE FOR CO-OPERATION
WITH THE EUROPEAN ECONS. IN TRANSITION, OECD, EXCHANGE CONTROL POLICY (1993);
and OECD, OPEN MARKETS MATTER: THE BENEFITS OF TRADE AND INVESTMENT
LIBERALISATION (1998). But see Bo SANDEMANN RASMUSSEN, INTERNATIONAL TAX COMPETI-
TION, TAX COOPERATION AND CAPITAL CONTROLS (Univ. of Aarhus, Den., Dep't of Econ.
Working Paper No. 1997-9, 1997) (arguing that even though capital controls are inferior to coop-
eration, threats to impose such controls may be useful in persuading countries to cooperate in tax
matters).
357 Conclusions of the ECOFIN Council Meeting on i December 1997 Concerning Taxation
Policy, 1998 O.J. (C 2) 1, 1 [hereinafter Conclusions of the ECOFIN Council].
358 Resolution of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States,
Meeting within the Council, of i December 1997 on a Code of Conduct for Business Taxation, 1998
O.J. (C 2) 2, 2 [hereinafter Code of Conduct].
359 See Commission Proposal for a Council Directive to Ensure a Minimum of Effective Taxa-
tion of Savings Income in the Form of Interest Payments within the Community, COM(98)2 9 5 final
at 11-19 [hereinafter Draft Directive on Savings].
360 See Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common System of Taxation Appli-
cable to Interest and Royalty Payments Made between Associated Companies of Different Member
States, COM(98)6 7 final at 11-18 [hereinafter Draft Directive on Interest and Royalties]. Under
Article ioo of the Treaty of Rome, the draft directives require the unanimous consent of theCouncil for adoption. See TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY,
Mar. 25, 1957, art. 100, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 54 [hereinafter TREATY OF ROME].361 For a description and critique of the OECD proposals, see below at pp. 1657-66.
362 Code of Conduct, supra note 358, preamble 6, at 3.
363 Id. §A, at 3.
1652
HeinOnline  -- 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1652 1999-2000
2000] GLOBALIZATION, TAX COMPETITION, AND FISCAL CRISIS
law, regulation, or administrative practice, whether through the nomi-
nal tax rate, the tax base, or "any other relevant factor."364 "Business
activity" is defined broadly as including all activities, carried out within
a company or a group of companies.'36  In addition, the ministers
bound themselves to reexamine subsidies delivered outside the tax sys-
tem.3
66
The code covers all tax measures that "provide for a significantly
lower effective level of taxation, including zero taxation, than those
levels which generally apply in the Member State in question.
367
Such measures are considered "potentially harmful."368 In determining
whether they are in fact harmful, several other factors are considered,
including: whether the tax measures apply only to nonresidents;
whether the measures are "ring-fenced," or segregated from the domes-
tic market to prevent erosion of the domestic tax base; whether advan-
tages are granted without any real economic activity or substantial
economic presence in the member state; whether the state follows the
OECD transfer pricing guidelines (to prevent artificial allocation of
profits to the activity benefiting from the measure); or whether the
measure lacks transparency (for example, if it is granted by covert ad-
ministrative action).369
The code envisions two forms of enforcement. First, member states
will engage in a self-review process and commit themselves not to in-
troduce new tax measures that are deemed harmful under these crite-
ria ("[s]tandstill") and to eliminate existing harmful measures within a
two-to-five-year period ("[r]ollback").370 Second, member states will
inform each other about their preferential tax regimes, and any mem-
ber state may request an opportunity to discuss and comment on the
tax measures of other member states. For this purpose, the code pro-
364 Id. § B, at 3.
365 Id. § A, at 3.
366 See Conclusions of the ECOFIN Council, supra note 357, at i; Code of Conduct, supra note
358, § J, at 5; Nigel Tutt, European Commission to Propose Guidelines on Providing State Aid
Through Tax System, 98 WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY 135-3 (1998), available in WL 98 WTD 135-3.
The Treaty of Rome limits state aid. See TREATY OF ROME, supra note 360, arts. 92-94, 298
U.N.T.S. at 51-52. On the particular problem of regional development programs, see Code of
Conduct, supra note 358, § G, at 4.
367 Code of Conduct, supra note 358, § B, at 3.
368 Id.
369 Id. §§ B(I)--, at 3. Germany took the position that paragraph 3 applies to the targeted
granting of advantages for international mobile activities when they are not granted for non-
mobile activities. See Conclusions of the ECOFIN Council, supra note 357, at 2.
370 Code of Conduct, supra note 358, §§ C-D, at 4; see Conclusions of the ECOFIN Council,
supra note 357, at 1-2. The Council may approve a longer period in some circumstances.
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poses forming a review group to assess those measures and forward a
report to the Council, which may publish it.371
Thus, the idea is to exert political pressure through the review pro-
cess to influence member states that have established either production
tax havens (such as Ireland) or headquarters tax havens (such as Bel-
gium) to abolish them. In fact, Ireland announced soon after the
code's promulgation that it was phasing out its preferential tax re-
gimes and replacing them with a single, lower rate of corporation tax
applicable to all companies (whether domestic- or foreign-owned).372
The code also requires member states to "promot[e]" the adoption
of similar principles in other countries and to apply them to "depend-
ent or associated territories," such as the Channel Islands. 373  The
United Kingdom has in fact already begun to pressure its dependencies
to adopt the code's principles.3 74
2. Taxation of Savings. - At the code-of-conduct meeting (chaired,
ironically, by Luxembourg), the EU Council adopted another resolu-
tion on taxation of savings, which would apply a new regime to inter-
est income paid to individual residents of the EU by paying agents lo-
cated in another member state.37- The Commission in May I998
proposed a draft Directive on this topic for adoption by the Council.3 16
The draft Directive proposes a "coexistence" model based on two
options: each member state must either cooperate in an exchange-of-
information program or levy a withholding tax on interest payments
disbursed by agents within its territory to individual residents of an-
other member state. 3 7 Under the exchange-of-information system, the
member state would agree to provide, automatically and annually, in-
formation on all interest payments made by paying agents in its terri-
tory in the preceding year to individual beneficial owners residing in
every other member state.378  Under the withholding tax system, the
member state would agree to levy a 20% withholding tax on all such
payments unless the beneficial owner provided a certificate from his
country's tax authorities attesting that they had been informed of the
371 See Code of Conduct, supra note 358, §§ E-I, at 4-5. For the formation of the Code of Con-
duct Group, see Report of the 2072nd Council Meeting (Mar. 9, 1998), 6619/98 (Presse 61), C/98/6i,
at 10-12 (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
372 See Edward Troup & Paul Hale, EU Initiatives on Tax Harmonization: Do as I Say, Not as I
Do?, i7 TAX NOTES INT'L xo81, io82 (i998).
373 Code of Conduct, supra note 358, § M, at 5.
374 See Jim Kelly, Relegation Threat Looms, FIN. TIMES (London), July I5, 1999, § 2, at i i.
375 See Taxation of Savings, 1998 O.J. (C 2) 6, 6.
376 See Draft Directive on Savings, supra note 359, at 11-14.
377 See id., art. 2, at 14.
378 See id., art. 7, at 16.
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interest to be received. 37 9 The withholding tax would be credited
against tax liability in the beneficial owner's country of residence.
3 80
This draft Directive has encountered significant opposition. Indus-
try groups have argued that it will result in an outflow of savings from
the EU to, among other countries, Switzerland.381  More significantly,
both Luxembourg and the United Kingdom have opposed the Direc-
tive, anticipating an adverse impact on the Eurobond market.38 2 Lux-
embourg announced that it would not support the Directive unless the
EU's main trading partners accepted parts of the plan.
38 3
3. Taxation of Interest and Royalties. - This proposal is the least
controversial element of the package. The draft Directive calls for the
abolition of withholding taxes on interest and royalty payments made
within the EU between "associated companies," defined by a 25%
ownership threshold.384 However, the tax reduction would not apply
when the interest or royalty payment was subject to a corporate tax
rate in the country of residence lower than the generally applicable
rate or benefits from a preferential reduction in the tax base.
38 5
4. Critique. - A fundamental problem of the EU tax competition
package is its lack of a full-fledged normative grounding for the meas-
ures it proposes. The Council resolution mentions three reasons to ad-
dress harmful tax competition: to prevent distortions in the single
market, to prevent "excessive" losses of tax revenue, and to "get[] tax
structures to develop in a more employment-friendly way."38 6 Moreo-
379 See id., art. 8, at 17.
380 See id., art. io, at 17-18. If the withholding tax exceeded tax: liability, a refund would be
provided.
381 See Impact Assessment Form, COM(98)295 final at 22-24 (reporting statements of the Euro-
pean Mortgage Federation and the Banking Federation of the European Union); David L. Cleeton,
European Finance Groups Respond to ECOFIN Cross-Border Savings Directive, 17 TAX NOTES.
INT'L 874, 874 (1998) (referencing a study by the International Securities Markets Association and
the International Primary Markets Association).
382 See Conclusions of the ECOFIN Council, supra note 357, at 2 (U.K. position); Jonathan An-
nells, U.K. Chancellor Renews Attack on EC's Eurobond Tax Plan, 17 TAX NOTES INT'L 1044,
1044-45 (1998); Nick Antonovics, European Union Finance Ministers to Debate Tax Savings Plan,
17 TAX NOTES INT'L 946, 946 (1998). The International Primary Markets Association estimated
that about 5% of existing Eurobond issues might become callable if the plan were adopted. See
Troup & Hale, supra note 372, at io82.
383 See Luxembourg Says No Agreement Reached on EU Savings Tax, 17 TAX NOTES INT'L
1039 (1998).
384 Draft Directive on Interest and Royalties, supra note 360, art. i, at 12; see id. art. 3(I)(b), at
14.
385 See id. art. 7, at i6. This article is to be reviewed in three years.
386 Conclusions of the ECOFIN Council, supra note 357, at i. The rationale for the relationship
between employment and tax competition is that tax competition increases the tax burden on (im-
mobile) labor relative to (mobile) capital. The increased taxes on employment result in a loss of
jobs. See Draft Directive on Savings, supra note 359, at 3; European Parliament, Resolution on the
Commission Communication 'A Package to Tackle Harmful Tax Competition in the European
Union' (COM(97)o564), 1998 O.J. (C 210) 227, 227.
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ver, the package cites the transition to the European Monetary Union
as increasing the mobility of capital in the EU.38 7 However, the pro-
posal's authors do not develop any of these reasons in detail, leaving
the package open to criticism as being opportunistic and unbal-
anced.388
In light of the normative argument developed in Part II above,
however, the EU package seems quite reasonable; it addresses the
problems of inefficiency, inequity, and tax-base erosion in a way that
provides sufficient freedom to member states to define the size of their
public sectors as they desire. In particular, the package maintains the
distinction between generally applicable tax reductions and measures
aimed only at foreigners; this distinction has proven effective, as the
Irish example illustrates. In addition, the Savings Directive appropri-
ately aims at ensuring that a saver will be taxed in his country of resi-
dence.
The EU package does suffer, however, from a major limitation: It
applies only within the EU. Thus, as far as the preferential regimes
addressed in the code of conduct are concerned, only regimes in EU
member states are affected. However, as described in Part II, both
production tax havens and headquarters tax havens have proliferated
outside the EU. Although the code envisions "promoting" its princi-
ples in nonmember countries,38 9 it has little impact outside the de-
pendent territories. This does not mean, however, that the code has no
impact at all. Locating within the EU provides a firm significant ad-
vantages in trading with EU member countries, which gives the code
of conduct significant bite, because production or headquarters tax ha-
vens located outside the EU will not benefit from the same advantages
as those in Ireland, Belgium, or any other EU member country.3 90
Nevertheless, from a global perspective, the code's reach is quite lim-
ited, and given the reduction in transportation costs, it seems likely
that multinationals will be able to locate their activities in production
tax havens outside the EU.
A more significant problem faces the draft Directive on Savings.
Fear that this proposal would drive capital away from EU members
and to Switzerland or the United States may impede its adoption. The
drafters sought to address this problem by limiting the Directive's ap-
plication to interest payments made to EU residents.3 91 This limita-
387 See Draft Directive on Savings, supra note 359, at 2.
388 See, e.g., Troup & Hale, supra note 372.
389 See Code of Conduct, supra note 358, § M, at 5.
390 The EU package may, however, encourage companies to locate in countries like Israel, which
has a free-trade agreement with the EU but is not a member.391 This provision would allow EU countries to continue to attract capital from outside the EU
without having to impose a withholding tax on such capital.
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tion diminishes the Directive's attractiveness from a global perspec-
tive. In addition, the focus on paying agents rather than debtors
means that U.S. issuers raising capital in Europe will, to some extent,
have no direct competitive advantage over European issuers a 92  Fi-
nally, the Directive envisions the EU taking measures "to promote the
adoption in third countries of equivalent measures relating to pay-
ments of interest to Community residents."393  However, as Luxem-
bourg's reaction makes clear, requiring the imposition of a 20% with-
holding tax risks shifting the savings of EU residents (for example,
German residents) 394 to non-EU countries.
In addition, even if the Directive were implemented, it would only
alleviate, not solve, the problem of under-taxation of interest income.
A 20% rate is far from sufficient to compensate for nontaxation in the
home country (at rates of 50% or higher). 95 However, the EU con-
cluded that a higher rate would be more likely to drive capital out of
the Community.396 In this way, the proposal resembles the Nordic
"dual tax" system, under which capital is taxed at a much lower rate
than labor to ensure that it is subject to at least some tax.397 Although
the Directive is a start, it cannot serve as a complete solution.
The obvious solution is to expand the scope of the EU proposals to
nonmember countries. Some ways to accomplish this are discussed in
section V.C.
B. OECD Proposals and Critique
i. The OECD Report. - The OECD Report, entitled Harmful Tax
Competition: An Emerging Global Issue, was approved by the OECD
Council on April 9, 1998, with two abstentions (Luxembourg and
Switzerland).398  The Report was written by the "Special Sessions on
Tax Competition," which was co-chaired by France and Japan under
the auspices of the Committee on Fiscal Affairs. The introduction ex-
plains the Report's goals:
392 See Draft Directive on Savings, supra note 359, at 4. The Directive also notes that the Euro-
bond Market is to a large extent composed of institutional investors and non-EU residents, who
would not be affected by the proposal. See id.
393 Id. at 20.
394 See supra p. 1583.
39S This argument makes the realistic assumption that host countries do not offer significant de-
ductions for interest income to individual taxpayers.
396 See Draft Directive on Savings, supra note 359, at 3. The French argued that the rate should
be set no lower than 25%. See Conclusions of the ECOFIN Council, supra note 357, at 2.
397 See Timo Viherkentta, A Flat Rate Tax on Capital Income: The Nordic Model, 6 TAX NOTES
INT'L 659, 659-61 (1993).
398 See OECD REPORT, supra note 26, at 65. Although most of the OECD's 29 members are
considered developed countries, the organization also includes some developing countries (such as
Mexico and South Korea) and some transition economies (such as the Czech Republic, Hungary,
and Poland).
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[T]o develop a better understanding of how tax havens and harmful pref-
erential tax regimes, collectively referred to as harmful tax practices, affect
the location of financial and other service activities, erode the tax bases of
other countries, distort trade and investment patterns and undermine the
fairness, neutrality and broad social acceptance of tax systems gener-
ally.3 99
Thus, on the one hand, the OECD Report maintains a narrower
focus than the EU package. It does not address the taxation of cross-
border interest flows; that issue is to be the topic of a separate report,
which was scheduled to be issued in i99 by a Working Party on Tax
Evasion and Avoidance. 400 In addition, the Report focuses entirely on
"geographically mobile activities, such as financial and other service
activities, including the provision of intangibles."41 The Report ex-
plains that the issue of tax competition for "real" investments will be
examined separately in the future but does not commit itself to a
date.40 2 According to Hugh Ault, who served as academic consultant
to the OECD and participated in drafting the Report, this matter was
postponed "in the interest of creating a manageable work plan."403
On the other hand, because of its provenance, the OECD Report
applies to a much broader geographical area than does the EU pack-
age. In addition to binding twenty-seven of the twenty-nine OECD
members, the Report envisages that the OECD will attempt to per-
suade nonmember countries to abide by its recommendations. Three
regional seminars with nonmember countries have already been held,
and the Report proposed that a high-level meeting open to nonmember
countries be organized in 1999.404 Moreover, the OECD Report places
much greater emphasis on traditional tax havens than does the EU
package.
Chapter i of the Report sets out its normative basis. The Report
barely mentions economic distortions and never mentions CEN at all.
Instead, it focuses on tax-base erosion and the change in the tax mix:
[Tihese schemes can erode national tax bases of other countries, may alter
the structure of taxation (by shifting part of the tax burden from mobile to
relatively immobile factors and from income to consumption) and may
hamper the application of progressive tax rates and the achievement of re-
distributive goals.405
399 Id. at 8.
400 See id. at ro. The second report is still pending.
401 Id. at 8.
402 See id.
403 Joann M. Weiner & Hugh J. Ault, The OECD's Report on Harmful Tax Competition, i i
NAT'L TAX J. 6o1, 602 (1998).
404 See OECD REPORT, supra note 26, at o.
40S Id. at 14; see also id. at 37 ("Governments cannot stand back while their tax bases are eroded
through the actions of countries which offer taxpayers ways to exploit tax havens and preferential
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However, the Report does not set out any of these points in detail.
406
In particular, the Report introduces no evidence to support the asser-
tion that the tax base of OECD members is being eroded.
407 Chapter
i does attempt to distinguish between regimes that intend to "poach"
the tax base of other countries and regimes that "reflect different
judgments about the appropriate level of taxes and public outlays or
the appropriate mix of taxes in a particular economy."
408 However, it
makes no systematic effort to distinguish on a normative basis between
harmful and beneficial tax competition, as Part Im attempts to do.
Because of the absence of an overt normative framework, one must
divine the line that the OECD draws between beneficial and detrimen-
tal tax competition from the characteristics of tax havens and harmful
preferential tax regimes listed in Chapter 2 of the Report. The OECD
draws a distinction between, on the one hand, tax havens and prefer-
ential regimes in countries that have generally applicable taxes, and on
the other hand, generally applicable tax rates that are lower than those
of other countries.409 Chapter 2 acknowledges that all three situations
may have negative effects from the perspective of a high-tax country
but explicitly excludes the third category from the scope of the Re-
port.410
A major contribution of the OECD Report is that it lists factors to
be used in identifying tax havens.4 11 The OECD factors are: "[n]o or
only nominal taxes" (a necessary condition); a "[flack of effective ex-
change of information"; a "[1lack of transparency"; and the absence of
any requirement for "substantial activities" by the taxpayer in the ju-
risdiction.412  These objective factors are superior to the previous at-
tempt by the OECD to identify tax havens based on reputation, or a
"smell test," because reputation is in the eye of the beholder.413  Al-
though the Report itself does not attempt to identify specific countries
as tax havens, it does establish a Forum on Harmful Tax Competition,
regimes to reduce the tax that would otherwise be payable to them."). This emphasis is unfortu-
nate, given both the paucity of the evidence and the impression it gives of government bureaucrats
trying to protect their cherished tax revenues; it certainly does nothing to combat the Leviathan
critique.
406 The entire chapter contains only five and a half pages.
407 See id. at i7 ("The available data do not permit a detailed comparative analysis of the eco-
nomic and revenue effects [of tax competition]."). The Report does note that FDI by G7 countries
in the Caribbean and in the South Pacific islands increased more than five-fold, to over $2oo bil-
lion, between i985 and 1994, a rate well in excess of the growth of total outbound FDI. See id.
408 Id. at 16.
409 See id. at 19-20.
410 See id. at 20.
411 Because the EU contains no traditional tax havens, it neglected to include such a list of
factors in its package.
412 Id. at 23 box 1.
413 See Weiner & Ault, supra note 403, at 602-03.
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which has begun to assemble a list. In fact, the Forum has already
asked one country - Bermuda - to explain why it should not be la-
beled a tax haven.414
The Report also lists characteristics to be used in identifying
"harmful preferential tax regimes." 415  These characteristics resemble
the factors defined in the EU Code of Conduct, except that the OECD
list is limited to financial and service activities. The factors are: "[n]o
or low effective tax rates" (a necessary condition); "ring fencing" (that
is, separation from the domestic tax base); a lack of "transparency" and
of "effective exchange of information"; an "artificial definition of the
tax base"; "[f]ailure to adhere to international transfer pricing princi-
ples"; the exemption of foreign source income from tax; a negotiable
tax rate or base; "secrecy provisions" such as bank secrecy laws or
bearer debt; membership in "a wide network of tax treaties"; self-
promotion as "tax minimisation vehicles"; and the "[e]ncouragement of
tax-driven operations. '416 The first four factors are identified as "key";
the other.factors are less significant. 417
In addition, the Report lists three questions that may be asked to
help identify whether a preferential tax regime is harmful:
Does the tax regime shift activity from one country to the country
providing the preferential tax regime, rather than generate significant new
activity?
Is the presence and level of activities in the host country commensu-
rate with the amount of investment or income?
Is the preferential tax regime the primary motivation for the location
of an activity?418
However, because these questions are difficult to answer and the
Report offers little guidance, I doubt they will add much to the objec-
tive factors identified above.419
Chapter 3 of the OECD Report is the most important. It contains
nineteen recommendations, divided into three categories: domestic
legislation that each member may adopt unilaterally; tax treaties; and
414 See Ahmed ElAmin, OECD Panel Reportedly Met in Paris to Address Tax Haven Inquiry,
98 WORLDWIDE TAx DAILY 201-7 (998), available in WI, 98 TNI 20I-7.
415 OECD REPORT, supra note 26, at 27 box II.
416 Id. at 27 box II, 27-34.
417 See id. at 27, 30.
418 Id. at 34-35 (emphasis omitted).
419 In particular, even if it is impossible to show a prohibited motive, the OECD should pre-
sumptively treat regimes that qualify as preferential under the objective criteria as harmful. See
Troup & Hale, supra note 372, at 1082 (questioning the appropriateness of tests based on a coun-
try's motivation). Relying on taxpayer motivations is no more helpful.
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intensifying international cooperation. 420 In addition, the chapter con-
tains "Guidelines for Dealing with Harmful Preferential Tax Regimes
in Member Countries."421 These guidelines resemble the EU Code of
Conduct; they represent a nonbinding political commitment by the
OECD members (except, importantly, Luxembourg and Switzerland)
to eliminate their preferential tax regimes. The guidelines contain
three R's: to refrain, to review, and to remove. The twenty-seven
member states bind themselves to refrain from adopting new harmful
tax practices (as defined in Chapter 2). They also agree to review their
existing measures and report to the Forum on their harmful tax prac-
tices within two years. The member states also commit to remove
those practices within five years.422
Finally, the Report recommends establishing a Forum on Harmful
Tax Practices, which has in fact been established 423 and whose main
goals are: to establish a list of countries that maintain tax havens; to
review potentially harmful tax practices by member countries (which
may argue that their practices are not harmful) and coordinate re-
sponses to harmful practices by nonmembers; and to "encourage ac-
tively non-member countries to associate themselves with" the Guide-
lines. 42 4 Any member may request review of another member's
practices by the Forum, which may issue a nonbinding opinion. As
Weiner and Ault note, the establishment of the Forum may be "the
most important achievement" of the Report because it is the "first
broadly mandated international institutional structure directly respon-
sible for the evaluation and coordination of existing and proposed tax
measures."425 Although the opinions of the Forum are not legally
binding, they are likely to have a significant stigmatic impact on mem-
ber states who are found to have violated their commitment to the
guidelines.426
Luxembourg and Switzerland abstained from the vote on the Re-
port and are therefore not bound by it.427 Luxembourg objected
chiefly to the fact that the Report, "[b]y voluntarily limiting itself to fi-
420 The most practically relevant of these recommendations are that member countries should
adopt controlled foreign corporation and foreign investment fund rules and should restrict the ap-
plication of the exemption method in a fashion consistent with the desirability of curbing harmful
tax practices.
421 OECD REPORT, supra note 26, at 56 box Ill.
422 See id. at 56-57. The final deadline for completing removal is December 31, 2oo5. See id.
Ireland has agreed to eliminate its Dublin International Financial Services Center, which allows
holding companies to be taxed at a io% rate, by that date. See Walsh, supra note I 7, 2-3.
423 See id. at 66; see also Weiner & Ault, supra note 403, at 6oi.
424 OECD REPORT, supra note 26, at 57.
42S Weiner & Ault, supra note 403, at 6o6.
426 See id.; supra note 422 (noting the example of Ireland).
427 See OECD REPORT, supra note 26, annex i1, at 73-75.
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nancial activities ... adopts a partial and unbalanced approach."428
In addition, Luxembourg noted its opposition to any future extension
of the underlying philosophy of the report (namely, exchange of infor-
mation) to the taxation of interest and proposed the EU's co-existence
model instead. 429 Because any member can block Council recommen-
dations, this threat is credible.
Switzerland seconded Luxembourg's objection to the Report's em-
phasis on financial activities and to its implied rejection of the co-
existence model. It also objected to including lower tax rates as a cri-
terion for identifying harmful preferential tax regimes, despite the fact
that this criterion is never sufficient by itself. Switzerland argued that
the latter "results in unacceptable protection of countries with high
levels of taxation. '430 However, "[a]fter having seriously considered
the possibility of exercising its veto," Switzerland decided to abstain
"in order not to prevent [the] adoption [of the Report] by other OECD
Member countries wishing to do so.'431
2. Critique. - The OECD Report is a major achievement; it repre-
sents the first attempt to limit harmful tax competition to be based on
a broad consensus of many nations, including developing countries.4 32
It is particularly remarkable that Switzerland and Luxembourg,
which, as financially-oriented tax havens, are the most affected by the
recommendations, chose not to veto the Report. This probably reflects
their judgment that doing so would subject them to an unacceptable
level of criticism from the other OECD member countries, and there-
fore may demonstrate that a broad consensus on the principal goals of
the Report has indeed developed.
Thus, the OECD Report is an indispensable first step in the pro-
cess of limiting harmful tax competition. The Forum that it estab-
lishes promises to provide the institutional framework for further de-
velopment in this area and may (as suggested in Part VI) become the
initial kernel of a "world tax organization." The development of any
further limits on harmful tax competition must realistically be based
on what the OECD has achieved, which represents the most promising
signal that further work can usefully be done in this area.
However, the OECD Report does suffer from several problems and
limitations, some of which may have inevitably resulted from the po-
litical compromises needed to achieve consensus within a diverse
group of twenty-seven countries. I discuss four such limitations. First,
the normative grounding (Chapter i) is far too cursory to be persua-
428 Id. at 74.
429 See id.
430 Id. at 77.
431 Id. at 78.
432 The EU package applies only to fifteen developed countries.
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sive.4s3 The emphasis on tax-base erosion, as opposed to the potential
beneficial uses of increased tax revenues, leaves the Report open to the
Leviathan critique - that it is merely an attempt by the governments
of high-tax countries to protect their tax revenues even if their citizens
would benefit from lower taxes.434 This lack of thoroughness is par-
ticularly troubling because it is unnecessary: the OECD does present
sufficient data to support its tax-base erosion argument. It would have
been better to have set out more fully the efficiency and equity consid-
erations.
Second, although the line drawn between acceptable and harmful
tax competition is the right one (that is, it distinguishes between gener-
ally applicable tax reductions and tax regimes that are limited to for-
eign investors as well as traditional tax havens), the emphasis on
whether the country intended to adopt a "beggar thy neighbor" policy
is unfortunate because it invites fruitless inquiries into subjective mo-
tivation. It would have been better to have focused on objective fac-
tors and to draw the line based on considerations of democracy and on
the benefits and costs to the investors.
Third, the self-imposed limitations of the OECD Report are prob-
lematic, although they were probably politically necessary.435 The
OECD deferred the topic of taxation of interest (originally to 1999),
but given the threat of a Luxembourg veto, it is unclear whether a re-
port on this topic has any chance of being adopted, particularly if the
OECD continues to adhere to exchange of information as the main
mechanism. 436 More troubling is the Report's self-limitation to finan-
cial activities and services; it lacks even a timetable for extending the
Report to real activities. Given the proliferation of production tax ha-
vens and the reductions in transportation costs, 43 7 real activities are
just as subject to harmful tax competition as are financial and service
activities, even if they are less mobile in the short run.
Finally, the most important limitation of the OECD Report is
similar to the main problem of the EU package: its direct application
is restricted to OECD members (excluding Luxembourg and Switzer-
433 See supra pp. 1655-56.
434 For an unpersuasive version of this critique, see Arthur W. Wright, Review: OECD Harmful
Tax Competition Report Falls Short, I7 TAX NOTES INT'L 461, 463 (1998). But see Jan Francke,
Letter to the Editor, The z998 OECD Report on Harmful Tax Competition: Just Right, x7 TAX
NOTES INT'L 979 (z998) (disputing Wright's claims); Eric Osterweil, Letter to the Editor, In De-
fense of the OECD Report on Harmful Tax Competition, 17 TAX NOTES INT'L 895 (1998) (same).
435 I suspect that the reasons Luxembourg and Switzerland wanted to include real activities in
the Report were not just that they are mainly havens for financial activities, but also that they
knew such an inclusion would delay the Report.
436 Withholding taxes are mentioned as a "topic for further study." OECD REPORT, supra note
26, at 60.
437 See supra Part I, pp. 1579-1603.
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land). Although the OECD measures cover a broader scope than the
EU package, that scope is far from sufficient. How can these reforms
be extended to nonmember countries?
The increasingly wide adoption of the OECD transfer pricing
guidelines by nonmember countries and the increasing use of the
OECD model treaty, even by developing countries, are encouraging
indications that the suspicion of the OECD as the "rich countries'
club" has abated somewhat. After all, the OECD now includes several
countries that are classified by the World Bank as developing.438
Thus, it seems likely that the Forum will be able to persuade many
nonmember countries, especially prospective members, to abide by the
Guidelines.43 9 However, as the examples of Luxembourg and Switz-
erland indicate, other nonmember countries that have preferential tax
regimes, as well as the traditional tax havens, are unlikely to cooper-
ate.440
Thus, the key question in evaluating the Report is whether its rec-
ommendations will enable the OECD to curb tax competition by un-
cooperative nonmember countries. The main goal of such recommen-
dations is to expand the use of CFC and foreign investment fund (FIF)
regimes.4 41 The other recommendations, which focus on administra-
tive measures, 442 are likely to be helpful but not decisive.
CFC and FIF regimes (such as Subpart F and Passive Foreign In-
vestment Company (PFIC) rules443 in the United States) are ways of
subjecting low-taxed foreign income to current taxation in the tax-
payer's country of residence. Specifically, CFC regimes apply to cor-
porate taxpayers and require them to include currently in their income
certain types of income of their foreign subsidiaries. The types of in-
come usually covered are classified either by category (for example,
passive income) or by source (for example, income from low-tax juris-
dictions). FIF regimes apply to individual shareholders and require
438 These countries are Turkey, Mexico, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and South Korea.
439 Both South Korea and Mexico adopted the transfer pricing guidelines as the price of their
admissions to the OECD. See Ken Cook & Yasuko Masaki, Korea's New International Tax Coor-
dination Law, 12 TAX NOTES INT'L 243, 243-44 (1996); John A. McLees, John G. Wilkins & Igna-
cio Valdes V, Thx Advisors' Forum: Extension of Mexican Assets Tax Complicates Transfer Pricing
for Maquiladoras, io TAX NOTES INT'L 16i9, 1621 (1995).
440 This possibility is acknowledged in the Report. See OECD REPORT, supra note 26, at 20.
The Report argues that countries with preferential tax regimes are more likely to want to cooperate
because they have revenues to protect, but the Luxembourg and Switzerland cases raise doubts as
to the validity of this prediction.
441 See id. app. Recommendation i deals with CFC regimes, Recommendation 2 with FIF re-
gimes, and Recommendation 3 with the related problem of countries with exemption systems. See
id. app. at67.
442 See id.
443 See I.R.C. §§ 1291-98 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
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them to report (or to pay an interest charge on) income from foreign
investment vehicles.
Relying on CFC and FIF regimes is problematic in several ways.
First, existing regimes are filled with loopholes. Even Subpart F,
which is the world's strictest CFC regime, has broad exceptions for ac-
tive business income and for income derived from the active conduct
of a financial business.444 The OECD Report merely recommends that
member countries "consider" applying CFC and FIF regimes "in a
fashion consistent with the desirability of curbing harmful tax prac-
tices.1445  Unless OECD members make a stronger commitment, they
may not be able to resist the lobbying pressures of their multinationals
to restrict CFC rules in the name of competitiveness. 446
Second, even if OECD members could adopt broad CFC and FIF
rules that applied to all the activities identified as harmful tax prac-
tices, such rules might not suffice to curb harmful tax competition.
With regard to FIF rules, the problem (as explained in Part II) is an
administrative one: individuals who reside in one OECD member can
invest in another OECD member through a tax-haven entity and es-
cape the exchange-of-information net. It is not clear whether the
"greater and more efficient" exchange of information envisaged by the
OECD Report can overcome this problem.447 Terminating tax treaties
with tax havens and otherwise limiting treaty benefits would have no
effect as long as there existed non-treaty-based exemptions from with-
holding on interest earned by nonresidents.448
Scope, rather than enforcement, limits the effectiveness of CFC
rules. Even if CFC rules were to apply to all tax havens and preferen-
tial tax regimes, they still would apply only to multinationals whose
parents were residents of an OECD member. Currently, about eighty-
five percent of MNEs meet that description, 449 but were CFC rules
significantly expanded, they would probably gradually shift their resi-
dences to Luxembourg, Switzerland, or countries entirely outside the
444 This last provision, enacted on a "temporary" one-year basis in 1997 and extended in 1998,
runs directly contrary to the spirit of the OECD Report.
445 OECD REPORT, supra note 26, at 40-43.
446 The debate around I.R.S. Notice 98-I1, 1998-1 C.B. 433, and the current effort to limit Sub-
part F to passive income demonstrate the existence of these pressures within the U.S. tax system.
See Preface to NFTC PROJECT, supra note 33 ("American multinationals increasingly voice their
concern that the Internal Revenue Code places them at a competitive disadvantage....").
447 OECD REPORT, supra note 26, app. at 68 (Recommendation 8); see also id. at 67 (Recom-
mendation 4) (urging the adoption of foreign income reporting rules and the exchange of informa-
tion obtained under those rules). An interest charge would work only if the income were eventu-
ally distributed to an OECD member country rather than enjoyed through consumption overseas.
448 See id. at 68-69 (Recommendations 9, 11-12) (asking countries to deny treaty benefits to the
beneficiaries of harmful tax competition, providing for a list of treaty mechanisms used to deny
benefits in this way, and suggesting that countries terminate treaties with tax havens).
449 See WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT, supra note 104, at 5-6 tbl.I.x.
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OECD. In addition, the parent corporations of new MNEs would be
incorporated or managed and controlled from outside the OECD. In
particular, the headquarters tax havens of the world, many of which,
such as Singapore, are outside the OECD, are likely to welcome any
expansion of CFC rules by the OECD.
The OECD Report does recommend as a "topic for further study" a
review of the residency rules. It acknowledges that both country of in-
corporation and country of management and control are "easily ma-
nipulated," and recommends focusing instead on the residence of the
shareholders.450 However, because most multinationals' shares trade
on several exchanges, establishing a single country of residence in this
way might prove difficult. Furthermore, different CFC rules might
apply at different times as shares changed hands. In addition, given
the widespread use of nominees, it is far from clear that the residence
of a shareholder of a publicly traded MNE can be known.45 1
Thus, the solutions offered by the OECD Report to the problem of
harmful tax competition represent an indispensable first step toward
limiting harmful tax competition, but they are incomplete. The next
section represents a preliminary attempt to develop a better approach
that combines the best elements of the EU package and the OECD
Report with some suggestions of my own.
C. Recommended Proposals
The following two proposals build on the work of the EU and the
OECD described in the previous sections. The first proposal addresses
the under-taxation of cross-border portfolio investment, and the second
proposal addresses the same issue for direct investment. Both propos-
als emphasize actions that the OECD can take without securing the
approval of traditional, production, or headquarters tax havens. The
proposals therefore focus on ways by which those countries (OECD
members) most likely to want to tax the income on such investment
may do so. In the case of portfolio investments, because low-risk,
450 OECD REPORT, supra note 26, at 6o-6i. For a similar suggestion, see Doernberg, supra note
352, 36; and Howard E. Abrams & Richard L. Doernberg, How Electronic Commerce Works, 14
TAX NOTES INT'L 1573 (I997).
451 A more feasible suggestion is to abandon the corporate-level tax and to focus on taxing the
shareholders either by imputation, which is administratively cumbersome, or by marking their
shares to market. See Dodge, supra note 354, at 334-64; Robert A. Green, The Future of Source-
Based Taxation of the Income of Multinational Enterprises, 79 CORNELL L. REV. i8, 70-74 (I993).
As I have argued elsewhere, however, source countries are unlikely to give up their right to the
corporate tax when shareholders are residents of other countries. See Avi-Yonah, International
Taxation of Electronic Commerce, supra note 40, at 530. Nor, as a matter of inter-nation equity,
should they do so. See Musgrave & Musgrave, Inter-nation Equity, supra note 197. Retaining
corporate-level taxes would require combining mark-to-market rules (or a PFIC-like interest
charge) with complex foreign tax credit rules.
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high-return investments exist primarily in OECD member countries,
the host country into which the investment is made can levy the tax.
In the case of direct investment, because countries in which goods and
services are consumed are likely to wish to tax (there are few, if any,
"consumption tax havens"), the country of consumption can levy the
tax. In both cases, however, the tax revenue can be shared or even
remitted completely if the income is subject to tax elsewhere. In the
case of portfolio investment, the tax is refunded if the income is re-
ported to tax authorities in the investor's home country. In the case of
direct investment, the tax base can be shared with the countries in
which production takes place. Because neither provision would de-
pend on the level of the other taxes - instead, each would depend
only on whether those taxes were applicable in principle - this
method preserves the distinction articulated here between harmful and
acceptable tax competition.
r. A Uniform Withholding Tax on Portfolio Investment. - As noted
above, the OECD Report does not address the issue of taxation of
portfolio investment. Although the EU package contains a draft Di-
rective on this topic, it applies only to payments made within the EU
to individual EU residents. Moreover, even this draft may fail in the
face of opposition from Luxembourg and the United Kingdom, which
fear that their lucrative Eurobond markets might flee to Zurich or
New York if the Directive were adopted. 4 2
This situation does, however, present a golden opportunity. As Part
II recounts, the problem of nontaxation of cross-border interest flows
stems largely from the unilateral enactment of the portfolio interest ex-
emption by the United States in 1984. That enactment was driven by
the need to finance a growing budget deficit and by the fear that any
tax withheld on portfolio interest flows from the United States would
simply be shifted forward to the U.S. borrowers, including the U.S.
Treasury.
Whatever merit these contentions had in 1984, they have none
now. 453 The United States is enjoying a budgetary surplus, and be-
cause it is perceived as a safe haven in financially troubled times, its
borrowers are unlikely to bear the cost of any withholding tax on in-
terest. Thus, the United States could probably repeal the portfolio in-
terest exemption immediately without suffering adverse consequences.
Further work in this area by economists is clearly desirable.
Even if the repeal of the portfolio interest exemption on a unilateral
basis were to lead to adverse consequences for the United States, the
452 See EU Savings Tax Gains Strength Before ECOFIN Meeting, 1999 WORLDWIDE TAX
DAILY 195-5, available in WL 1999 WTD 195-5.
453 See supra pp. i58o-8i.
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prospective OECD report and the EU position render multilateral ac-
tion much more likely. As observed in Part II, the nontaxation of
cross-border interest flows is an assurance game: each player (the EU,
the United States, and Japan) refrains from taxing for fear of driving
investment to the others, even though they would all benefit from im-
posing the tax. Nevertheless, such assurance games can be resolved if
parties can credibly signal to each other their willingness to cooper-
ate.454
The EU draft Directive represents just such a signal. The EU is
telling the United States that it is willing to go forward with taxing
cross-border interest flows, and even Luxembourg and the United
Kingdom are indicating willingness to cooperate if the United States
and Japan agree to follow the EU's lead. Thus, if in the context of the
OECD Report on taxation of interest the United States and Japan
were to commit themselves to taxing cross-border interest flows, the
assurance game could be resolved and a new, stable equilibrium of
taxing, rather than forgoing taxation, be established.4 55
The prospects for agreement in this area are particularly good be-
cause only a limited number of players need be involved. The world's
savings may be parked in traditional tax havens, but the tax havens'
cooperation is not needed. To earn decent returns without incurring
excessive risk, investors must use the markets in the EU, the United
States, Japan, and Switzerland. Thus, if the OECD member countries
could agree to the principles adopted by the EU in its draft Directive,
they could effectively tax cross-border portfolio interest flows.
This Article therefore proposes that the OECD implement, on a
coordinated basis, the principles contained in the EU draft Directive
on taxation of savings. However, although in the EU context exchange
of information plays a large role in ensuring taxation because there are
few traditional tax havens there, in a global context withholding taxes
must be the primary means of enforcement. As noted above, tradi-
tional tax havens with strong bank secrecy laws render it very difficult
to exchange information effectively among OECD member countries.
454 See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS 45 (196S) ("[W]hether a group will have the capacity to act, without coercion
or outside inducements, in its group interest ... depends on whether the individual actions of any
one or more members in a group are noticeable to any other individuals in the group.").
4S5 The United States's role in this regard would be more that of a follower than that of a leader.
It is unfortunate that in enacting the portfolio interest exemption the United States abandoned the
role of a positive leader in international tax affairs that it had played by being the first to adopt the
foreign tax credit and CFC rules. Nevertheless, even if it were to follow Europe, the United States
would occupy a decisive place in breaking the current impasse. Japan is likely to cooperate be-
cause it also suffers from the current regime (the portfolio interest exemption was enacted to attract
Japanese investors who wish to avoid tax in Japan) and has led the OECD effort to limit harmful
tax competition.
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If the investment is made through a tax-haven intermediary, exchange
of information is likely to be useless because tax. authorities will not
know the identity of the funds' owner.
Therefore, instead of the "co-existence" model of the EU, the
OECD should adopt a uniform withholding tax on cross-border inter-
est flows, which should also be extended to royalties and other de-
ductible payments on portfolio investments. 45 6 To approximate the tax
rate that would be levied if the payments were taxed on a residence
basis, the uniform withholding tax rate should be at least 40%. How-
ever, unlike the withholding taxes that were imposed before the cur-
rent race to the bottom began in 1984, the uniform withholding tax
should be completely refundable. To obtain the refund, as suggested
by the EU draft Directive, a beneficial owner need only show the tax
authorities in the host countries a certificate attesting that the interest
payment was reported to the tax authorities in the home country. No
actual proof that tax was paid on the interest income is required; from
efficiency, equity, and revenue perspectives, the country of residence
needs only the opportunity to tax foreign investment income just as it
taxes domestic.4 7 Thus, in accordance with the distinction drawn in
section III.E, even if the home country imposes a low generally appli-
cable tax rate on its residents (or even a zero tax rate, as long as it ap-
plies to all bona fide residents), the resident could obtain a refund by
reporting the income to the tax authorities in his home country.
458
Neither the proposed withholding tax nor the refund mechanism
would require a tax treaty. Nevertheless, countries could reduce or
eliminate the withholding tax in the treaty context when payments are
made to bona fide residents of the treaty partner. In those cases, the
exchange of information among treaty countries should suffice to en-
sure residence-based taxation. Because most OECD members already
have tax treaties with most other members, the proposed uniform
withholding tax would generally apply only to payments made to non-
OECD member countries, including traditional tax havens.
456 Extending the tax to nondeductible payments, such as dividends, may also be advisable, but
this step is less crucial. See Avi-Yonah & Swartz, sup'ra note i6, at 251.
457 Developing countries might obtain a direct transfer of the funds from the OECD member
country, which they would then credit against domestic tax liability. The OECD member would
retain a small percentage of the tax as a fee for its collection assistance. For a precedent for this
type of procedure, see Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Sept. 28, 1995,
Isr.-Palestine Liberation Org., ann. V, app. 1, 36 I.L.M. 551, 640, which establishes a system under
which Israel collects taxes from Palestinians working within its borders and remits 75% of the
revenue to the Palestinian National Authority.
458 This tax would apply to individuals, and residence would thus be a meaningful concept. If
an individual chose to live in a Caribbean tax haven, he could, under the proposal, avoid tax on his
foreign source investment income. Presumably, living in a tax haven would entail giving up cer-
tain public services in exchange for lower taxes.
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Were OECD members to enact such a uniform withholding tax, it
would go a very long way toward solving the problem of under-
taxation of cross-border portfolio investments by individuals. Such
under-taxation is unacceptable from either an efficiency or an equity
perspective. Moreover, unlike the under-taxation of direct investment,
this type of under-taxation is illegal (which is assessing its magnitude is
so difficult). By adopting a uniform withholding tax, the OECD could
thus strike a major blow at tax evasion, which is a major problem for
most developing countries and some developed countries (including
OECD members) as well.
2. Consumption-Based Taxation of Multinationals. - The OECD
proposals for taxing multinationals on their income from international
operations are adequate in the short run. Eighty-five percent of mul-
tinationals' parent corporations now reside in OECD member coun-
tries. If adopted by all members, the OECD proposal for an effective
CFC regime would therefore solve eighty-five percent of the prob-
lem.4 5 9 Moreover, the OECD Report answers the common argument
made by multinationals against CFC regimes that was examined in
section hI.A: If all OECD member countries adopt effective CFC re-
gimes, then all multinationals resident in those countries will compete
equally.460
In the longer run, however, multinationals may well establish their
parent corporations' residences in non-OECD member countries (or in
OECD members that do not subscribe to the Report, like Luxembourg
or Switzerland). In that case, the application of CFC regimes is likely
to be ineffective. The solution envisaged by the OECD Report is to
redefine residence based on the residence of shareholders, but for those
multinationals whose shares trade on many exchanges, this proposal is
likely to be ineffective or very costly to administer in practice. 461
Accordingly, this Article proposes instead that the OECD adopt a
regime that taxes multinationals as an initial matter in the country
459 Current CFC regimes, however, do not observe the OECD Report's distinction between gen-
erally applicable rate reductions and targeted tax havens. See OECD REPORT, supra note 26, at
41 ("CFC rules may also apply in situations which do not involve harmful tax practices as defined
in this Report. It is recognised that countries retain their right to use such rules in such situa-
tions.').
460 This response exposes the flaw in current arguments to restrict the scope of Subpart F based
on competitiveness, see, e.g., NFTC PROJECT, supra note 33, 262 ("[L]oss in world market-share
... can occur where it is difficult for U.S. multinationals to offset the higher tax burdens imposed
by [S]ubpart F through cost advantages or product differentiation."). Another field of law offers an
interesting precedent for this type of situation: U.S. multinationals have argued since 197 7 that the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-i to -3 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998), restricts their
ability to compete effectively overseas against foreign multinationals. These complaints have lost
their force since the OECD adopted strict anticorruption guidelines in 1996.
461 See supra p. 1666 & n.451.
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that consumes the goods or services the multinational provides.4 62 The
advantage of choosing that country (the "demand jurisdiction") as the
locus of initial taxation is that large consumer markets are unlikely to
be tax havens and are likely to want to impose tax on foreign import-
ers as well as on domestic sellers. Consider the popularity of the des-
tination principle for consumption taxes such as the VAT or the United
States's retail sales taxes. Such taxes are imposed on a destination ba-
sis without the need for a coordinating tax treaty4
63
The first step toward imposing such a tax would be to modify the
permanent establishment threshold embodied in tax treaties and do-
mestic legislation. The current threshold relies on physical presence,
but as Part II explains, that concept is obsolete and is likely to lead to
under-taxation of multinationals that can sell in a jurisdiction without
having a physical presence therein. Thus, as I have proposed else-
where, a different type of threshold is required, one that will not be
linked to physical presence.464 Such a threshold could be a de minimis
amount of sales into the jurisdiction, as suggested in the state sales tax
context by Walter Hellerstein.4 65  For example, the rule for the United
States could be that a seller with gross sales of $i million or less within
a given tax jurisdiction (adjusted for inflation) would not be subject to
taxation at source.466
The determination of what constitutes a sale into a jurisdiction is
obviously a key issue in applying the proposed rule. Fundamentally,
the inquiry should begin by defining the area in which buyers consume
the goods and services. Such a determination is difficult to make
without a proxy. A billing address is adequate for most individual cus-
tomers for two reasons. First, they are unlikely to consume the prod-
462 This proposal is based on a similar one for electronic commerce. See Avi-Yonah, Interna-
tional Taxation of Electronic Commerce, supra note 40, at 548-49. That proposal, however, was
not limited to harmful tax competition. The OECD Report does mention as a "topic for further
study" the possibility of denying deductions for payments to tax havens, citing a Spanish prece-
dent, but then fails to elaborate. OECD REPORT, supra note 26, at 59-6o.
463 They are thus operationally independent from the international tax system. Cf. Charles E.
McLure, Jr. & George R. Zodrow, The Economic Case for Foreign Tax Credits for Cash Flow Taxes,
51 NAT'L TAX J. I, 1-22 (1998) (arguing for the inclusion of such taxes in the system by granting a
credit for their payment, which the IRS currently does not do). Imposing income taxes pursuant to
a destination principle will not violate the WTO rules if the destination country imposes those
taxes on domestic producers and rebates them if countries in which production takes place impose
a tax. See Victoria P. Summers, The Border Adjustability of Consumption Taxes, Existing and
Proposed, 12 TAX NOTES INT'L 1793, 1795 & n.Io (1996).
464 See Avi-Yonah, International Taxation of Electronic Commerce, supra note 4o, at 535-36.
465 See Walter Hellerstein, State Taxation of Electronic Commerce, 52 TAX L. REV. 425, 5O-02
(1997). Aggregation rules would be required to prevent manipulation of the threshold.
466 This Article recommends a gross sales threshold, rather than a net income threshold, because
the latter requires information from outside the destination jurisdiction about the taxpayer's in-
come. For the same reason, a threshold based on a percentage of total sales worldwide seems im-
practicable because such a method requires knowledge available only to the taxpayer.
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uct elsewhere. Second, they have no incentive to provide a false ad-
dress because they typically do not bear the tax burden. By contrast,
these two factors may be absent for business customers, because the
billing address may be anywhere (including in a tax haven) and be-
cause, in the case of large customers, collusion is a possibility. How-
ever, the fact that business customers are physically located in the
taxing jurisdiction means that an audit may determine where the busi-
ness consumed the product. Moreover, purchasing goods or services in
a high-tax jurisdiction would maximize the value of the deduction a
business customer could take when it determines its own tax liability.
This factor would provide a strong incentive for business customers to
increase purchases from these jurisdictions.
The proposed withholding tax regime would include the following
rules:
(a) A Gross Withholding Tax. - The demand jurisdiction imposes
on foreign businesses a gross withholding tax on sales and services at a
rate equal to the corporate tax rate in the demand jurisdiction. As ex-
plained above, a sale is defined as being into the demand jurisdiction if
the goods or services are consumed therein under rules similar to a
destination-based VAT. The demand jurisdiction may impose a gross
withholding tax by forbidding merchants from selling goods to its resi-
dents unless procedures for withholding the tax are in place.467
(b) Filing. - To obtain a refund or reduction of the gross tax, the
taxpayer must file a return showing its deductions and including the
cost of the goods sold. Thus, the function of the gross withholding tax
is to force the taxpayer to file a return in a jurisdiction where she has
no physical presence. 468 It may therefore be advisable to allow a full
refund at this point if the total gross sales fall below the expanded
threshold. The remaining rules would then apply only if the total
gross sales exceeded the threshold.469
(c) Third-Party Limitations. - The demand jurisdiction disallows
deductions to parties that are located in supply and residence jurisdic-
tions that have tax incentives targeting foreigners, unless those parties
file returns in and pay taxes to the demand jurisdiction. This rule pre-
serves the distinction between jurisdictions that engage in harmful tax
competition - tax incentives targeting foreigners - and jurisdictions
467 Given that the proposal implicates coordinated OECD action, it will cover most large mar-
kets. Thus, countries need not fear that the imposition of their tax regime will drive sellers away
from their markets.
468 This requirement for withholding gross income is similar to the rule for U.S. real estate
transactions. See I.R.C. § i445 (i994).
469 Although a threshold will enable some income to escape taxation, it is necessary to shield
small businesses and to prevent situations in which the cost of compliance exceeds the profit that
businesses derive from the transaction. For a fuller discussion, see Avi-Yonah, International Taxa-
tion of Electronic Commerce, supra note 40, at 532-45.
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that have low, generally applicable tax rates.470 Thus, all income that
another supply jurisdiction does not tax under targeted tax incentives
becomes taxable by the demand jurisdiction. However, income that is
taxed elsewhere at a rate lower than that in the demand jurisdiction
thanks to generally applicable tax reductions is not taxed in the de-
mand jurisdiction.471
This rule is similar to current rules that reflect the view that a
source or residence country should not reduce its tax unless it can be
sure that the income is really subject to tax elsewhere. For example, a
VAT rule allows deductions for inputs only for purchases from regis-
tered VAT payers. 472  However, the proposed rule is limited to those
countries that engage in harmful tax competition and allows for more
flexibility than the current rules.
It should be emphasized that under the proposed regime the de-
mand jurisdiction would reach only income that is untaxed in the pro-
duction jurisdiction because of production tax havens, or income that
does not belong to any jurisdiction. 473 The proposed regime would
also allocate to the demand jurisdiction any income that is untaxed in
the residence jurisdiction because of incentives targeting foreign corpo-
rations. Because the demand jurisdiction is less likely to be a tax ha-
ven than is either the residence or production jurisdiction, one should
view its taxation regime primarily as a mechanism for the prevention
of harmful tax competition.
(d) Refunds. - The demand jurisdiction refunds the difference be-
tween the gross tax and the net tax according to the return. The net
tax is then credited by the corporation's residence jurisdiction if it im-
poses a corporate tax.474 If the residence jurisdiction has an integrated
tax regime, credit for the net tax should exist at the shareholder level.
Although this system appears quite complex, it is fundamentally
similar to the rules for a destination-based VAT, except that the tax
470 A look-through rule would be needed to prevent sellers from selling into the demand jurisdic-
tion via independent, low-profit distributors who are located in a jurisdiction that does not engage
in harmful tax competition. In most cases, however, multinational enterprises prefer to control the
distribution of their products, as evidenced by their choice to engage in costly FDI rather than to
sell to independent distributors. See id. at 537-39.
471 A rule similar to the anti-subsidies rule of I.R.C. § 9oi(i) would prevent countries from en-
gaging in harmful tax competition through targeted subsidies rather than tax reductions. Such a
rule would treat a targeted subsidy as equivalent to a targeted tax break.
472 A VAT rule also reflects some aspects of the current international tax regime, such as the de-
nial of tax sparing credits, the anti-treaty-shopping rule, and most recently, the hybrid entity rules.
See I.R.C. § 894(c) (Supp. 111997).
473 In the case of related parties, transfer pricing principles that are based on a profit split should
apply and only the residual profit should be allocated to the demand jurisdiction. See Avi-Yonah,
International Taxation of Electronic Commerce, supra note 40, at 545-50.
474 Resident taxpayers should not receive credit for taxes that the denial of deductions imposes
on the unaffiliated.
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base is net income and not consumption.475 These destination-based
VAT rules seem to operate quite well (with a few notorious exceptions,
such as banks) and do not seem to require an elaborate tax treaty net-
work to allocate the tax base among countries. Similarly, the proposed
rules can be adopted by the OECD demand jurisdictions acting in
concert, but may even be adopted by a majority if some members dis-
sent. Moreover, the information that the demand jurisdiction requires
to implement the rules relates to other countries' tax systems, which it
can readily discern, rather than to the specific tax characteristics of the
individual taxpayer, which are harder to ascertain.476
The OECD can adopt this proposal as a way to limit harmful tax
competition in situations in which rules based on corporate residence
or CFC regimes do not work. The key to this proposal, just as to the
withholding tax proposal, is that the tax base is shared with those
countries that do not engage in harmful tax competition. However, the
tax base shifts from production tax havens and headquarters tax ha-
vens toward the demand jurisdiction by applying the rules that disal-
low deductions to parties who use such havens.
Given this shift in the tax base, the proposal may seem regressive,
especially considering that production tax havens tend to be develop-
ing countries. By contrast, demand jurisdictions tend to be the richest
countries in the world, for the richer a country is, the higher its de-
mand for goods and services. However, assuming that the analysis in
Part IV is correct and that developing countries engage in tax competi-
tion mostly out of fear of losing investments to other developing coun-
tries, the likely effect of the proposal would be to stop this race to the
bottom. Nonetheless, developing countries could benefit by imposing
their taxes on multinationals that produce within their borders without
fearing that other countries could undercut them by offering produc-
tion tax havens. Generally applicable tax reductions would be avail-
able as a policy tool, but for the reasons stated above, they are unlikely
to be a major determinant in attracting investments. 477 Thus, the re-
sult of the proposed OECD actions could benefit, rather than harm,
developing countries that could use the extra revenues, as discussed in
Part IV. Countries would attract investments based on their compara-
tive advantages in non-tax areas and on their generally applicable tax
rates, not because of harmful tax competition.
475 See, e.g., Value Added Tax: A Model Statute and Commentary, 1989 A.B.A. SEC. TAX'N 65-
66.
476 Many countries have CFC regimes that hinge on whether the other country imposes a suffi-
cient tax rate. For example, Australia takes even sub-country tax variations into consideration.
See AULT, supra note 346, at 387. In all cases, the burden of proof will be on the taxpayer to show
that she is subject to tax.
477 Profits are likely to be lower if overall public services are lower. See supra p. 1627.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The preceding analysis can be summarized as follows: Tax competi-
tion has resulted in a significant potential for evasion and avoidance of
taxation on the income from cross-border portfolio and direct invest-
ments, which may lead to significant tax base erosion and revenue
losses (Part II). Although avoidance interferes with global efficiency
and equity, any actions to restrict tax competition must also weigh the
need to allow democracies to determine the size of their governments
(Part III). Moreover, unrestrained tax competition threatens the social-
insurance safety net in developed countries at a time when such coun-
tries are facing a severe fiscal crisis. Likewise, unrestrained tax com-
petition is generally not in the best interest of developing countries. In
balancing the competing revenue needs of developed and developing
countries, inter-nation equity indicates that tax structures should prefer
the latter over the former (Part IV).
Part V then argues that the design of the EU and OECD efforts to
restrict tax competition reveals that the OECD, whose members are
currently both the destination of most portfolio investment and the
largest markets, is better positioned to implement changes. Thus, the
OECD can effectively implement solutions that depend on withhold-
ing taxes that the source country levies for portfolio investment and
that the demand jurisdiction levies for direct investment. The purpose
of the proposed withholding taxes is to enable residence jurisdictions
to levy tax on portfolio investment and source jurisdictions to levy tax
on direct investment, without the limitations that unrestricted tax
competition imposes. The outcomes in both cases are favorable to de-
veloping countries in terms of inter-nation equity.
The purpose of this Article is to show that as a result of globaliza-
tion and tax competition, countries that act unilaterally or by bilateral
tax treaties can no longer set tax rules. In a world in which capital
can move freely across national borders and MNEs are free to choose
from among many investment locations, the ability of any one country
(or any two countries in cooperation) to tax (or otherwise regulate)
such capital is severely limited. Other countries will undercut any
such unilateral attempt. Thus, for the sake of preserving national
competitiveness, most countries will make no attempt to restrain the
mobility of international capital. A multilateral solution (such as the
OECD-based proposal Part V offers) is therefore essential if the fun-
damental goals of taxation are to be preserved. Only organizations
with an equally global reach can regulate or tax private market activi-
ties.
This Article delineates some of the ways in which global govern-
ance can develop in the area of capital income taxation. Attaining this
goal will be difficult, given the expected resistance both of private ac-
tors, who are eager to preserve their freedom from taxation, and of
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governments, which are concerned about preserving their sovereign
authority to set their own tax rules. Nevertheless, international gov-
ernance is not impossible. Because preserving the ability of nations to
tax income from capital is essential to the achievement of several fun-
damental goals, such as the development and preservation of an ade-
quate social safety net, it must be attempted.
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